Why Should China Reassure the U.S.?
Published in Sohu
(China) on 16 October 2009
by Zhang Zhixin (link to original)
The U.S. has demanded that China provide “strategic reassurance,” but what kind of “reassurance” can the U.S. provide for China?
In the wake of a series of articles published by the International Herald Tribune, in which China is described as a “responsible international stakeholder,” the U.S. has recently tossed onto the world stage a new idea concerning its China policy – “strategic reassurance.”
This policy was first proposed on Sept. 24, 2009, by the U.S. deputy secretary of state, James Steinberg, who delivered the keynote address on the “Obama Administration's Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship” at the Center for New American Security. In this address, Steinberg proposed that China and the U.S. must provide mutual “strategic reassurance.” This address marks the first time that a second-level cabinet official has advanced a comprehensive policy framework concerning the new administration’s approach to China relations. However, whether or not this “strategic reassurance” can replace the Bush era's “responsible international stakeholder” framework is worthy of consideration.
On the whole, Steinberg conveyed three points. In summarizing 30 years of established diplomatic relations between China and the U.S., Steinberg believes that “China could become a partner with the United States” and the U.S. is not “trying to thwart China’s ambitions,” as China can be beneficial for the national interests of the U.S.
Reflecting on the undisputed fact of China’s rise in the world, the U.S. urgently wants to “work with China to meet global challenges,” and does not wish to sink into the realm of “competition and rivalry.” The U.S. welcomes China’s rise to become a “prosperous and successful power;” however, the U.S. also hopes that China can provide reassurance that its development “will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others.”
Since taking office, after overcoming an initial “bumpy” period, Obama has succeeded in maintaining good China-U.S. relations, demonstrating that there is a bipartisan consensus about maintaining the long-term stability in the development of the two countries’ relations. Against the backdrop of the economic crisis, the contrasting ebb and flow of power in both countries and the profound changes that have affected international structures, the U.S. has re-evaluated its relations with China, and, by using the common interests that bind together the two countries, has succeeded in postponing the decline of U.S. hegemony.
Looking at this from a positive perspective, the U.S. does not wish for the issue of bilateralism to affect the healthy development of its relations with China; it hopes that the two countries can restrain their behavior through talks and “strategic reassurance,” reaching a necessary level of “strategic mutual trust.” This is undoubtedly advantageous for American interests. The “strategic reassurance” proposed by the U.S. shows that they intentionally recognize that China has risen into a position of importance; by dividing the power, the exchange of “reassurance” with China will not challenge the hegemonic position of the U.S. This will maintain the existing international system and order, rather than break it.
In other words, the demand that China provide the U.S. with “strategic reassurance” betrays the uneasiness that the U.S. currently feels towards China. From its individualistic standpoint, the U.S. views China’s unique socialist path as “different,” and is constantly criticizing China’s political model and democratic process.
With regards to issue concerning Taiwan, Tibet and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity: on the one hand, the U.S. is constantly unwilling to abandon its sale of arms to Taiwan, and tries to impede the peaceful unification of the two; on the other hand, the U.S. makes eyes at radical separatists, making pretenses of preserving religions, human rights and freedom in order to intervene in Chinese domestic policy. With regards to trade, the U.S. uses the excuse of protecting its industries and jobs to engage in trade protectionism. With regards to military communications, the U.S. continues to call on China to be open and transparent; however, using congressional legislation as an excuse, the U.S. has continually obstructed substantial contact between the two countries.
Furthermore, when the U.S. demands that China provide “strategic reassurance,” what kind of “reassurance” can the U.S. provide for China? If the U.S. holds a reasonable hope of being able to build a strategic foundation for the long-term and stable development of China-U.S. relations, then it must not only provide “strategic reassurance” on the question of China’s core concerns, but it must feasibly act on this provision. Only then will there be prosperity for both countries and their people.
In the wake of a series of articles published by the International Herald Tribune, in which China is described as a “responsible international stakeholder,” the U.S. has recently tossed onto the world stage a new idea concerning its China policy – “strategic reassurance.”
This policy was first proposed on Sept. 24, 2009, by the U.S. deputy secretary of state, James Steinberg, who delivered the keynote address on the “Obama Administration's Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship” at the Center for New American Security. In this address, Steinberg proposed that China and the U.S. must provide mutual “strategic reassurance.” This address marks the first time that a second-level cabinet official has advanced a comprehensive policy framework concerning the new administration’s approach to China relations. However, whether or not this “strategic reassurance” can replace the Bush era's “responsible international stakeholder” framework is worthy of consideration.
On the whole, Steinberg conveyed three points. In summarizing 30 years of established diplomatic relations between China and the U.S., Steinberg believes that “China could become a partner with the United States” and the U.S. is not “trying to thwart China’s ambitions,” as China can be beneficial for the national interests of the U.S.
Reflecting on the undisputed fact of China’s rise in the world, the U.S. urgently wants to “work with China to meet global challenges,” and does not wish to sink into the realm of “competition and rivalry.” The U.S. welcomes China’s rise to become a “prosperous and successful power;” however, the U.S. also hopes that China can provide reassurance that its development “will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others.”
Since taking office, after overcoming an initial “bumpy” period, Obama has succeeded in maintaining good China-U.S. relations, demonstrating that there is a bipartisan consensus about maintaining the long-term stability in the development of the two countries’ relations. Against the backdrop of the economic crisis, the contrasting ebb and flow of power in both countries and the profound changes that have affected international structures, the U.S. has re-evaluated its relations with China, and, by using the common interests that bind together the two countries, has succeeded in postponing the decline of U.S. hegemony.
Looking at this from a positive perspective, the U.S. does not wish for the issue of bilateralism to affect the healthy development of its relations with China; it hopes that the two countries can restrain their behavior through talks and “strategic reassurance,” reaching a necessary level of “strategic mutual trust.” This is undoubtedly advantageous for American interests. The “strategic reassurance” proposed by the U.S. shows that they intentionally recognize that China has risen into a position of importance; by dividing the power, the exchange of “reassurance” with China will not challenge the hegemonic position of the U.S. This will maintain the existing international system and order, rather than break it.
In other words, the demand that China provide the U.S. with “strategic reassurance” betrays the uneasiness that the U.S. currently feels towards China. From its individualistic standpoint, the U.S. views China’s unique socialist path as “different,” and is constantly criticizing China’s political model and democratic process.
With regards to issue concerning Taiwan, Tibet and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity: on the one hand, the U.S. is constantly unwilling to abandon its sale of arms to Taiwan, and tries to impede the peaceful unification of the two; on the other hand, the U.S. makes eyes at radical separatists, making pretenses of preserving religions, human rights and freedom in order to intervene in Chinese domestic policy. With regards to trade, the U.S. uses the excuse of protecting its industries and jobs to engage in trade protectionism. With regards to military communications, the U.S. continues to call on China to be open and transparent; however, using congressional legislation as an excuse, the U.S. has continually obstructed substantial contact between the two countries.
Furthermore, when the U.S. demands that China provide “strategic reassurance,” what kind of “reassurance” can the U.S. provide for China? If the U.S. holds a reasonable hope of being able to build a strategic foundation for the long-term and stable development of China-U.S. relations, then it must not only provide “strategic reassurance” on the question of China’s core concerns, but it must feasibly act on this provision. Only then will there be prosperity for both countries and their people.