The Obama Doctrine

The desert dunes are not the only battlefields of the war that continues to develop in Libya. An international conference in London and a discourse in Washington recently defined the possible roads for the military intervention that has lasted ten days, and the outcome of which is uncertain.

Yesterday, in the British capital, the member countries of the coalition not only ratified their commitment to UN resolution 1973 against the Tripoli regime, but they also agreed to continue to pressure Muammar Gaddafi in order to force his exit from power. Representatives of some 40 nations, including eight Arab and Muslim countries, decided to take steps beyond the humanitarian objectives of the United Nations document and continue the aerial attacks until the dictatorship falls. For the allies, the military and diplomatic tools must add a discussion of the political foundations of a democratic post-Gaddafi Libya.

While in Great Britain, the chancellors of the Western powers had interviews with the rebel leaders, and the battle for control of Sirte, the birthplace of the Libyan leader, continues without any clear winner. Despite the destruction of Tripoli’s air power through the international incursions, ground forces loyal to the government and the insurgents have divided the country in two. In contrast with the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, the conflict in Libya comes closer to a civil war between tribes. On top of these issues is the pragmatism outlined in last Monday’s speech by the President of the United States, Barack Obama, and directed at its citizens.

In support of the presence of the North American troops in the Maghreb conflict, the president outlined a pragmatic approach in defense of democratic causes. He recognized that the Gaddafi regime was not a top priority within the security objectives of the White House. The Nobel Prize winner affirmed: “We must always measure our interests against the need for action.”

In other words, the new Obama doctrine of international intervention of the superpower is that there is no doctrine but cost and benefit analysis, case by case. The two large weaknesses of the discourse are precisely consequences of such pragmatism: Why does the United States not defend the same humanitarian cause in other Arabic nations that are subject to the abuses of their leaders such as Bahrain and Yemen, and whose regimes are allied with Washington? And in second place, after the recognition that the aerial attacks will be insufficient to bring Gaddafi down on their own, what is the exit strategy of the military intervention?

Being the first war that Obama would declare and not inherit, the leader of the United States has made it clear that Libya is not Iraq.

“Regime change there took eight years, thousands of American and Iraqi lives, and nearly a trillion dollars. That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya,” he said.

However, members of the coalition such as Great Britain and France seek to address the fall of Gaddafi and the transition to a democratic system.

The diverse positions of the allies, shyness in Washington and belligerence in London and Paris, combine with a series of practical decisions that go beyond the content of the resolution, such as giving arms to the rebel army or strengthening the insurgent Council of Transition in order to avoid reproducing the institutional void that plunged Iraq into chaos. While the forces loyal to Gaddafi resist, this incursion of “days and not weeks” extends and complicates without a clear exit strategy.