Nuclear Strategy: Why President Ahmadinejad Chooses to Clash with the U.S.

Published in People's Daily 人民网
(China) on 6 March 2010
by Zhang Jingwei (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Darren Wright. Edited by Jessica Boesl.
On May 3rd, at the United Nation’s eighth review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in New York, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a statement criticizing the U.S. and its Western allies of holding a double standard for their nuclear policies, thereby breaking with the international system for preventing proliferation. –Xinhua News/Reuters

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lead the Iranian delegation in attendance for the two-day review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York. As the leader of a sovereign nation, Ahmadinejad’s attendance of a United Nations conference as a representative of his country is not news. However, due to the decades-long antagonistic relationship that has existed between the U.S. and Iran, as well as the sensitive nature of the present Iran nuclear crisis, Ahmadinejad’s attendance in New York has made international news headlines.

Just as when Ahmadinejad has attended other United Nations conferences in New York over the past few years, he has been uncompromising toward the U.S. When he arrived in New York, President Ahmadinejad emphasized that Iran does not need the confidence of the U.S., since the major Western countries have not attempted to build a “relationship of mutual understanding.”* From this, Ahmadinejad’s uncompromising nature and eloquence becomes apparent. Not only is he unafraid to argue with the U.S. as the leader of the Western countries, but he also places responsibility for the Iran nuclear crisis on the U.S., which he accuses of stockpiling, using and monopolizing nuclear weapons.

It is undeniable that President Ahmadinejad has the same purpose in going to New York as the leaders of other nations; that is, to hold a discussion on nuclear proliferation. However, the ways in which the United States and Iran perceive this subject are quite different. Iran wants to be in control of the purposes of its nuclear program, a position that has already obtained the sympathy of the international community and has eroded the alliance behind U.S. sanctions against Iran. According to Ahmadinejad, he merely wishes to provide the NPT conference with “pragmatic, fair, and clear suggestions.”

The U.S., however, wants Iran to honor its promises and obligations; the U.S. is taking advantage of the NPT conference to form a consensus in order to pressure Iran to do so. According to U.S. media, the purpose of the conference is to gather the consensus of the international community and to use the 25 days of the conference to improve and amend the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with the aim of increasing the difficulty Iran, North Korea and other countries have developing nuclear weapons. Even more importantly, U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley tried to lessen some of the contention prior to the conference by telling Ahmadinejad that he hoped Iran would play a “constructive role” in the conference. In addition, the U.S. emphasized that it would not be holding talks between itself and Iran. This demonstrates the fact that, while Ahmadinejad has the freedom to perform at the conference as he wishes, the U.S. is not willing to interact with him.

Because the U.S. and Iran are diametrically opposed to each other on the issue of nuclear proliferation, international observers universally agree that the international community is not counting on President Ahmadinejad to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis while in New York, and certainly does not hope for any warming of the frigid relationship between the U.S. and Iran. The most probable outcome will be the same as in the past: President Ahmadinejad will give a brilliant oration in front of the United Nations, but nothing more.

Though the U.S. seems to have an advantage, Iran’s ability to counter U.S. strategy within U.S.-Iranian nuclear diplomacy cannot be ignored.

Because it has already obtained the support of virtually all of the other six nations in the alliance (including Russia), the U.S. has the upper hand. Thus, if it made up its mind, it would be possible for the U.S. to intensify economic sanctions and even move toward war with Iran. However, the power held by the U.S. is a double-edged sword — practical experience shows that economic sanctions are not the best choice for resolving the Iranian nuclear problem. As for launching a war with Iran, the U.S. is not willing to act rashly. This cautiousness arises from the remnants of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, from which Obama has been able to learn from some of Bush’s failings. If the U.S. truly wanted to start a war with Iran, another paradox arises: The standpoints of Russia and Europe would reverse. This is especially true for Russia, who absolutely does not want a U.S. war with Iran to destroy the economic benefits of having carried on business inside Iran for the past few decades. Even more so, Obama, who has been riddled by the economic crisis, clearly understands that only by saving the American economy through a “New Deal” can he gain some historical footing.

But in the case of Iran, not only would using brute force to solve issues with Iran not improve his legacy, but he could become another George W. Bush if he is not careful.

Iran also has some points that it can use to counter the U.S.'s sharp sword: First, through international public relations, it can garner support in order to deter the U.S. Iran has already gained some positive results from this measure. Turkey, a predominant force in the Middle East, and Brazil have expressed their disagreement with sanctions on Iran. Both are willing to serve in the role of peacemaker between the U.S. and Iran. Turkey, a Middle Eastern ally of the U.S., and Brazil, a newly established power, both certainly have an influence on the U.S.

In addition, Iran also plans to drum up support from the 14 member nations of the U.N. Security Council to gain additional power. Iran held its own nuclear disarmament conference (April 17-18) in response to the Washington Nuclear Security Summit (April 12-13) in order to vie with U.S. rhetoric. In contrast to the U.S., which threatens to attack Iran and North Korea with nuclear weapons, Ahmadinejad emphasized that an “independent international group which plans and oversees nuclear disarmament and prevents proliferation should be set up."
In comparison, the position President Ahmadinejad has committed himself to is
seemingly more reasonable.

Third, Iran has already prepared for the worst. It first implemented the “Great Prophet 5” war games, which was implemented to prepare for a possible U.S. military attack. At the same time, it increased oil reserves to more than 1 billion liters and also has plans to increase its capabilities for oil production in the event of economic sanctioning. Fourth, it understands what can greatly harm the U.S., and it holds an ace in playing the game of containment. Iraq and Afghanistan are two areas of concentration for Obama’s foreign policy. Following its elections, Iraq has yet to truly realize peace, as it continually experiences attacks. Iran holds great influence over Iraq’s Shiite Party. If Iran causes trouble, the state of affairs in Iraq would take a turn for the worse.

Aside from this, Ahmadinejad also recently paid a visit to Afghanistan, attempting to contend for some influential power in this region. Even though the effects have
not been as he would have liked, Ahmadinejad’s visit still has caused Obama a good amount of concern. After all, Afghanistan is Obama’s primary strategic location for combating terrorism.

Ahmadinejad’s trip to New York is yet another display of his consistently tough style of foreign policy. As such, the Iran nuclear crisis has yet to show any signs of improvement, and any harmonizing at the NPT conference is not possible. However, regardless of the relationship between the U.S. and Iran, no one wishes to see the Iran nuclear crisis resolve itself in an extreme manner. The clashing between both nations and the sharp tone of their rhetoric is merely a strategy for engaging in politics. More importantly, in addition to the U.S.-Iran relationship being one of pure hostility, it also serves the beneficial purpose of containment in the the Middle East and Afghanistan. Thus, in very vague terms, President Ahmadinejad’s trip to New York provides the international community with a thread of hope. Nevertheless, as for which direction U.S.-Iran relations will head and how the Iran nuclear crisis will unfold, we will have to see how wisdom guides the politics of both nations.


5月3日,伊朗总统艾哈迈迪-内贾德在美国纽约联合国总部举行的第八次《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会上发言,指责美国及其西方盟国在核政策上奉行双重标准,破坏了国际防扩散体制。新华社/ 路透

伊朗总统内贾德2日率领伊朗代表团赴纽约参加《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT)审议大会。客观地说,作为主权国家的元首,内贾德代表他的国家参与联合国大会并非新闻。但是,由于美国和伊朗长达几十年的敌对关系,加上当前伊朗核危机的敏感性,内贾德赴纽约就成了国际社会的大新闻。

和过去几年内贾德赴纽约参加联合国大会一样,这次内贾德依然表现出对美绝不妥协之势。他在到达纽约机场时强调,伊朗不需要西方国家的信任,因为西方大国并没有尝试同伊朗建立“相互信任的关系”。可见,内贾德依然表现出他一贯不妥协的品性和雄辩气质,不仅不惮于和美国为首的西方国家吵架,而且能将伊核危机的责任推给 “囤储并使用和垄断了核武”的美国。

无可否认,内贾德的纽约之旅,和其他国家的目的一样,都是奔“核”而来。但是同一个“核”字,伊朗和美国的解读却是不一样的。伊朗要为自己的核目的进行辩解,取得国际社会的同情,瓦解美国制裁伊朗的同盟。按照内贾德的表述,就是在NPT大会上给出“务实、公平和清楚的建议”。美国则要伊朗兑现承诺和义务,利用 NPT审议大会对伊朗形成舆论夹逼。按照美国舆论的说法,就是汇聚国际社会的共识,利用25天的冗长会期,对诞生于1970年的《不扩散核武器条约》予以充实改进和修正,目的就是增加伊朗、朝鲜和其他国家开发核武器的难度。更重要的是,会前美国国务院发言人克劳利已经给内贾德打了预防针,希望其成为“会议的‘建设者’而非‘自我孤立者’。”此外,美国还强调不会和伊朗举行双边会谈。言外之意,内贾德可以尽情表演,但美国不会和其互动。

国际观察人士普遍认为,由于美伊两国在核问题上南辕北辙,针锋相对,国际社会不要指望内贾德纽约行会给伊朗核危机解套,更不可能化解美伊关系的坚冰。最可能的结果就是,和以往一样,内贾德在联合国的讲台上让国际社会再次领略他滔滔不绝的雄辩口才,唯此而已。

值得一提的是,在美伊核博弈的棋局中,美国看似强势一方,但实际上伊朗的反制能力同样不容忽视。

美国的优势在于,已经取得了原六方机制中几乎全部国家(包括俄罗斯)的支持。只要美国下定决心,对伊实施更严厉的制裁甚至发动一场战争都有可能。但是,美国的强势恰恰也是其最致命的硬伤——事实证明,制裁并非解决伊朗核问题的最佳选择,只会导致伊朗国内更为广泛和强烈的反美声势。至于发动对伊战争,美国更是不敢轻举妄动。伊拉克和阿富汗的战争负遗产摆在那,布什总统的前车之覆,显然已成奥巴马后车之鉴。更为吊诡的是,一旦美国真要对伊动武,俄欧立场也会逆转,尤其是俄罗斯,绝对不希望美国的一把战火将俄罗斯在伊经营几十年的利益烧得干干净净。更何况,被经济危机缠身的奥巴马总统明白,通过“新政”拯救美国经济才能成就其历史地位,使用蛮力解决伊朗核问题,不仅不会为他的“传奇”加分,一不小心还会使他成为另一个小布什。

对于美国的利剑,伊朗的反制也有可圈可点之处。一、以国际公关应对美国的国际游说。伊朗已经取得了一定的公关效果,地区大国土耳其和巴西表示不同意对伊制裁,愿意充当美伊之间的和事佬。土耳其是美国在中东地区的盟友,巴西是新兴大国,两国对美有一定影响力。此外,伊朗还打算游说安理会14个理事国,为己张力。二、举行核裁军会议(4月17-18日)招架华盛顿的核安全峰会(4月12-13日),和美国争夺话语权。相较于美国在核安全峰会上誓言对伊朗和朝鲜等国施以核武器打击的威胁,内贾德则在核裁军会议上强调“应该建立独立的国际组织,有计划地监督核裁军并防止核扩散”。相比之下,内贾德的表态似乎更加理性。三、已经做好了最坏打算。伊朗先举行“伟大先知5”军事演习,是为了应对美国的军事打击;同时增加10亿多升汽油储量并计划提升国内炼油能力,是为了应对经济制裁。四、了解美国死穴,握有制衡王牌。伊拉克和阿富汗,是奥巴马外交部署的两个重点。选举后的伊拉克,并未实现和平,而是陷入了连环袭击的乱局。伊朗对伊拉克什叶派有相当的影响力,如果伊朗捣乱,伊拉克局势就不会好转。此外,内贾德不久前还访问了阿富汗,和美国争夺在此地区的影响力。虽然效果未必如意,却也让奥巴马心乱如麻,毕竟阿富汗是奥巴马反恐战略的重点。

内贾德的纽约之旅,是他一贯强硬外交风格的体现。就此而论,伊朗核危机并未出现好转的迹象,在NPT大会上也不可能出现“和”的结果。但是,无论美伊,恐怕都不希望伊核危机走向最极端的结局。双方的针锋相对和言辞激烈,不过是博弈手段而已。更重要的是,美伊双方不仅是单纯的敌对关系,在中东和阿富汗地区也有相互制衡的利益关系。所以,内贾德的纽约之旅,也隐隐约约让国际社会看到了一丝希望。不过,美伊关系向何处去,伊核危机如何发展,关键还要看双方的博弈智慧。(张敬伟)
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

Hot this week

Ireland: The Irish Times View on Trump vs the Fed: Rocky Times Ahead

Canada: How Ottawa Gift-Wrapped our Dairy Sector for Trump

Germany: Trump’s Opportunity in Iran

Germany: NATO Secretary-General Showers Trump with Praise: Seems Rutte Wanted To Keep the Emperor Happy

Austria: Would-Be King Trump Doesn’t Have His House in Order

Topics

Colombia: The Horsemen of the New Cold War

Australia: Australia Is Far from Its Own Zohran Mamdani Moment. Here’s Why

Canada: How Ottawa Gift-Wrapped our Dairy Sector for Trump

Canada: New York Swoons over an American Justin Trudeau

Germany: Europe Bending the Knee to Trump

Germany: NATO Secretary-General Showers Trump with Praise: Seems Rutte Wanted To Keep the Emperor Happy

China: US Chip Restrictions Backfiring

China: US Visa Policy Policing Students

Related Articles

China: US Chip Restrictions Backfiring

Thailand: US-China Trade Truce Didn’t Solve Rare Earths Riddle

Taiwan: Taiwan Issue Will Be Harder To Bypass during Future US-China Negotiations

Hong Kong: Amid US Democracy’s Moral Unraveling, Hong Kong’s Role in the Soft Power Struggle

Russia: Trump Is Shielding America*