Americans Change Their Strategy in the War against Afghan Opium

After having pressured their NATO allies in Afghanistan these last years to invest in the eradication of poppies, the United States has just undertaken a radical change of their doctrine. From now on, Washington will give priority to “develop more fully alternative livelihoods with a very strong emphasis on agriculture and on subsistence agriculture,” David Johnson, the assistant secretary of state specializing in international drug trafficking, said on Monday, March 1st. He thus formalized the end of a policy that had created tensions, particularly with its British and Afghan partners.

For a long time, the United States denounced its allies’ resistance to the destruction of poppy fields, specifically those in the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, which were the main centers of production. “When I see a poppy field, I see weapons being supplied to the Taliban,” General David McKiernan, the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, confided to Le Monde in June 2008. According to him, drugs financed the insurgency. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 90 percent of the opium used in the production of heroine worldwide comes from Afghanistan while making up 60 percent of their GDP. In the south, within the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, the principal stronghold of the Taliban in the country, 20 percent to 30 percent of the economy depends upon drug money.

For the British, charged with Helmand Province on behalf of NATO, the destruction of Afghanistan’s cultivation could push the local population into the insurgents’ arms. Furthermore, radical action could destabilize the country’s economy, which depends upon this production. During 2009, in the village of Sanguine, the British patrols’ mission was not to destroy the dozens of heroine laboratories that they found. These laboratories consisted of a barrel of product called “fixatives,” necessary to turn poppies into opium. The whole set-up costs about $50 and can sustain an entire family.

Outreach Work

The Canadians, charged with Kandahar Province, adopted a fairly similar policy. “If we intercept a truck full of poppies, we stop the drivers. Otherwise, we prefer to undertake outreach work with farmers in order to encourage them to choose other crops, like wheat,” they explained Tuesday, March 2nd, at the headquarters of the Canadian forces in Kandahar.

In its report, published around the end of 2009, the UNODC guaranteed that the Taliban derived only “10 to 15 percent” of their revenue from opium traffic, thanks to taxes collected on the traffic. Still, according to the UN office, 60 percent of Afghan representatives are related to people who have an interest in opium traffic. These interests explain the half-heartedness of Afghan police officers charged with the eradication of poppy cultivation. In 2008 and 2009, only 4 percent of crops have been destroyed.

“The lack of poppy eradication explains the United State’s strategy change. Above all, it goes hand in hand with the counter-insurgency techniques practiced today which imply a closer connection with the population”* noted a member of the State Department, posted in Kandahar, on Tuesday.

In Kabul, on the other hand, two days after Washington’s decision, the government announced a plan to eradicate the poppy fields in large portions of the country, particularly the south.

*Editor’s Note: Department of State quote could not be verified.