Revolt of the Generals
Published in Frankfurter Rundschau
(Germany) on 7 October 2009
by Dietmar Ostermann (link to original)
It’s one of the most momentous decisions of his presidency and Barack Obama wants to make it in peace and quiet and only after due deliberation. But the peace and quiet has already been broken with the public wrangling in Washington between the Pentagon and the politicians over future strategy. The protagonist on the military side is Afghanistan Commander Stanley McChrystal, who was appointed only last June by Obama. It was his gloomy assessment of the situation in Afghanistan that touched things off. McChrystal has requested up to 40,000 additional troops for the campaign. The strategy of better protecting the civilian population and a force of over 100,000 troops in the country is expected to halt the Taliban advance.
When McChrystal’s strategy ran up against skepticism in Washington, the General appeared to be publicly trying to put pressure on President Obama, who has been hesitating now for weeks to make a decision. In an unusual speech last week in London, McChrystal warned that a strategy focusing solely on fighting al-Qaeda would be a recipe for chaos. Since then, Washington has been rife with speculation over possible discord between the civilian and military leadership. Some are even referring to a “revolt of the generals.”
Disputes between presidents and the chiefs of staff are old hat in the United States. In 1951, Harry Truman withdrew General Douglas McArthur from command in Korea after he requested an escalation of the war there against Washington’s wishes. In Vietnam, many commanders kept their doubts about the strategy to themselves. Most recently, the Pentagon reluctantly agreed to then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s plans to conduct the war in Iraq with as few troops as possible. The only general to openly disagree with that plan, General Eric Shinseki, was quickly reprimanded and forced into retirement. Bush’s opponents, including Barack Obama, later described his plan to stabilize Iraq by ramping up troop levels as “prophetic.” The new president later appointed Shinseki Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
Now Obama has to struggle with the advice his commanders in Afghanistan are providing. Just seven weeks ago he declared the war there as “necessary” and added that the United States could not afford to allow al-Qaeda and the Taliban to find sanctuary there. In February, he had already increased troop strength by 21,000 to a total of 68,000. But especially since the massive electoral fraud perpetrated in the Afghan presidential elections, doubts are growing in the White House that a troop surge can solve the nation’s problems. Military expert Michael O’Hanlon says: “One thing we learned in Vietnam is that we can’t hope for success in this kind of war if we don’t have viable domestic partners.”
Advisors like Vice-President Joe Biden are more circumspect in their advice: contain the Taliban and attack al-Qaeda from the air. Afghanistan expert Peter Bergen, however, says “that’s what got us into this situation in the first place.” At the close of the day, Obama still has to ask himself whether he thinks trying to stabilize Afghanistan is even realistic.
When McChrystal’s strategy ran up against skepticism in Washington, the General appeared to be publicly trying to put pressure on President Obama, who has been hesitating now for weeks to make a decision. In an unusual speech last week in London, McChrystal warned that a strategy focusing solely on fighting al-Qaeda would be a recipe for chaos. Since then, Washington has been rife with speculation over possible discord between the civilian and military leadership. Some are even referring to a “revolt of the generals.”
Disputes between presidents and the chiefs of staff are old hat in the United States. In 1951, Harry Truman withdrew General Douglas McArthur from command in Korea after he requested an escalation of the war there against Washington’s wishes. In Vietnam, many commanders kept their doubts about the strategy to themselves. Most recently, the Pentagon reluctantly agreed to then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s plans to conduct the war in Iraq with as few troops as possible. The only general to openly disagree with that plan, General Eric Shinseki, was quickly reprimanded and forced into retirement. Bush’s opponents, including Barack Obama, later described his plan to stabilize Iraq by ramping up troop levels as “prophetic.” The new president later appointed Shinseki Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
Now Obama has to struggle with the advice his commanders in Afghanistan are providing. Just seven weeks ago he declared the war there as “necessary” and added that the United States could not afford to allow al-Qaeda and the Taliban to find sanctuary there. In February, he had already increased troop strength by 21,000 to a total of 68,000. But especially since the massive electoral fraud perpetrated in the Afghan presidential elections, doubts are growing in the White House that a troop surge can solve the nation’s problems. Military expert Michael O’Hanlon says: “One thing we learned in Vietnam is that we can’t hope for success in this kind of war if we don’t have viable domestic partners.”
Advisors like Vice-President Joe Biden are more circumspect in their advice: contain the Taliban and attack al-Qaeda from the air. Afghanistan expert Peter Bergen, however, says “that’s what got us into this situation in the first place.” At the close of the day, Obama still has to ask himself whether he thinks trying to stabilize Afghanistan is even realistic.