The State of Europe’s Military Neglect

Published in El País
(Spain) on 21 May 2012
by Andrés Ortega (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Lisa Steward. Edited by Peter McGuire.
In 1999 during air operations in the Kosovo war, NATO fighter planes carried out over 800 flights daily. Last year, in the campaign against Libya, NATO carried out 250. As it became known later on, not only did the U.S. have to furnish its own communications intelligence, but it also had to supply part of the fuel used by the Europeans. It was nevertheless, a NATO war, even if the U.S. did end up “leading from behind,” more than they had intended.

NATO Secretary General Paul Rasmussen recently stated that during the Cold War, Europeans made up one third of NATO defense expenditures, and now constitute a mere 20 percent. Obviously the end of the Cold War was responsible for the reduction then. However, now it is mostly due to the budget cuts caused by the economic recession and resulting operative and geopolitical consequences. Denmark has decided to get rid of its submarines. In Spain the situation continues to be unsettling due to cutbacks in air force flight training hours in order to save fuel – during which the planes could lose operability – or the decommissioning of the Principe de Asturias aircraft carrier. The British are also doing the same with their aircraft carriers.

While it is true that Europe’s defense needs have changed, a smart defense would not be a cheap solution. Meanwhile, according to Jane’s, what Europe does spend – 1.7 percent of GDP, versus 5.4 percent in the U.S. – is not enough for sufficient productivity. Never before have Europeans had so many troops spread out on so many missions – between 55,000 and 79,000 depending upon the year – yet in spite of having an equivalent number of soldiers, European deployment capacity is still a fraction of the U.S. capacity.

Europe currently stands the chance of becoming strategically irrelevant – less useful to Washington and even less useful to itself. In fact, according to a recent article in the Financial Times, the U.S. considers Europe less and less useful for defense needs. They have announced the withdrawal of two combat brigades from Germany, thus reducing the number of North American troops in Europe to 30,000 – compared to 280,000 at the height of the Cold War. Obama is keeping the U.S. strategic priority sights trained on the Pacific, with China being a primary factor, while Europe risks being relegated to a mere logistical platform, an advance base for U.S. military projection towards the Middle East and Central Asia, including anti-missile defense and Africa.

European defense policy has been left to stagnate. High Representative Catherine Ashton, like a good Brit, has halted some of the advances achieved by Solana. Although there has been some progress, with battle groups for example – 1,500 soldiers in each – the most effective is the Nordic battle group. Some progress – in NATO as well – with arms programs in spite of the fact that many are still dominated by state-run national industries. This is insufficient. NATO, as demonstrated in its Chicago summit, will carry on. It will overcome its failure in Afghanistan or Libya. It doesn’t consider itself to be exclusively Western, even though it really is, and it will aspire to be a hub for other kinds of allies, although they have yet to resolve their relations with Russia. And eventually, with China.




En la operación aérea de la guerra de Kosovo, en 1999, los cazabombarderos de la OTAN realizaron 800 salidas diarias. Contra Libia, el año pasado, 250. Y EE UU tuvo que poner no sólo sus capacidades de información, sino hasta una parte del carburante gastado por los europeos, según se ha sabido después. Fue otra guerra de la OTAN, pero menos, con EE UU “liderando desde atrás”, aunque no tanto como pretendió.
El secretario general de la OTAN, Paul Rasmussen, declaraba recientemente que en la Guerra Fría los europeos representaban una tercera parte de los gastos en defensa de los países de la OTAN, y ahora sólo un 20%. Evidentemente el fin de la Guerra Fría contó en esta reducción. Pero ahora es sobre todo la crisis, y los recortes presupuestarios a los que ésta obliga. Con consecuencias operativas y geopolíticas. Dinamarca ha decidido deshacerse de sus submarinos. Y en España la situación no deja de ser preocupante con menos horas de vuelos de entrenamiento para ahorrar combustible (con lo que los aviones podrían perder operatividad), o la desconexión del portaviones Príncipe de Asturias. Los británicos también están parando sus poraaeronaves.
Es verdad que las necesidades de defensa de Europa han cambiado, pero ladefensa inteligente (smart defence) no va a resolver todo a menor precio. Y, mientras, lo que gasta (1,7% del PIB, según Jane’s, frente a 5,4% de EE UU) ni siquiera tiene una productividad suficiente.Nunca han tenido los europeos tantas tropas desplegadas en el exterior en diversas misiones (entre 55.000 y 79.000 según los años), pero pese a tener un número equivalente de soldados, la capacidad de despliegue de los europeos es una fracción de la de EE UU.
Europa corre el riesgo de caer en la irrelevancia estratégica, mucho menos útil para Washington, e incluso para sí. “EE UU está encontrando a Europa cada vez menos relevante para sus necesidades de defensa”, señala un editorial delFinancial Times (surrayar). EE UU ha anunciado la retirada de dos brigadas de combate de Alemania, con lo que las tropas norteamericanas en Europa se reducen a 30.000 (frente a 280.000 en lo más alto de la Guerra Fría). Obama le está dando otra visión, hacia el Pacífico, a las prioridades estratégicas de EE UU, con China como primer factor, y Europa corre el riesgo de limitarse a ser una mera plataforma logística, base avanzada para la proyección militar de EE UU hacia Oriente Medio y Asia Central, lo que incluye la defensa antimisiles, y África.

La política europea de defensa no progresa. La alta representante, Catherine Ashton, como buena británica, ha paralizado algunos de los avances que había puesto en marcha Solana. Si ha habido algún progreso, por ejemplo con los Grupos de Combate (de.1500 soldados cada uno), aunque el que mejor funciona es el nórdico. Y (también en la OTAN) con algunos programas de armamentos, aunque sigue predominando la defensa de los intereses industriales nacionales. Insuficiente.
La OTAN, como demuestra su cumbre en Chicago, seguirá. Superará su fracaso en Afganistán. Es la única alianza militar integrada (entre 28 Estados) que existe, y como se ha visto en Afganistán o Libia, no es sólo occidental, aunque lo es, pero aspira a ser un hub para otro tipo de aliados, aunque le falta resolver sus relaciones con Rusia. Y eventualmente con China.
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