Escalation in Afghanistan
Obama’s plan errs on the side of optimism and is dependent on too many factors outside of his control.
More than eight months after announcing a change of strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to “dismantle and defeat” Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. president has finally delivered by sending 30,000 additional soldiers—essentially giving his generals what they wanted. Barack Obama wanted to placate the most critical voices and gain favor with Congress—which must approve financing for the proposal, about 30 billion dollars in the next fiscal year—anticipating the beginning of a probable withdrawal in the summer of 2011. Republicans consider this announcement a recipe for defeat in the war.
In his message from West Point, Obama said that the U.S. forces, which will increase to almost 100,000 soldiers, together with a contribution of 40,000 from NATO, will be sufficient to protect the cities, respond on all fronts, and, above all, upgrade the Afghan forces so that they can take over. The secretary of the Atlantic Alliance tried again yesterday to combat the growing skepticism of the European allies about winning a war “which is not only America’s.” With London leading the troop count, Spain will provide 200 additional soldiers, a contribution that is more than reasonable. But Germany and France are still up in the air.
In light of what has been occurring for years, the White House is erring on the side of optimism. It is unlikely that, despite its size, the new contingent will represent a turning point in the conflict, especially if U.S. troops begin their withdrawal one year after being deployed, next August. It also seems illusory that, in that time, the Afghan troops will have achieved an adequate operating level against such a strong and motivated enemy.
Obama said that the U.S. will win the war, but in doing so will require some key circumstances that are beyond his control. One is a Kabul government that is minimally credible and far removed from the practices of Ahmed Karzai. Another is cooperation from the crucial and unstable country of Pakistan, which is besieged by its own Taliban, and which yesterday warned that Washington’s plans had better not create adverse, unintended consequences in its own territory. There are too many actors on too many different stages, with differing levels of commitment, to carry forward what is presumably the most important decision of Obama's term of office. Too often, reality disrupts the best laid-out plans.
More than eight months after announcing a change of strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to “dismantle and defeat” Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. president has finally delivered by sending 30,000 additional soldiers—essentially giving his generals what they wanted. Barack Obama wanted to placate the most critical voices and gain favor with Congress—which must approve financing for the proposal, about 30 billion dollars in the next fiscal year—anticipating the beginning of a probable withdrawal in the summer of 2011. Republicans consider this announcement a recipe for defeat in the war.
In his message from West Point, Obama said that the U.S. forces, which will increase to almost 100,000 soldiers, together with a contribution of 40,000 from NATO, will be sufficient to protect the cities, respond on all fronts, and, above all, upgrade the Afghan forces so that they can take over. The secretary of the Atlantic Alliance tried again yesterday to combat the growing skepticism of the European allies about winning a war “which is not only America’s.” With London leading the troop count, Spain will provide 200 additional soldiers, a contribution that is more than reasonable. But Germany and France are still up in the air.
In light of what has been occurring for years, the White House is erring on the side of optimism. It is unlikely that, despite its size, the new contingent will represent a turning point in the conflict, especially if U.S. troops begin their withdrawal one year after being deployed, next August. It also seems illusory that, in that time, the Afghan troops will have achieved an adequate operating level against such a strong and motivated enemy.
Obama said that the U.S. will win the war, but in doing so will require some key circumstances that are beyond his control. One is a Kabul government that is minimally credible and far removed from the practices of Ahmed Karzai. Another is cooperation from the crucial and unstable country of Pakistan, which is besieged by its own Taliban, and which yesterday warned that Washington’s plans had better not create adverse, unintended consequences in its own territory. There are too many actors on too many different stages, with differing levels of commitment, to carry forward what is presumably the most important decision of Obama's term of office. Too often, reality disrupts the best laid-out plans.