Washington-Beijing: Voices Raise
The relationship between China and the United States is too critical to be re-questioned by arms sales to Taiwan. However, the very strong reaction from Beijing to the $6.4 billion of supplies to the nationalist island opens a disturbing period of agitation between the two largest countries in the world.
Washington is obliged by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taipei with the necessary defensive weapons. Every administration should do the same, even if only for domestic political reasons relating to congressional power.
The timing is never innocent. This time, it follows a sequence of U.S. discontentment: the less successful visit to China of Obama in mid-November, Beijing's refusal to revalue the Yuan, the failure of the Copenhagen conference on climate [change], conflict over Google and China's refusal to consider sanctions against Iran.
Arms sales are more consistent from the days of George W. Bush. They do not concern the F-16 fighters claimed by Taiwan but include 60 Blackhawk helicopters. They come at a time when China, proud of having gone through the global economic crisis much better than any other country, is becoming increasingly powerful internationally.
Thus, this time, Beijing’s reaction is harder than the previous ones. The recently restored military contacts are suspended and, above all, there is a threat of trade sanctions against the U.S. companies involved, including Boeing. The speech about U.S. "interference" in the vital interests of China flatters a Chinese skin-deep nationalism.
Barack Obama, too, flatters his electorate by reacting to what is considered Chinese bad will. All this confirms the usual diplomatic game between Washington and Beijing. Provided they stay there.
How can Obama expect to double U.S. exports, as he promised in his State of the Union address, without obtaining a revaluation of the Yuan? As for China, it still requires foreign manufacturers to develop its aviation industry.
The reason requires the establishment of a modus vivendi between the current and future superpowers.
Washington is obliged by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taipei with the necessary defensive weapons. Every administration should do the same, even if only for domestic political reasons relating to congressional power.
The timing is never innocent. This time, it follows a sequence of U.S. discontentment: the less successful visit to China of Obama in mid-November, Beijing's refusal to revalue the Yuan, the failure of the Copenhagen conference on climate [change], conflict over Google and China's refusal to consider sanctions against Iran.
Arms sales are more consistent from the days of George W. Bush. They do not concern the F-16 fighters claimed by Taiwan but include 60 Blackhawk helicopters. They come at a time when China, proud of having gone through the global economic crisis much better than any other country, is becoming increasingly powerful internationally.
Thus, this time, Beijing’s reaction is harder than the previous ones. The recently restored military contacts are suspended and, above all, there is a threat of trade sanctions against the U.S. companies involved, including Boeing. The speech about U.S. "interference" in the vital interests of China flatters a Chinese skin-deep nationalism.
Barack Obama, too, flatters his electorate by reacting to what is considered Chinese bad will. All this confirms the usual diplomatic game between Washington and Beijing. Provided they stay there.
How can Obama expect to double U.S. exports, as he promised in his State of the Union address, without obtaining a revaluation of the Yuan? As for China, it still requires foreign manufacturers to develop its aviation industry.
The reason requires the establishment of a modus vivendi between the current and future superpowers.