Trump Pays the Price for Expensive Gas, Not for ‘Betraying Eastern Europe’* Part 2
Editor’s note: This is the second part of a two-part article.
Donald Trump is a player whose seemingly hopeless situations make his rivals exceptionally difficult to defeat. Despite potential losses due to old age and character traits, the logic of the American political system remains intact.
There is no more telling test of Donald Trump's attitude toward Central and Eastern European interests than his successive statements and actions regarding Ukraine and Russia. Here his line is inconsistent, zigzagging, and for many months blocked by actions in the Middle East, but his sympathy for Vladimir Putin's reasoning is obvious.
Trump, Ukraine and Russia: The Impact of US Elections on the Polish Right
Polish Trump supporters on the right find various points around the world where Trump's policies objectively harmed Russian interests — Venezuela, Greenland, and even the war with Iran can be presented this way. Nevertheless, when one hears about Trump's idea for him to establish peace terms on the Russian-Ukrainian front with the leaders of Russia and China, one can be horrified. The Polish right has become somewhat resistant to this. Partly due to an increasingly anti-Ukrainian stance, and partly because many of Trump's announcements amounted to nothing more than rhetoric: off-putting, but without any real consequences.
Of course, foreign issues don't play a fundamental role in the American campaign, apart from the high prices caused by the war with Iran. However, it is worth noting that, according to a recent study by The Economist and YouGov among Republican voters, 52% express sympathy for Ukraine, and toward Russia ... 4%. This happened when Trump, for an otherwise immediate electoral purpose, loosened the corset of anti-Russian sanctions in order to buy some fuel from Putin. And just a moment earlier, Democrats and Republicans in Congress had only just agreed to grant him the right to tighten them.
Marek Magierowski cited this in Krynica as an example of poor social sentiment awareness. Another is the American president's increasingly open identification with the causes of the rich. Surrounded by big tech CEOs, he is increasingly less associated with the "populist Republicanism" of his campaign. To this day, his vice president, who is otherwise more isolationist and anti-Ukrainian, JD Vance, remains faithful to this spirit. Vance, a potential contender for the presidency.
During the panel in Krynica, Jakub Dymek stated that even if these elections don't resolve much in the U.S., they will be a kind of primary election in Poland, ahead of the showdown in the fall of 2027. They could deal a blow to the Polish right if the Democrats take control of Congress (which, as we now know, is exactly what happened). But if Trump had defended the Republicans' position, it could have been, in turn, a kind of defeat for Donald Tusk.
Polish liberals and the left are already preparing to declare a virtual victory. The conservatives will respond that it's none of their business, but they will feel cornered. Until now, its politicians have had to put on a brave face when Trump made overly friendly gestures toward Putin. As a result, they referred to him a bit less, and Polish President Karol Nawrocki had to distance himself from the White House's position a few times.
Let's repeat: Americans did not vote for this or that policy toward our region in Europe. Trump is paying the price for expensive gasoline, not for "betraying Eastern Europe." Although Tusk can also use this as a game of associations. After all, he blamed the American administration for the high prices at gas stations in Poland.
I understand the right's conviction that Trump changed the global balance of power in the culture war worldwide. And the hope, formulated circuitously, for example by the Law and Justice Party or Nawrocki's circle, that even if they hand Ukraine over to Russia, they will at least maintain a protective umbrella over Poland. I understand, although I warned that too strong an identification with Trump could backfire on the conservatives.
I see a strong conviction on leftist and liberal websites that Trump will be completely blocked. I've already written that a president who loses a war for Congress still has a great influence on reality (like Harry Truman in 1946-1948, although he was advised to resign then). Foreign policy is, for example, his domain; a strong veto can force the other party into agreements. Trump is a player whose seemingly hopeless situations make him exceptionally difficult for rivals to defeat. He may get lost due to old age and character traits, but not due to the logic of the American political system.
True, both parties are less flexible and willing to compromise today than they used to be, and the Democrats' advantage is overwhelming. But Trump has pursued a policy of increasingly concentrating power in his own hands and circumventing both Congress and the courts. For example, after 60 days from the commencement of hostilities, the president should seek authorization from Congress, but he used various loopholes to avoid doing so, citing either a pause in operations or a state of emergency that he himself declared.
As early as February of this year, the Supreme Court ruled that the president does not have the right to impose tariffs without the consent of Congress. Trump continues to impose them, citing a misleading interpretation of one of the laws. He will therefore continue to be the main player. Democrats can, of course, block his nominations in the Senate. They can strike him with various investigations; they can even initiate impeachment proceedings, but for that they need two-thirds of the vote, and they won't have that. He had grown accustomed to this sort of thing long ago. And he will still remain the alpha male. Polish officials, too, will therefore have to lobby him for decisions that serve Poland's interests. And conservatives, after some disorientation, can continue to flex their muscles, boasting about his friendship. It will be him, and not the Democratic Congress, who will decide on the presence of American troops in Poland; that is, a permanent base. For their part, the Democrats are likely to be more pro-European than Trump.
At the same time, if Trump goes too far in weakening NATO solidarity, if he actually imposes a new Yalta on Kyiv along with the Kremlin and Beijing, and especially if he starts betraying his formal allies from our region for Putin, he may alienate Poles. Friendly relations with the U.S. president may mean less in the eyes of our society in such a case than they do today.
I see one particularly unpleasant element in this. From time to time, I've tried to remind Polish Trump supporters that situations where the rules of international law and various forms of correctness are replaced by the argument of force can be attractive to a global superpower. For a country with Poland's strength and location, it's more of a problem. Then these discussions subsided. Because Trump changed his mind or his focus. The story of his changing positions on Ukraine would fill a book.
However, we have other circumstances as well. Ukrainian international commentator Mykola Susuyev wrote something sensible, which I will quote at length:
"The entire top management of Polar Train LNG has resigned in the USA. This is a strategically important American company that will build a large terminal for exporting American gas extracted in Alaska to Asian markets for $25 billion. Company CEO Joel Riddle resigned along with four other senior project management executives when he discovered that Russian Novatek and its management were financing the project and had direct influence on strategic decisions made for the company. Novatek has been under U.S. sanctions since 2023, and to carry out this project, a shell company was used – an investment fund from the UAE. Fund managed by former Novatek executives. Joel Riddle and other managers actually resigned so as not to become scapegoats when this whole scam comes out.
“The main initiator and promoter of this project is Texas investor Gentry Thomas Beach, a close friend of Trump for 30 years, with whom he shares business interests. It turned out that Beach himself didn't put a single dollar into this project and only served as its face and was the one who handled matters in the White House. However, as the ‘New York Times’ discovered, he was supposed to reach an agreement in 2025 with Russian oligarch Leonid Mikhelson, the head of the sanctioned company Novatek, regarding Russia's participation in this project, including its financing by a fund from Abu Dhabi.
“The Trump administration is not a Russian agency. It's an agency for Trump's family and friends. (...) The problem with the U.S. under Trump's administration isn't that they might sell you out to Russia, because that's the strategic arrangement and how they treat American interests in Europe. No, you might not get spare parts for F-16s or missiles for Patriot systems simply because Jared Kushner or Thomas Beach want to make a few bucks on deals with the Russians. The American Empire, with all its might, is held hostage not even by oligarchs but by petty crooks."
Susuyev writes that Polish Trump supporters are eager to write about corruption in Ukraine, which is real, but they don't ask who will arrest Beach. The U.S. federal government's increasingly strong involvement in business also has this dimension.
At the same time, although it's true that, while the fusion of business and politics in America has always been greater than in capitalist Europe, this administration, led by a professional businessman, is setting records. What we perceive as a geopolitical concept can be explained by much more mundane motives. Will today's more pro-social and pro-European Democrats want, and be able, to change this?
*Editor’s note: This article is available in its original language with a paid subscription.
Donald Trump is a player whose seemingly hopeless situations make his rivals exceptionally difficult to defeat. Despite potential losses due to old age and character traits, the logic of the American political system remains intact.
There is no more telling test of Donald Trump's attitude toward Central and Eastern European interests than his successive statements and actions regarding Ukraine and Russia. Here his line is inconsistent, zigzagging, and for many months blocked by actions in the Middle East, but his sympathy for Vladimir Putin's reasoning is obvious.
Trump, Ukraine and Russia: The Impact of US Elections on the Polish Right
Polish Trump supporters on the right find various points around the world where Trump's policies objectively harmed Russian interests — Venezuela, Greenland, and even the war with Iran can be presented this way. Nevertheless, when one hears about Trump's idea for him to establish peace terms on the Russian-Ukrainian front with the leaders of Russia and China, one can be horrified. The Polish right has become somewhat resistant to this. Partly due to an increasingly anti-Ukrainian stance, and partly because many of Trump's announcements amounted to nothing more than rhetoric: off-putting, but without any real consequences.
Of course, foreign issues don't play a fundamental role in the American campaign, apart from the high prices caused by the war with Iran. However, it is worth noting that, according to a recent study by The Economist and YouGov among Republican voters, 52% express sympathy for Ukraine, and toward Russia ... 4%. This happened when Trump, for an otherwise immediate electoral purpose, loosened the corset of anti-Russian sanctions in order to buy some fuel from Putin. And just a moment earlier, Democrats and Republicans in Congress had only just agreed to grant him the right to tighten them.
Marek Magierowski cited this in Krynica as an example of poor social sentiment awareness. Another is the American president's increasingly open identification with the causes of the rich. Surrounded by big tech CEOs, he is increasingly less associated with the "populist Republicanism" of his campaign. To this day, his vice president, who is otherwise more isolationist and anti-Ukrainian, JD Vance, remains faithful to this spirit. Vance, a potential contender for the presidency.
During the panel in Krynica, Jakub Dymek stated that even if these elections don't resolve much in the U.S., they will be a kind of primary election in Poland, ahead of the showdown in the fall of 2027. They could deal a blow to the Polish right if the Democrats take control of Congress (which, as we now know, is exactly what happened). But if Trump had defended the Republicans' position, it could have been, in turn, a kind of defeat for Donald Tusk.
Polish liberals and the left are already preparing to declare a virtual victory. The conservatives will respond that it's none of their business, but they will feel cornered. Until now, its politicians have had to put on a brave face when Trump made overly friendly gestures toward Putin. As a result, they referred to him a bit less, and Polish President Karol Nawrocki had to distance himself from the White House's position a few times.
Let's repeat: Americans did not vote for this or that policy toward our region in Europe. Trump is paying the price for expensive gasoline, not for "betraying Eastern Europe." Although Tusk can also use this as a game of associations. After all, he blamed the American administration for the high prices at gas stations in Poland.
I understand the right's conviction that Trump changed the global balance of power in the culture war worldwide. And the hope, formulated circuitously, for example by the Law and Justice Party or Nawrocki's circle, that even if they hand Ukraine over to Russia, they will at least maintain a protective umbrella over Poland. I understand, although I warned that too strong an identification with Trump could backfire on the conservatives.
I see a strong conviction on leftist and liberal websites that Trump will be completely blocked. I've already written that a president who loses a war for Congress still has a great influence on reality (like Harry Truman in 1946-1948, although he was advised to resign then). Foreign policy is, for example, his domain; a strong veto can force the other party into agreements. Trump is a player whose seemingly hopeless situations make him exceptionally difficult for rivals to defeat. He may get lost due to old age and character traits, but not due to the logic of the American political system.
True, both parties are less flexible and willing to compromise today than they used to be, and the Democrats' advantage is overwhelming. But Trump has pursued a policy of increasingly concentrating power in his own hands and circumventing both Congress and the courts. For example, after 60 days from the commencement of hostilities, the president should seek authorization from Congress, but he used various loopholes to avoid doing so, citing either a pause in operations or a state of emergency that he himself declared.
As early as February of this year, the Supreme Court ruled that the president does not have the right to impose tariffs without the consent of Congress. Trump continues to impose them, citing a misleading interpretation of one of the laws. He will therefore continue to be the main player. Democrats can, of course, block his nominations in the Senate. They can strike him with various investigations; they can even initiate impeachment proceedings, but for that they need two-thirds of the vote, and they won't have that. He had grown accustomed to this sort of thing long ago. And he will still remain the alpha male. Polish officials, too, will therefore have to lobby him for decisions that serve Poland's interests. And conservatives, after some disorientation, can continue to flex their muscles, boasting about his friendship. It will be him, and not the Democratic Congress, who will decide on the presence of American troops in Poland; that is, a permanent base. For their part, the Democrats are likely to be more pro-European than Trump.
At the same time, if Trump goes too far in weakening NATO solidarity, if he actually imposes a new Yalta on Kyiv along with the Kremlin and Beijing, and especially if he starts betraying his formal allies from our region for Putin, he may alienate Poles. Friendly relations with the U.S. president may mean less in the eyes of our society in such a case than they do today.
I see one particularly unpleasant element in this. From time to time, I've tried to remind Polish Trump supporters that situations where the rules of international law and various forms of correctness are replaced by the argument of force can be attractive to a global superpower. For a country with Poland's strength and location, it's more of a problem. Then these discussions subsided. Because Trump changed his mind or his focus. The story of his changing positions on Ukraine would fill a book.
However, we have other circumstances as well. Ukrainian international commentator Mykola Susuyev wrote something sensible, which I will quote at length:
"The entire top management of Polar Train LNG has resigned in the USA. This is a strategically important American company that will build a large terminal for exporting American gas extracted in Alaska to Asian markets for $25 billion. Company CEO Joel Riddle resigned along with four other senior project management executives when he discovered that Russian Novatek and its management were financing the project and had direct influence on strategic decisions made for the company. Novatek has been under U.S. sanctions since 2023, and to carry out this project, a shell company was used – an investment fund from the UAE. Fund managed by former Novatek executives. Joel Riddle and other managers actually resigned so as not to become scapegoats when this whole scam comes out.
“The main initiator and promoter of this project is Texas investor Gentry Thomas Beach, a close friend of Trump for 30 years, with whom he shares business interests. It turned out that Beach himself didn't put a single dollar into this project and only served as its face and was the one who handled matters in the White House. However, as the ‘New York Times’ discovered, he was supposed to reach an agreement in 2025 with Russian oligarch Leonid Mikhelson, the head of the sanctioned company Novatek, regarding Russia's participation in this project, including its financing by a fund from Abu Dhabi.
“The Trump administration is not a Russian agency. It's an agency for Trump's family and friends. (...) The problem with the U.S. under Trump's administration isn't that they might sell you out to Russia, because that's the strategic arrangement and how they treat American interests in Europe. No, you might not get spare parts for F-16s or missiles for Patriot systems simply because Jared Kushner or Thomas Beach want to make a few bucks on deals with the Russians. The American Empire, with all its might, is held hostage not even by oligarchs but by petty crooks."
Susuyev writes that Polish Trump supporters are eager to write about corruption in Ukraine, which is real, but they don't ask who will arrest Beach. The U.S. federal government's increasingly strong involvement in business also has this dimension.
At the same time, although it's true that, while the fusion of business and politics in America has always been greater than in capitalist Europe, this administration, led by a professional businessman, is setting records. What we perceive as a geopolitical concept can be explained by much more mundane motives. Will today's more pro-social and pro-European Democrats want, and be able, to change this?
*Editor’s note: This article is available in its original language with a paid subscription.
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