The New Nuclear Doctrine
Published in El País
(Spain) on 8 April 2010
by Staff (link to original)
(Spain) on 8 April 2010
by Staff (link to original)
Translated from
by Veronica Pascarel.
Edited by Stefanie Carignan.
Obama is redefining the limits of the use of atomic arms that were established during the Bush era.
United States President Barack Obama continues to take steps toward tackling the next revision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with the actual possibility of success. On the eve of his trip to Prague to sign the new disarmament agreement with Russia, the U.S. president has publicly redefined the North American nuclear doctrine.
In the United States, the Republicans have accused Obama of going too far with the limits on the usage of the atomic bomb, while the pacifists have accused him of coming up short. These are unjustifiable criticisms, which seem to ignore the fact that, first of all, Obama hasn’t done anything but adapt the ability to respond to real threats, and secondly, that a realist initiative for disarmament can only be approached in a consensual manner, not in a unilateral one.
Along general lines, the new U.S. strategy proposes to consolidate the distinction between the usage of conventional forces and nuclear escalation, blurred by President Bush in contemplating the possibility of a nuclear response to attacks of another nature, such as chemical or biological. While Bush was in power, the current revision of the doctrine didn't increase dissuasion, but encouraged proliferation while instruments such as the NPT deteriorated despite being considered essential in setting boundaries and then in reducing the risk that was ignored after the Cold War. Iran’s nuclear program has brought the issue back to the forefront.
Even these carefully planned and accurately executed initiatives cannot guarantee the success of the revision of the NPT given that, in the international confine, the actors are independent. This makes it difficult to persuade each of the players to find a common ground, especially when the regimes of countries such as North Korea and Iran are involved. However, the only guaranteed outcome without these initiatives is failure, which would open the doors for a nuclear race with unpredictable consequences. The United States is doing the work that corresponds to it without decreasing its capacity for deterrence, or eventually for a gradual response on the conventional as well as the strategic confine.
Now all that remains is for the others to follow, particularly powers such as India, Pakistan and Israel, that have not signed the NPT to commit them to dispose of nuclear arms. Above all, countries such as Iran, aspiring to a level of nuclearization that is suspected to go beyond civilian use, should be persuaded in signing the NPT.
United States President Barack Obama continues to take steps toward tackling the next revision of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with the actual possibility of success. On the eve of his trip to Prague to sign the new disarmament agreement with Russia, the U.S. president has publicly redefined the North American nuclear doctrine.
In the United States, the Republicans have accused Obama of going too far with the limits on the usage of the atomic bomb, while the pacifists have accused him of coming up short. These are unjustifiable criticisms, which seem to ignore the fact that, first of all, Obama hasn’t done anything but adapt the ability to respond to real threats, and secondly, that a realist initiative for disarmament can only be approached in a consensual manner, not in a unilateral one.
Along general lines, the new U.S. strategy proposes to consolidate the distinction between the usage of conventional forces and nuclear escalation, blurred by President Bush in contemplating the possibility of a nuclear response to attacks of another nature, such as chemical or biological. While Bush was in power, the current revision of the doctrine didn't increase dissuasion, but encouraged proliferation while instruments such as the NPT deteriorated despite being considered essential in setting boundaries and then in reducing the risk that was ignored after the Cold War. Iran’s nuclear program has brought the issue back to the forefront.
Even these carefully planned and accurately executed initiatives cannot guarantee the success of the revision of the NPT given that, in the international confine, the actors are independent. This makes it difficult to persuade each of the players to find a common ground, especially when the regimes of countries such as North Korea and Iran are involved. However, the only guaranteed outcome without these initiatives is failure, which would open the doors for a nuclear race with unpredictable consequences. The United States is doing the work that corresponds to it without decreasing its capacity for deterrence, or eventually for a gradual response on the conventional as well as the strategic confine.
Now all that remains is for the others to follow, particularly powers such as India, Pakistan and Israel, that have not signed the NPT to commit them to dispose of nuclear arms. Above all, countries such as Iran, aspiring to a level of nuclearization that is suspected to go beyond civilian use, should be persuaded in signing the NPT.