The Taliban at Berlin’s Gates?

However you twist and turn it, there’s a war being waged in Afghanistan. And it’s a war that serves America’s interests.

Three German soldiers lost their lives last week in a Hindu Kush battle supposedly protecting Germany. No wonder the Berlin government is struggling to find the right words regarding security and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan. Otherwise they would be forced to explain to a lot of highly skeptical voters why German soldiers have to die in Afghanistan. That discussion should begin with an assessment of military abilities and possibilities.

Actually, no European middle-sized power is unilaterally capable of enforcing a military solution anywhere in the world. The Europeans weren’t even capable of creating a fragile equilibrium in the Balkans. Thus, the war in Afghanistan has nothing to do with the German defense policy, but rather serves the strategic interests of the United States. But the government either cannot or will not try to explain that to the German people.

This doesn’t mean, as the left likes to think, that we should bring the boys home as quickly as possible. German security is dependent, after all, on a NATO strategy that long ago signed onto a war against terror and the Taliban. Those who advocate leaving now can hardly expect others to rush to their aid if they should ever need it in the future. But that, in turn, doesn’t mean that Germany should shy away from developing an exit strategy within the framework of the alliance.

But is it really smart and, more importantly, necessary to try stabilizing a country from the outside, where history and tradition militate against such external interference? Defense Minister Struck’s trenchant phrasings have entangled German foreign policy in a trap from which it can’t escape without considerable embarrassment.

History alone should be enough to scare people off. The British once believed they had to defend their Indian empire in Afghanistan, but their empire survived the humiliating British withdrawal from Afghanistan for almost another hundred years. The fact that the Soviet Union collapsed shortly after the Soviets gave up Kabul had less to do with Afghanistan than it did with the USSR’s overstretched resources.

It could well be that the lines of defense in the Hindu Kush can be withdrawn without the Taliban’s marching into Brussels or Berlin the next day. Above all, the German government has to decide if the danger is as imminent as claimed. If it is, then the war should be pursued with total commitment of the German government and support of the German people. But if it becomes apparent down the road that there are no tangible benefits, it will be time to consider alternatives in cooperation with NATO and the Americans, not against them. Waging just a bit of war won’t be enough, especially not if the number of body bags coming home keeps increasing.