The Taliban Has Timebut Obama Doesn’t
Published in die Zeit
(Germany) on 20 June 2011
by Steffen Richter (link to original)
(Germany) on 20 June 2011
by Steffen Richter (link to original)
Translated from
by Ron Argentati.
Edited by Jennifer Pietropaoli.
The United States is negotiating with the Taliban. It’s the smart thing to do, but the radical Islamists have a significant advantage.
It’s been official since last weekend: The U.S. military is talking to Taliban representatives. The move is both understandable and reasonable, although no one knows yet who is speaking to whom and who is authorized to speak for the Taliban. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates didn’t reveal that information.
The Taliban is part of Afghan society even though most Afghans can’t stand them because of their intolerance and violent acts. They primarily belong to the Pashtuns, numerically the largest of all Afghan ethnic groups, and are thus an important national power factor. Therefore, some sort of communication with them is helpful for Afghanistan as well as for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) countries.
Talks with the Taliban also make sense in view of the original goal of the Afghan mission. After 9/11, al-Qaeda was to be neutralized in the Hindu Kush and its leader Osama bin Laden eliminated. The first goal had nearly been achieved when the mission was suddenly diverted toward the Taliban, who had strict control in Afghanistan and had afforded terrorists a safe haven in their country.
While the Taliban no longer has nearly as much power as it once had, it hasn’t been completely eradicated and the West has to accept the fact that it obviously won’t be. There are far too many hiding places in the mountains and access to weapons and bomb-making materials is still far to easy.
But their decisive advantage lies elsewhere: The Taliban has time on its side. The debate over the right Afghan strategy for the United States and its allies has developed into determining the best withdrawal date. The Taliban really doesn’t have to do anything but wait them out. They know they will be the last troops left standing in the Hindu Kush long after the ISAF troops have left.
That gives them a decided advantage in any talks with U.S. negotiators. Another is that the Pashtun Taliban has no plans to attack any Western nations — their goal is to rid Afghanistan of foreign troops. They are no danger to the West.
From a Western perspective, the more important question is whether or not al-Qaeda still poses a danger in the Hindu Kush. That won’t be known until the ISAF troops have left Afghanistan. It’s only known that the U.S. would not invade other nations known to harbor international terrorists. If Afghanistan were to become an international security risk again, it would probably be attacked with unmanned drones.
How that works out may be seen today in the tribal regions of northwestern Pakistan. On Monday, two U.S. drones killed six of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s militants. An unmanned drone war protects soldiers’ lives and costs less money. But above all, it’s far easier to end.
It’s been official since last weekend: The U.S. military is talking to Taliban representatives. The move is both understandable and reasonable, although no one knows yet who is speaking to whom and who is authorized to speak for the Taliban. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates didn’t reveal that information.
The Taliban is part of Afghan society even though most Afghans can’t stand them because of their intolerance and violent acts. They primarily belong to the Pashtuns, numerically the largest of all Afghan ethnic groups, and are thus an important national power factor. Therefore, some sort of communication with them is helpful for Afghanistan as well as for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) countries.
Talks with the Taliban also make sense in view of the original goal of the Afghan mission. After 9/11, al-Qaeda was to be neutralized in the Hindu Kush and its leader Osama bin Laden eliminated. The first goal had nearly been achieved when the mission was suddenly diverted toward the Taliban, who had strict control in Afghanistan and had afforded terrorists a safe haven in their country.
While the Taliban no longer has nearly as much power as it once had, it hasn’t been completely eradicated and the West has to accept the fact that it obviously won’t be. There are far too many hiding places in the mountains and access to weapons and bomb-making materials is still far to easy.
But their decisive advantage lies elsewhere: The Taliban has time on its side. The debate over the right Afghan strategy for the United States and its allies has developed into determining the best withdrawal date. The Taliban really doesn’t have to do anything but wait them out. They know they will be the last troops left standing in the Hindu Kush long after the ISAF troops have left.
That gives them a decided advantage in any talks with U.S. negotiators. Another is that the Pashtun Taliban has no plans to attack any Western nations — their goal is to rid Afghanistan of foreign troops. They are no danger to the West.
From a Western perspective, the more important question is whether or not al-Qaeda still poses a danger in the Hindu Kush. That won’t be known until the ISAF troops have left Afghanistan. It’s only known that the U.S. would not invade other nations known to harbor international terrorists. If Afghanistan were to become an international security risk again, it would probably be attacked with unmanned drones.
How that works out may be seen today in the tribal regions of northwestern Pakistan. On Monday, two U.S. drones killed six of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s militants. An unmanned drone war protects soldiers’ lives and costs less money. But above all, it’s far easier to end.