Imperfect Battles

In its reporting, the Wall Street Journal gave a measure of the complexity of the conflict in Iraq. Syrian rebels from across the spectrum (the moderates of the al-Nusra group) are protesting their exclusion from the campaign against the jihadi group Islamic State, and denouncing the bombing by America and its allies as convenient to the interests of the dictator Bashar al-Assad (who combats the Islamic State group with less vigor than other rebels in the civil war).

Among American targets this past week was the group Khorasan, a mutation of the “venerable” al-Qaida network who acts as a sort of international division of the al-Nusra front, focusing on the civil war and committed to overthrowing the Assad regime. Even more moderate groups have operational affiliations with the al-Nusra Front. The indices of complexity shot up. Now, jihadi of the al-Nusra Front are adhering to the Islamic State group, and leaders of the two groups are talking about an alliance against common enemies: Assad and the coalition led by the U.S.

Take note. It’s complicated. Michael Young, in the Lebanese journal Daily Star observes that Assad’s patrons, the Iranian Ayatollahs along with their men on the battlefield and the militia of the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah are also worried. Same thing with Vladimir Putin over in Moscow. Michael Young reasons that there is a concern that the attacks launched by the United States and its allies against the Islamic State group will have a logical outcome: more pressure for a political solution in the civil war, which would result in Assad’s exit from power.

Americans apply the same logic in Syria and Iraq. They will conclude that only a more inclusive government in Damascus can eventually consolidate gains made against the Islamic State group. In Iraq, the objective is to bring the Sunni minority into the political process, as an essential part of defeating the Islamic State group, and in such a way stopping the disintegration of the country. (The Kurds in Iraq dissociate more and more from the national project each time they combat the terror of the extremist Sunnis and, dejected, accompany the bleak picture of the Kurds in Syria, also targets of the Islamic State group.)

Obviously, nothing will be easy in diluting the sectarian components (Sunni vs. Shiite) in the troubles of the Middle East. In the Syrian civil war, the Saudi focus (leader of the Sunni block) is to overthrow Assad, godson of the Ayatollahs, and not to stitch together an inclusive solution. In Iraq, besieged by the terror of the Islamic State group, Sunni sectors consider this barbarity more tolerable than a coalition governed by majority Shiites. The man of Tehran, Qassem Suleimani, chief of the Quds forces of the Revolutionary Guard, when speaking about external battles made clear that a solution to fight the Islamic State group lies in “Shiite solidarity.”

The fact is that at present there is an impasse in Syria, something which, according to Michael Young may “create the elements of a broader deal in Syria that sees Assad’s removal while also offering guarantees to the country’s frightened minorities.” However, Russia and Iran are skeptical about this deal, calculating that it would be more beneficial for Assad’s enemies.

One factor contravenes this skepticism. For a long time Barack Obama was averse to involvement in the Syrian swamp (I already used quagmire so I am varying my language) because it is beyond dirty and slippery, but now the president has stuck his foot in, his hand and airplanes. For any more sophisticated American strategy against the Islamic State group to function, Assad must be cast out. The plan will obviously become more complicated if the dictator ends up being strengthened by the attacks against the Islamic State group.