Trump and the 2 Americas

Published in Público
(Portugal) on 7 November 2018
by Jorge Almeida Fernandes (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Rita Oliveira Almeida. Edited by Helaine Schweitzer.
Radicalization was a trap for Democrats. Trump is the one who needs this polarization and knows best how to use it.

It is said that Donald Trump’s biggest failure is his inability to unite the country when it comes to his presidency. It would be better to say that it is exactly upon the division of the American society that his strength relies. This division is not new, but its intensity and the fracture it has led to are indeed new. It wasn’t Trump who created this. He only lives off of it – and radicalizes it.

There are historical, geographical and social differences in a continent-country such as the U.S., but the greatest conflict between what some call the “two nations” involves values and behavior. The resentment of white voters, in economic and insecurity terms, was decisive in Trump’s election in 2016. However, more important than the social and economic factors are the ideological variables that have given way to the cultural war. American society became polarized between antagonistic attitudes regarding the political elite, the role of the state, minorities and immigrants, women and family and customs and religion. The sources of information that the two Americas rely on are not the same.

This division was imposed on the political scene with devastating consequences. The tea party protests in 2009 during Barack Obama’s first term and Trump’s election in 2016 are significant moments. Political opponents became enemies. The Republican Party started a radicalization process to which the Democrats responded with a corresponding inflection to the left. Liberals and conservatives have quickly moved away from the center, which now tends to remain vacant.

In turn, political radicalization aggravates social division. A survey carried out by the Pew Research Center in November 2017 reveals the intensity of the radicalization of the elites in the two parties. Their vanguards, the most faithful and influential militants, are at the top of the social pyramid of America’s social and cultural elite, and they are the ones who most resist coexistence with the others.

Radicalization was a trap for Democrats; Trump is the one who needs this polarization and who knows best how to use it. The Republican Party ended up becoming domesticated, since their candidates and representatives fear losing votes if they diverge from the president. The separation of powers and the mechanisms of executive authority were shaken. The regime turned to the president, and revolves increasingly more around the presidential elections. And in an unsecure America, Trump is a skilled manager of the business of fear.

The importance of these elections can’t be measured today, but rather they will be measured in the near future. The Democrats’ conquest of the House of Representatives might have contradictory effects and it might create an institutional crisis, for Trump will be tempted to radicalize his conflicts with the Congress and to use Congress as a scapegoat for his own failures. On the other hand, the Democrats’ win might re-establish a relative balance of powers, limiting presidential discretion. If this happens, it will be a sign for the institutions to resist, and a factor in revitalizing American democracy.




Trump e as duas Américas

Diz-se que o grande fracasso de Donald Trump é não conseguir unir o país em torno da sua presidência. Seria mais correcto dizer que é exactamente na polarização da sociedade americana que assenta a sua força. A divisão não é inédita. O que é novo é a intensidade da polarização que conduziu a uma fractura, esta, sim, inédita. Não foi Trump que produziu o fenómeno. Ele apenas vive dele — e radicaliza-o.
Há diferenças históricas, geográficas e sociais num país-continente como os Estados Unidos. Mas a maior oposição entre aquilo a que alguns chamaram as “duas nações” diz respeito a valores e comportamentos. O ressentimento dos eleitores brancos, em termos económicos e de insegurança, foi decisivo na eleição de Trump em 2016. No entanto, mais determinantes do que os factores socioeconómicos, são as variáveis ideológicas que deram lugar à “guerra cultural”. A sociedade polarizou-se entre atitudes antagónicas — sobre as elites políticas e o papel do Estado, as minorias e os imigrantes, as mulheres e a família, os costumes e a religião. As fontes de informação das “duas Américas” não são as mesmas.

Esta polarização projectou-se na cena política com efeitos devastadores. A irrupção do Tea Party em 2009, no início do primeiro mandato de Obama, e a eleição de Trump, em 2016, são momentos marcantes. Os adversários políticos passam a ser “inimigos”. O Partido Republicano lançou-se num processo de radicalização a que os democratas responderam com paralela inflexão à esquerda. Liberais e conservadores afastam-se velozmente do “centro”, que tende a esvaziar-se.

Por sua vez, a radicalização política agrava a polarização social. Um inquérito do Pew Research Center, de Novembro de 2017, revela a intensidade da radicalização das elites dos dois partidos. As suas “vanguardas”, os militantes mais fiéis e influentes, vêm ambas do topo da pirâmide social, da elite social e cultural americana. E são quem mais fortemente recusa a coexistência com “o outro”.
A radicalização foi uma armadilha para os democratas. É Trump quem precisa da polarização e melhor a sabe utilizar. O Partido Republicano acabou domesticado. Os seus candidatos e representantes temem perder eleitores, se divergirem do Presidente. A separação dos poderes e os mecanismos de controlo do executivo foram abalados. O regime “presidencializou-se” e gira cada vez mais em torno das eleições presidenciais. E, numa América insegura, Trump é um hábil gestor do “negócio do medo”.

A importância destas eleições não se mede hoje, mas no futuro próximo. A conquista da Câmara dos Representantes pelos democratas pode ter efeitos contraditórios. É susceptível de abrir um crise institucional, pois Trump será tentado a radicalizar os conflitos com o Congresso, usando-o como “bode expiatório” para os seus fracassos. Por outro lado, pode restabelecer um relativo equilíbrio dos poderes, limitando o arbítrio presidencial. Se isto acontecer, será um indício de resistência das instituições e um factor de revitalização da democracia americana.
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

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