Not So Fast: Participation in Trans-Pacific Partnership
Published in Ryukyushimpo
(Japan) on 31 October 2011
by (link to original)
Too much, too soon. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has decided on Japan’s participation in the negotiation for the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Has the government even once made an effort to explain the partnership’s advantages and disadvantages to the public? The decision must be concluded as a speed-before-quality one that is indifferent to the opinions of voters.
The Prime Minister plans to let the Singaporean Prime Minister know of his decision during a meeting at the mid-November APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, but the intention behind such an action is clear: to weaken the impression of subordinating to the United States.
However, the true aim to boot-lick the U.S. is apparent to everyone. The government’s internal document states, “Upon the presidential election, the U.S. would like to produce a good outcome [in APEC] . . . If Japan announces its participation [in TPP], the timing would be most positively viewed by the U.S.”
Among the government and the administration, there are those who suggest the government participate first and withdraw if unhappy with the negotiation. However, withdrawing is impossible in terms of Japan’s international fidelity and negotiating power.
These go-and-see claims lead the blindfolded public, knowing that — just as mouse traps — getting out is impossible in the first place.
Although TPP is often discussed in the framework of agriculture versus manufacturers, it would require fundamental structural changes in almost all industries including medicine, construction, finance and insurance. The partnership would be a significant policy modification that involves not only particular industries but all Japanese people.
Tariffs on agro-products are not the only one. Of particular interest is a rule called “poison pills.” If there are principles that are considered “barriers” for an American corporation to operate in Japan, the corporation could sue the Japanese government for compensation and abolish the system.
With such tactics, the system, in which regional governments prioritize local companies in public projects, can be eradicated. Division contract could be over at any moment. It is also pointed out that universal healthcare would be modified into a more expensive system like the American one in order to benefit U.S.-based insurance corporations.
The United Sates is big on genetically modified agro-products. Because the underlying purpose of TPP is to expand U.S. exports to Japan, the Japanese food labeling system that obligates the disclosure on such products will be targeted as well.
It would be irresponsible of the Japanese government to participate in the negotiation without addressing these concerns. There is no need for Japan to rustle up before the U.S. presidential election. Whether or not to participate should be determined after much public discussion.
The Prime Minister plans to let the Singaporean Prime Minister know of his decision during a meeting at the mid-November APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, but the intention behind such an action is clear: to weaken the impression of subordinating to the United States.
However, the true aim to boot-lick the U.S. is apparent to everyone. The government’s internal document states, “Upon the presidential election, the U.S. would like to produce a good outcome [in APEC] . . . If Japan announces its participation [in TPP], the timing would be most positively viewed by the U.S.”
Among the government and the administration, there are those who suggest the government participate first and withdraw if unhappy with the negotiation. However, withdrawing is impossible in terms of Japan’s international fidelity and negotiating power.
These go-and-see claims lead the blindfolded public, knowing that — just as mouse traps — getting out is impossible in the first place.
Although TPP is often discussed in the framework of agriculture versus manufacturers, it would require fundamental structural changes in almost all industries including medicine, construction, finance and insurance. The partnership would be a significant policy modification that involves not only particular industries but all Japanese people.
Tariffs on agro-products are not the only one. Of particular interest is a rule called “poison pills.” If there are principles that are considered “barriers” for an American corporation to operate in Japan, the corporation could sue the Japanese government for compensation and abolish the system.
With such tactics, the system, in which regional governments prioritize local companies in public projects, can be eradicated. Division contract could be over at any moment. It is also pointed out that universal healthcare would be modified into a more expensive system like the American one in order to benefit U.S.-based insurance corporations.
The United Sates is big on genetically modified agro-products. Because the underlying purpose of TPP is to expand U.S. exports to Japan, the Japanese food labeling system that obligates the disclosure on such products will be targeted as well.
It would be irresponsible of the Japanese government to participate in the negotiation without addressing these concerns. There is no need for Japan to rustle up before the U.S. presidential election. Whether or not to participate should be determined after much public discussion.