Bogusław Chrabota: Europe Will Long Need US To Defend Itself from Russia
The presence of U.S. troops on the continent is today the most significant element of the EU's security. We should ensure that the number of U.S. forces in Europe increases, not decreases. It is even more important that they find a permanent place in Poland along the Vistula River. This should be an indisputable axiom in thinking about Poland's national security.
"European strategic autonomy is a mirage," said former head of the National Security Bureau Jacek Siewiera in one of the debates of the European Economic Congress. “All we can do in the long run is build strategic credibility. In the eyes of our transatlantic ally, Russia, and ourselves.”
What's the difference then? The prospect of achieving autonomy — that is, the strategic level of security of European NATO members, without the support of the U.S., is very remote. Setting aside the American nuclear umbrella, Europe is not — and will not be for a long time — self-sufficient in confronting Russia's military potential.
For example (data for 2025), the total production of maneuvering missiles in the EU is 300 units. Russia produces 1,100 of them. In the field of ballistic missiles, Russia produces 900 per year, and the EU doesn't produce them at all. Artillery ammunition: Russia — 4 million units, the EU — 2 million units. Infantry fighting vehicles: Russia — 3,500, EU — 500 pieces. The disparities can be listed at length, but there is only one conclusion. Without the U.S. component of NATO forces, both in terms of manpower and equipment, Europe is significantly inferior to Russia in many areas.
Does the EU Understand Its Weakness?
Brussels is aware of it, and that is why the European Commission is pushing ahead with plans to remilitarize the community. But it is not easy. Europe's industry, dormant for decades, is waking up slowly and with many problems. It is not only the case of the Polish president vetoing the parliamentary SAFE program* but also hundreds of systemic deficiencies that are acknowledged at the level of the European Commission. Inefficient local administrations, slow certification of new military technologies, difficulties in cross-border technology transfer, and long delays in launching new production lines — all of this is evident from multiple vantage points.
This is why, among other things, the commission is working on instruments to improve these processes. One of them will be the Defense Readiness Omnibus, a package of rules to speed up the process of rebuilding the capacity of the European defense industry.
What Is Europe's Strategic Credibility?
Why am I writing about it? Because no reasonable person who understands the real threats that we face or will soon face should support the process of withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Europe. Let me stress once again: We cannot afford strategic autonomy today and will not be able to do so in the next decade. All we Europeans can do is to demonstrate our strategic credibility in the eyes of the U.S. ally and the enemy from the East.
Although this is a paradox, both Moscow and Washington should be sure that the alliance with the U.S. is unquestionable, strong, and lasting, and that we are taking all possible measures to increase our own level of security. Especially when the U.S. president is a man who chooses to communicate on social networks more often than strictly adhering to written doctrine.
The triad outlined by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk: European solidarity, an alliance with the U.S., and Polish (and European) armaments — should be set in stone for decades.
Should we cheer the withdrawal of American troops from Germany, Italy or Spain? Not in the slightest. What must dominate here is reflection on collective security and common capability. Should we seek to increase the number of American troops in Poland? To expand infrastructure to accommodate them? To install new types of weapons? Absolutely. At any cost. After all, we are the eastern flank of NATO.
The scale of threats in our part of Europe is completely different than in Italy or the Iberian Peninsula. This is obvious. I will not comment on the words of Prime Minister Tusk about “poaching” units withdrawn from Germany. They were ill-advised. However, the triad he outlined — European solidarity, the alliance with the U.S., and Polish (and European) rearmament — should be set in stone for decades. There is no other way to build Polish defense.
*Editor’s note: The Safe (Security Action for Europe) program is a 150-billion-euro defense financing bill of the EU designed to strengthen European defense capabilities and industrial cooperation.
"European strategic autonomy is a mirage," said former head of the National Security Bureau Jacek Siewiera in one of the debates of the European Economic Congress. “All we can do in the long run is build strategic credibility. In the eyes of our transatlantic ally, Russia, and ourselves.”
What's the difference then? The prospect of achieving autonomy — that is, the strategic level of security of European NATO members, without the support of the U.S., is very remote. Setting aside the American nuclear umbrella, Europe is not — and will not be for a long time — self-sufficient in confronting Russia's military potential.
For example (data for 2025), the total production of maneuvering missiles in the EU is 300 units. Russia produces 1,100 of them. In the field of ballistic missiles, Russia produces 900 per year, and the EU doesn't produce them at all. Artillery ammunition: Russia — 4 million units, the EU — 2 million units. Infantry fighting vehicles: Russia — 3,500, EU — 500 pieces. The disparities can be listed at length, but there is only one conclusion. Without the U.S. component of NATO forces, both in terms of manpower and equipment, Europe is significantly inferior to Russia in many areas.
Does the EU Understand Its Weakness?
Brussels is aware of it, and that is why the European Commission is pushing ahead with plans to remilitarize the community. But it is not easy. Europe's industry, dormant for decades, is waking up slowly and with many problems. It is not only the case of the Polish president vetoing the parliamentary SAFE program* but also hundreds of systemic deficiencies that are acknowledged at the level of the European Commission. Inefficient local administrations, slow certification of new military technologies, difficulties in cross-border technology transfer, and long delays in launching new production lines — all of this is evident from multiple vantage points.
This is why, among other things, the commission is working on instruments to improve these processes. One of them will be the Defense Readiness Omnibus, a package of rules to speed up the process of rebuilding the capacity of the European defense industry.
What Is Europe's Strategic Credibility?
Why am I writing about it? Because no reasonable person who understands the real threats that we face or will soon face should support the process of withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Europe. Let me stress once again: We cannot afford strategic autonomy today and will not be able to do so in the next decade. All we Europeans can do is to demonstrate our strategic credibility in the eyes of the U.S. ally and the enemy from the East.
Although this is a paradox, both Moscow and Washington should be sure that the alliance with the U.S. is unquestionable, strong, and lasting, and that we are taking all possible measures to increase our own level of security. Especially when the U.S. president is a man who chooses to communicate on social networks more often than strictly adhering to written doctrine.
The triad outlined by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk: European solidarity, an alliance with the U.S., and Polish (and European) armaments — should be set in stone for decades.
Should we cheer the withdrawal of American troops from Germany, Italy or Spain? Not in the slightest. What must dominate here is reflection on collective security and common capability. Should we seek to increase the number of American troops in Poland? To expand infrastructure to accommodate them? To install new types of weapons? Absolutely. At any cost. After all, we are the eastern flank of NATO.
The scale of threats in our part of Europe is completely different than in Italy or the Iberian Peninsula. This is obvious. I will not comment on the words of Prime Minister Tusk about “poaching” units withdrawn from Germany. They were ill-advised. However, the triad he outlined — European solidarity, the alliance with the U.S., and Polish (and European) rearmament — should be set in stone for decades. There is no other way to build Polish defense.
*Editor’s note: The Safe (Security Action for Europe) program is a 150-billion-euro defense financing bill of the EU designed to strengthen European defense capabilities and industrial cooperation.
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