WikiLeaks: Killing the Messenger

The leak of more than a quarter million diplomatic cables to the world by WikiLeaks has caused an international stir. The cables confirm many of the people’s suspicions about how U.S. foreign policy functions. Some have disregarded the importance of the cables; nonetheless, they have revealed much more than we imagine. The reactions up to now are more explicitly clear than the scattered information.

It’s frightening to observe the working machinery of one of the most powerful governments in the world, which intends to convince that whoever reveals secrets is more dangerous than those who commit atrocious acts in secrecy. Politicians and journalists in the U.S. overreacted, suggesting that Julian Assange should face the death penalty.

The reactions of the press are interesting: While in the U.S., with some exceptions, they have aligned to the official discourse, in Europe they see the leak with clearer eyes. In the words of Simon Jenkins from The Guardian, “It is for governments — not journalists — to guard public secrets.”

But what does one gain from killing the messenger? Nothing. This problem is more grave than that. To divert attention from the disaster of the U.S.’ foreign policy solves nothing. What is certain is that one cannot invade a country without having justification to do so; neither can one violate the privacy of individuals in other countries and call it intelligence work. The U.S. should respond to these facts. Citizens have the right to know more about the management of their foreign policy, and that lesson should be learned; promoting transparency is not a crime.

These leaks have revealed acts of corruption and murder in many parts of the world: Kenya, Switzerland and now the U.S. Without this infrastructure, we would only have found out about these atrocities many years from now, or perhaps never. Hillary Clinton denounces the illegality through which the documents were obtained but has not made a statement about the concealed information of thousands of civilian deaths in the war in Afghanistan, nor about espionage. And that form of practicing politics is the problem.

To convict Assange or remove WikiLeaks from the Internet evidences a lack of knowledge about how the system works. WikiLeaks is like a central supply that provides warehouses to fruit and vegetable suppliers; there are many of these suppliers, and if the owner of this warehouse dies, nothing happens — the tradesmen continue their activities. Similarly, WikiLeaks is like a warehouse where information about distinct parts of the world arrives; anyone can use this distributed network that anonymously provides information, which arrives from different suppliers.

WikiLeaks is not Assange; it is thousands of contributing users. WikiLeaks receives about 300 million euros a year from donations, many of which arise from traditional sources, and many more from individuals that remain anonymous.

Cancelling the page or killing Assange does not solve anything. The world is witnessing a paradigm shift in journalism and politics. It will be difficult to reverse, and the flow of information perhaps will not stop. Getting rid of WikiLeaks only means that the next leak will come from another network. The attention that the government has given to one person as a public enemy demonstrates that it does not know what it is up against. Killing the messenger attaches more importance to the message.

In spite of the rapid speed of the information flow, we are witnesses to an historic moment. At times, governments must pay the price for exercising power in a certain way, and this is one of those times. I do not know the consequences of these leaks, but it is certain that if the U.S. does not learn this lesson and act accordingly, it will have more problems.

Mexican Pirate WikiPartido