Doubling Down Is Easier Than Backing Down: 4 Cards Trump Is Playing To Exit the US-Iran War, None of Them Good

Donald Trump’s conflict in Iran has reached a strategic deadlock. This article argues for pragmatic diplomacy or conditional military withdrawal over escalating hostilities for the sake of a leader saving face and that further escalation will divert American power away from the Indo-Pacific, a region crucial to Taiwan’s security, at the expense of American interests and the trust of its allies.

What Donald Trump truly lacks right now is not bombs, but a strategy for a dignified exit. After 13 consecutive nights of airstrikes, the U.S. military has suspended its attacks. Washington and Tehran are exchanging information through intermediaries, but normal passage through the Strait of Hormuz has not yet resumed. Trump is claiming that negotiations are making progress, while at the same time he is threatening to resume bombing if the talks break down.

This is not the eve of victory, but a classic strategic impasse. President Trump’s military campaign may destroy targets, but it has no answer to the question of what conditions it will take to end this war. What options does Trump really have to extricate himself from the chaos he has created? In reality, he only has four cards left to play, and none of them is particularly strong.

Trump’s first option is to declare victory and immediately withdraw at the cost of being accused of bluff and bluster. His second option is to expand the bombing campaign, even if it means deploying ground troops but at the cost of dragging the United States back into the Middle East quagmire. The third alternative is to accept an undignified agreement and effectively admit that Tehran still has the upper hand. And the fourth choice is to maintain the status quo, allowing retaliation and counter-retaliation to continue, while temporarily avoiding a final verdict of who has won and who has lost.

Of these, the fourth option is the most hardline and the most dangerous. Once a war is sustained by inertia, political leaders can declare each day that they have not yet lost, even as they lose a little more freedom everyday to withdraw. Bombing another military facility, targeting a power plant Trump has threatened, or freezing another tranche of Iranian assets may appear to be stepping up the pressure, but in reality, it is merely postponing a decision.

If Trump adopts a strategy that Iran will eventually collapse, he will be making the same mistake Washington has made time and again, in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan: confusing an adversary’s capacity to endure suffering with their willingness to surrender.

The second option, escalating the war, is not an answer either.

The United States is capable of severely damaging Iran’s military infrastructure, even setting its nuclear program back by several years. But facilities can be rebuilt, technology is not lost to bombing and political will does not crumble of its own accord. If Iran responds with missiles, drones, proxy groups and maritime harassment, the United States will have to commit more interceptor munitions, ships and defense of American bases.

Senior U.S. military officials have already acknowledged the limitations of air power, and Washington must face the reality of dwindling ammunition stockpiles and a shrinking pool of viable targets. If this continues, Trump will no longer be explaining how to end the war, but rather why he has dragged the United States once again into an endless Middle East conflict.

Therefore, only two truly workable paths remain: If negotiations succeed, then Trump should accept the limited and imperfect agreement that is the third option. If negotiations fails, Trump should play the first card and conditionally disengage. Neither an agreement nor disengagement will likely persuade Iran to relinquish its influence over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could, however, include a partial easing of sanctions, management of shipping lanes, or regional security arrangements.

None of these conditions is particularly favorable to Washington, but they would serve the national interest far better than an endless cycle of hostilities. Diplomacy has never been about celebrating victory, but about keeping worst-case scenarios at bay. Restoring shipping, reducing miscalculations, and establishing a ceasefire mechanism would bring the region closer to genuine peace than inflicting several more rounds of bombing on Iran.

If even a limited agreement proves elusive, then the United States should gradually hand responsibility for the security of the Strait of Hormuz over to the countries and regions that bear the true costs. Europe, the oil-producing nations of the Persian Gulf, Japan, South Korea and other Asian energy importers all bear the risks associated with oil prices, insurance premiums and shipping more directly than Washington does and, therefore, have a greater incentive to invest in naval escorts, insurance, port infrastructure and regional coordination. The United States can retain its long-range deterrence and rapid-response capabilities, but it does not need to remain on the front lines indefinitely, footing the bill for everyone else. This is no longer isolationism; it is strategic prioritization.

Taiwan in particular has no grounds to treat this war in the Middle East as anything more than distant international news. The island relies heavily on energy imports, with oil, natural gas and coal still constituting its primary energy sources.

If the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz persists for an extended period, the impact will not be limited to the Middle East but will extend to oil prices, liquefied natural gas, shipping insurance premiums and supply chains, affecting Taiwan’s electricity prices, consumer prices and business costs. Taiwan should rethink its overly romanticized notion of alliances and recognize that the United States does not always have the resources to spare, nor does it always make the best decisions.

Being pro-American does not mean applauding every time Washington uses force. A truly mature U.S.-Taiwan relationship means expecting the United States to apply its power where it matters most, while at the same time requiring Taiwan to improve its energy resilience, strategic reserves and supply-chain contingencies.

Otherwise, an attack on an oil tanker in the Middle East will spell higher prices for Taiwan, and every additional month the U.S. military spends in the region could mean fewer usable munitions for the Indo-Pacific. This is the real national security issue Taiwan must consider. Every time the U.S. gets embroiled in an endless Middle Eastern war, it loses more manpower, ammunition and financial resources and pays less political attention to the Indo-Pacific. What Taiwan truly needs is not a United States that rushes into every conflict, but one that knows how to preserve its strength and can maintain a credible deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

If Washington prolongs the conflict so that President Trump can save face, it will ultimately undermine not only Iran, but also its allies’ confidence in Washington’s strategic judgment. Or, of course, Trump can declare victory, or he can accept an agreement that is not “beautiful” enough to be trumpeted on his Truth Social platform.

But political embarrassment does not mean that national interests have been damaged. The real failure lies in demanding more troops. Taxpayers and allies pay the price for a leader’s pride, all while knowing that the war’s objective remains opaque. If negotiation is possible, then negotiate; if not, then withdraw under defined conditions. The strength of a great power lies not in perpetually pushing forward, but in knowing when taking another step is no longer worthwhile.

What America’s allies fear most is not that the United States will back down, but that it no longer knows what it is fighting for, yet refuses to stop.

The author is a research associate at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taiwan.