Argentina-US Agreement: The Real Context
Argentina’s tendency to view itself as an exceptional case is not a good starting point.
A few weeks ago, the White House announced the finalization of a new business and investment agreement with Argentina. This news has generated a great deal of interest in the nation, as well as differing opinions about its significance.
Some critics have highlighted imbalances in the concessions outlined in the announcement. Others have greeted them with great enthusiasm. While it is clearly impossible to fully evaluate an agreement without the disclosure of all its details, we can try to frame it in its real context.
Firstly, despite some critics’ interpretations, the White House’s announcement does not imply a future free trade agreement. Since his first term in office, Donald Trump has openly opposed signing them. He even withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an agreement driven by the Obama administration that was close to being ratified.
President Trump also forced the renegotiation of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, replacing it with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which is more restrictive, for example, in relation to rules of origin. Curiously, USMCA includes a revision clause after six years, which will be reached in July 2026. Finally, but not least important, the U.S. government does not have the legislative authority to negotiate free trade agreements.
What this means is that any new agreement would need to be passed through the standard process of approval in Congress, opening the door for an endless number of amendments. This would be unacceptable for even the most lenient representatives.
The truth is the U.S. government has never before negotiated a free trade agreement without prior assurance that its ratification would not be subject to the threat of amendments.
Second, a future agreement has nothing to do with Argentina; rather, it is part of a wider-reaching plan that was set in motion last April when Trump announced the introduction of reciprocal tariffs on American trade partners in response to what he perceived as unjust treatment of the United States.
These reciprocal tariffs, which vary by country and are added on top of those already implemented by the World Trade Organization, were designed using an unprecedented and openly arbitrary methodology. Through this process, Argentina and many of its regional neighbors were hit with an additional rate of 10%.
The announcement of tariffs, a decision that is currently being challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court, was accompanied by an offer to begin bilateral negotiations that could lead to their reduction in exchange for new concessions from signatories. A comprehensive list of the demands, country by country, can be found in the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers.
Since then, the Trump administration has reached several bilateral agreements that give us insight into what a potential future agreement with Argentina might look like. One conclusion is that these agreements do not reset tariffs to pre-Liberation Day levels, but only reduce them while making some specific products more favorable (such as through preferential tariff quotas).
In exchange, signatories offer concessions in the form of quantitative restrictions, non-tariff-related barriers, protection of intellectual property, e-commerce and rules of origin.
Most agreements also include the promise of adopting the same security measures as the United States. Some of them include a pledge to combat “unfair practices” carried out by companies controlled by third-party countries, such as those engaging in “dumping” when exporting to the U.S. (artificially lowering prices to drive out local competition), or those harming exports from North America to signatory or third-party markets.
In many cases, the agreements include a promise to design ways to evaluate security threats posed by foreign investment. This is particularly relevant to the fields of critical infrastructure and minerals, with clauses stating that reciprocal tariffs will be reinstated if the country signs any preferential or free trade agreements with parties considered a threat to American security interests.
In summary, the eventual trade agreement between Argentina and the U.S. is a good example of Lloyd Gruber’s concept of “go-it-alone power.” Gruber’s term refers to a political actor’s ability to unilaterally alter the status quo, in turn forcing its business partners to make concessions, even when the new situation may not be more favorable than the original one. The fact that there is incentive to reach an agreement, even when the new situation is worse, implies that the original status quo simply no longer exists.
This does not mean that the future Argentina-U.S. trade agreement cannot be beneficial for Argentina. However, in order to analyze it correctly, it is vital to properly understand its significance. Argentina’s tendency to view itself as an exceptional case is not a good starting point
A few weeks ago, the White House announced the finalization of a new business and investment agreement with Argentina. This news has generated a great deal of interest in the nation, as well as differing opinions about its significance.
Some critics have highlighted imbalances in the concessions outlined in the announcement. Others have greeted them with great enthusiasm. While it is clearly impossible to fully evaluate an agreement without the disclosure of all its details, we can try to frame it in its real context.
Firstly, despite some critics’ interpretations, the White House’s announcement does not imply a future free trade agreement. Since his first term in office, Donald Trump has openly opposed signing them. He even withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an agreement driven by the Obama administration that was close to being ratified.
President Trump also forced the renegotiation of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, replacing it with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which is more restrictive, for example, in relation to rules of origin. Curiously, USMCA includes a revision clause after six years, which will be reached in July 2026. Finally, but not least important, the U.S. government does not have the legislative authority to negotiate free trade agreements.
What this means is that any new agreement would need to be passed through the standard process of approval in Congress, opening the door for an endless number of amendments. This would be unacceptable for even the most lenient representatives.
The truth is the U.S. government has never before negotiated a free trade agreement without prior assurance that its ratification would not be subject to the threat of amendments.
Second, a future agreement has nothing to do with Argentina; rather, it is part of a wider-reaching plan that was set in motion last April when Trump announced the introduction of reciprocal tariffs on American trade partners in response to what he perceived as unjust treatment of the United States.
These reciprocal tariffs, which vary by country and are added on top of those already implemented by the World Trade Organization, were designed using an unprecedented and openly arbitrary methodology. Through this process, Argentina and many of its regional neighbors were hit with an additional rate of 10%.
The announcement of tariffs, a decision that is currently being challenged in the U.S. Supreme Court, was accompanied by an offer to begin bilateral negotiations that could lead to their reduction in exchange for new concessions from signatories. A comprehensive list of the demands, country by country, can be found in the U.S. Trade Representative’s 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers.
Since then, the Trump administration has reached several bilateral agreements that give us insight into what a potential future agreement with Argentina might look like. One conclusion is that these agreements do not reset tariffs to pre-Liberation Day levels, but only reduce them while making some specific products more favorable (such as through preferential tariff quotas).
In exchange, signatories offer concessions in the form of quantitative restrictions, non-tariff-related barriers, protection of intellectual property, e-commerce and rules of origin.
Most agreements also include the promise of adopting the same security measures as the United States. Some of them include a pledge to combat “unfair practices” carried out by companies controlled by third-party countries, such as those engaging in “dumping” when exporting to the U.S. (artificially lowering prices to drive out local competition), or those harming exports from North America to signatory or third-party markets.
In many cases, the agreements include a promise to design ways to evaluate security threats posed by foreign investment. This is particularly relevant to the fields of critical infrastructure and minerals, with clauses stating that reciprocal tariffs will be reinstated if the country signs any preferential or free trade agreements with parties considered a threat to American security interests.
In summary, the eventual trade agreement between Argentina and the U.S. is a good example of Lloyd Gruber’s concept of “go-it-alone power.” Gruber’s term refers to a political actor’s ability to unilaterally alter the status quo, in turn forcing its business partners to make concessions, even when the new situation may not be more favorable than the original one. The fact that there is incentive to reach an agreement, even when the new situation is worse, implies that the original status quo simply no longer exists.
This does not mean that the future Argentina-U.S. trade agreement cannot be beneficial for Argentina. However, in order to analyze it correctly, it is vital to properly understand its significance. Argentina’s tendency to view itself as an exceptional case is not a good starting point
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