Americanism: A Debate

Published in La Jornada
(Mexico) on 2 February 2023
by Ilán Semo (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Patricia Simoni. Edited by Lisa Attanasio.

O

In recent days, a debate on the current state of Americanism has been circulating in the networks. The concept was coined in the early 1930s by Antonio Gramsci, who envisioned the emergence in the United States of a type of capitalism that differed substantially from its European counterpart.

Fordism and Taylorism, together with new systems of psychological management of workers, would be the basis of an authentically passive revolution — that is, an updating of capitalism redesigned to confront the "historical tendency of the fall of the rate of profit.” Gramsci questioned the ability of European elites to promote a transformation of this dimension. Strictly speaking, the aristocratic and clerical estates, the dense layers of noblemen and landowners and the "sumptuary spirit" of the bureaucratic and military bodies had so far inhibited such a phenomenon on the old continent.

It was the violence and the spread of World War II that dismantled the power of the estates — but not those of the Mediterranean, of course — that had kept many European societies from modernization. However, in the 1950s, a new and unthinkable reordering emerged, initially based in the United Kingdom — a variant that, driven by the strength of social and workers' organizations, could perhaps be called Europeanism.

Instead of the high wages advocated by Henry Ford for workers (always under the close supervision of social and psychological control mechanisms managed by the companies themselves), the welfare state appeared: health, education, food and pensions became functions guaranteed as public responsibilities. Disciplinary techniques would be the responsibility of state systems. Europeanism became a form of capitalism obliged to increase its productivity on the basis of technological inventions and to secure wage limits through immigrants coming mostly from the Mediterranean countries.

In my opinion, the great crisis of the old Americanism began in the 1970s. More than an energy collapse, it was the revelation of a reason for the diminished competitiveness of the U.S. economy in the world market: high wages in manufacturing industries. Fordism had ceased to work.

The response was no longer a passive revolution as in the 1920s, but a process of restoration. The conservative (read: neoliberal) crusade was led by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who were impressed by the speed it had demonstrated in Chile under dictator Augusto Pinochet. This crusade consisted of privatization, deregulation, opening borders to capital and peripheral migration, the weakening of the power of trade unions and, above all, the transfer of manufacturing industries to emerging economies. It was a phenomenon that could be called Americanism II that Bolívar Echeverría analyzed with great precision at the end of the 1990s.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union facilitated the rapid spread of this model, with the exception of three areas: Europe, which preserved the order forged in the 1950s; the Asian capitalism of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore; and, surprisingly, the hybrid economy of China.

The technological key to Americanism II was the cyber revolution. The political-cultural key to the new discipline: psychopolitics. The social key: the massive migration of workers from the periphery, who were denied — and continued to be denied — citizenship, qualifications, health and a dignified life. The party was short-lived.

The financial crisis of 2008 called into question the solvency of both Europeanism and American restoration. As does Yannis Varoufakis, I believe they have not yet recovered. In fact, the economies of Europe have been in stagnation for a decade. And the German machine owes more to Chinese productivity than to the rhetorical excesses of its own assumptions.

Looking at the current map of the geoeconomies, the U.S. economy shows a continuing inability to regain its former vigor. The reason is both simple and complex: Business cannot pay for what the state should take in hand (health, education, pensions, etc.). To do so, it would have to stop subsidizing financial capital. It looks difficult. In Europe, attempts have been made since Silvio Berlusconi to move to the U.S. scheme. The difference is that social resistance is much more serious and severe there. These days, Emmanuel Macron must face the most radical workers' challenge since 1995: a belligerent opposition to the reduction of pensions. As a green deputy in Germany said, "Neoliberalism is a pit from which no one emerges unscathed.” And NATO is preparing with more vigor to confront local social protests than it is to fight Russian tanks.

The dilemma for Mexico is how to get out of this hole as quickly as possible. But that is not the goal of the Moreno* government’s social reforms, which aim to expand consumption by directly distributing money; however, it is a start. They legitimize the need to distribute income, but the most important thing is missing: to place the world of work, and not the world of investment or “poverty,” at the center of society.

* Editor's Note: This is the liberal political party of Andrés Manuel López Obrador.








En dнas pasados circulу en las redes un debate sobre el estado actual del americanismo. El concepto fue acuсado por Antonio Gramsci a principios de la dйcada de 1930, que vislumbrу la emergencia en Estados Unidos de un tipo de capitalismo que se diferenciaba de manera sustancial de su sнmil europeo. El fordismo y el taylorismo, junto con los nuevos sistemas de disciplinamiento sнquico de los trabajadores, serнan la base de una autйntica revoluciуn pasiva, es decir, una actualizaciуn del capitalismo que asн se reordenaba para hacer frente a la “tendencia histуrica de la caнda de la tasa de beneficio”. Gramsci descreнa de las capacidades de las йlites europeas para impulsar una transformaciуn de estas dimensiones. En rigor, los estamentos aristocrбticos y clericales, las densas capas de junkers y latifundistas y el “espнritu suntuario” de los cuerpos burocrбticos y militares habнan inhibido hasta la fecha un fenуmeno semejante en el viejo continente.

Fue la violencia y la extensiуn de la Segunda Guerra Mundial las que desmantelaron, en muchas sociedades europeas (no en las del Mediterrбneo, por supuesto), el poder de los estamentos que las alejaban de su modernizaciуn. Sin embargo, en los aсos 50, surgiу un nuevo e impensable reorden, cuya sede inicial fue Inglaterra. Una variante que, impulsada por la fuerza de las organizaciones sociales y de trabajadores, podrнa acaso definirse como europeнsmo. En vez de los altos salarios que Ford propugnaba para los trabajadores (siempre bajo la estrecha vigilancia de mecanismos de control sнquico y social gestionados por las propias empresas), apareciу el Estado de bienestar: salud, educaciуn, alimentaciуn y pensiones devinieron funciones garantizadas como responsabilidades pъblicas. Las tйcnicas de disciplinamiento correrнan a cargo de los sistemas estatales. El europeнsmo se convirtiу en una forma de capitalismo obligado a aumentar su productividad sobre la base de invenciones tecnolуgicas y a asegurar los lнmites del salario a travйs de migrantes que provenнan, en su mayorнa, de los paнses del Mediterrбneo.

A mi parecer, la gran crisis del antiguo americanismo se escenificу en los aсos 70. Mбs que un colapso energйtico, se tratу de la revelaciуn de aquello que estaba provocando una falta de competitividad de la economнa estadunidense en el mercado mundial: los altos salarios en las industrias de la manufactura. El fordismo habнa dejado de funcionar. La respuesta fue ya no una revoluciуn pasiva como en los aсos 20, sino un proceso de restauraciуn: la cruzada conservadora (lйase: neoliberal) encabezada por Ronald Reagan y Margaret Thatcher, impresionados por la rapidez que habнa mostrado en manos de la dictadura de Augusto Pinochet en Chile. їEn quй consistiу esta cruzada?: privatizar, desregularizar, abrir fronteras al capital y a la migraciуn perifйrica, abatir el poder de los sindicatos y, sobre todo, permitir la traslaciуn de las industrias de la manufactura a las economнas emergentes. Algo que se podrнa llamar americanismo II y que Bolнvar Echeverrнa analizу con mucha precisiуn a fines de los aсos 90.

La desintegraciуn de la Uniуn Soviйtica facilitу la rбpida diseminaciуn de este “modelo”, con excepciуn de tres бreas: Europa, que preservу su orden fraguado en los aсos 50; el capitalismo asiбtico de Japуn, Corea del Sur, Taiwбn y Singapur y, la sorpresa, la economнa hнbrida de China.

La clave tecnolуgica del americanismo II fue la revoluciуn cyber. La clave polнtico-cultural del nuevo disciplinamiento: la sicopolнtica. La clave social: la migraciуn masiva de trabajadores provenientes de la periferia, a los cuales se le negaba –y se les continъa negando– ciudadanнa, calificaciуn, salud y una vida digna. La fiesta durу poco. La crisis financiera de 2008 puso en entredicho la solvencia tanto del europeнsmo como de la restauraciуn estadunidense. Al igual que Yannis Varoufakis, pienso que hasta la fecha no se han recuperado. De facto, las economнas europeas llevan una dйcada estancadas. Y la maquinaria alemana debe mбs a la productividad china que a los excesos retуricos de sus presunciones.

Si observamos el mapa actual de las geoeconomнas, la estadunidense muestra una incapacidad constante para retomar el brнo de antaсo. La razуn es sencilla y compleja a la vez: las empresas no pueden solventar lo que el Estado deberнa tomar en las manos (salud, educaciуn, pensiones, etcйtera). Para ello tendrнa que dejar de subvencionar al capital financiero. Se ve difнcil. En Europa, se intenta desde Berlusconi pasar al esquema estadunidense. La diferencia es que la resistencia social ahн es mucho mбs seria y severa. En estos dнas, Macron debe enfrentar el desafнo obrero mбs radical desde 1995 que se opone beligerantemente a la reducciуn de las pensiones. Como dijo un diputado verde en Alemania, “el neoliberalismo es un pozo del que nadie sale incуlume”. Y la OTAN se prepara mбs para enfrentar las protestas sociales locales que para combatir tanques rusos.

Para Mйxico el dilema es cуmo salir lo mбs rбpido del pozo. Las reformas sociales del gobierno de Morena no persiguen este cometido. Su destino es ampliar el consumo distribuyendo de manera directa dinero. Sin embargo, es un comienzo. Legitiman la necesidad de distribuir el ingreso. Falta lo mбs importante: situar al mundo del trabajo (y no al de las inversiones o al de “la pobreza”) en el centro de la sociedad.
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