Those Who Believe America Will Leave the Region after the War Are Deluded — and Here’s Why

Is it a stroke of good luck or unfortunate timing that my visit to Washington to participate in a series of closed-door seminars with several American think tanks coincided with the testimony of U.S. Central Command Commander Admiral Charles Bradford Cooper II before the Senate on May 14, 2026?

That testimony provided a clearer political and strategic framework for the ongoing transformations in the Middle East, particularly in the aftermath of the American-Israeli war on Iran.

The testimony delivered by the CENTCOM commander before the Senate Armed Services Committee was not merely a routine session within the mechanisms of U.S. military oversight. It came across more as a comprehensive strategic declaration outlining the shape of the next phase in the Middle East and the nature of the new security balances taking shape.

Through discussions held in Washington — whether inside think-tank sessions or in the corridors of American strategic thinking — it became evident that the United States is not preparing to withdraw from the Middle East after the Iran war as many had assumed over the past decade. Instead, it is working to redefine its presence in the region through a lower-cost model that relies more heavily on technology, regional networks and local allies.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Middle East has occupied a contradictory position in American strategic thinking. On the one hand, Washington has viewed it as a vital arena that cannot be abandoned due to oil, Israel’s security, maritime routes and counterterrorism. On the other, it has often appeared as a burden that drained American power in Iraq and Afghanistan and hindered the United States’ shift toward its major priorities in Asia.

However, the American-Israeli war against Iran on Feb. 28, 2026, completely reshuffled this equation — not only because it ushered the region into a new military phase, but also because it revealed that the Middle East remains a structural component of the global order that Washington seeks to lead.

The real debate today is perhaps not whether Washington will have achieved a military victory after the Iran war, but whether that war has truly inaugurated a new Middle East within the American vision, or whether it was merely another round in an open-ended conflict that reproduces itself in different forms.

Although the war succeeded in destroying a large portion of Iran’s missile, naval and air capabilities, it did not resolve the core Iranian problem for the United States. In fact, it may have pushed it into a more complex stage.

Washington — between Attrition and Stability

This shift raises critically important questions: Can the United States sustain this model without sliding, once again, into prolonged attrition in the Middle East?

Historical experience shows that American military power is capable of destroying traditional structures with tremendous speed, but far less capable of producing stable political arrangements. This is precisely why the case of Syria stands at the heart of the Middle East equation and holds exceptional importance in the new American thinking.

Syria, after years of war and collapse, has become a real test for the American post-Iran vision. Notably, Admiral Cooper’s testimony did not treat Syria as a secondary conflict zone, but as a central element in reshaping regional stability, alongside the Lebanese, Iraqi and Jordanian situations.

The rise of the new Syria under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa represents, from Washington’s perspective, an opportunity to rebuild a state capable of preventing the return of the so-called Islamic State group and severing Iranian extensions, while gradually reintegrating Damascus into the Arab system.

The irony is that the United States, which spent many years preaching democracy and regime change, now appears far more interested in the idea of “functional stability” than in any comprehensive transformative project. The American priority is to prevent state collapse and the return of jihadist chaos.

This reveals a major shift in American strategic thinking after the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has come to see chaos as far more dangerous than the survival of imperfect regimes.

The Middle East at the Heart of Asia

The most significant variables may not relate directly to Iran, the Levant or the Arabian Gulf, but to the way the war has redefined the relationship between the Middle East and Asia in America’s broader strategy.

In recent years, the notion spread that the United States had finally decided to leave the Middle East and focus on China. However, the 2026 war showed that this perception was overly simplistic.

The Middle East is not a separate issue disconnected from U.S.-China competition: it is an integral part of that very competition.

The United States recognizes that China has become increasingly dependent on energy supplies from the Gulf and that any American retrenchment from the region could open the door for Beijing to enhance its economic, political, and possibly military influence.

President Donald Trump’s recent visit to China raised many questions and concerns — both before and after — regarding the nature of potential understandings between the two great powers and their repercussions on the Middle East.

At the same time, Washington understands that control over vital maritime corridors in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean is directly linked to global power balances and its ability to maintain international naval supremacy.

From this standpoint, the Middle East is no longer seen as a burden separate from the Asian conflict, but as one of the primary arenas for indirect competition with China.

On another level, the Middle East has become a real laboratory for future wars. The war against Iran revealed the scale of transformation in modern power tools: drones, artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, multi-layered defenses and integrated network operations. These are not merely tools specific to the Middle East; they are part of American preparation for any potential future confrontation with China or Russia.

In other words, Washington views the Middle East today not only as an arena that must be managed, but also as a space for testing new military doctrines.

A New Middle East or New Management of Chaos?

In the end, the Middle East does indeed appear to be entering a new phase in American policy — but not in the traditional sense of the “New Middle East” concept promoted after the invasion of Iraq.

The United States is not seeking to reshape the region ideologically today, but rather to recalibrate it in security and strategic terms to serve its global priorities. It wants a Middle East less capable of threatening American interests and more integrated into the regional deterrence network it is building against its global rivals.

However, the question that will determine the future of the region concerns not only Washington’s ability to impose this vision, but also the ability of regional powers themselves to adapt to it or resist it. Iran, despite the strikes, has not disappeared. The new Syria is still taking shape.

The international competition over the region has not ended. Therefore, the 2026 war may not represent the end of a phase as much as the beginning of a more complex one — one in which the Middle East becomes a direct part of the reshaping of the global order itself.