What the Americans Have Lost

The Americans have begun to recognize that the Iraq campaign has resulted in some significant setbacks for the U.S. Army. Recently, the Pentagon announced that it had lost track of some 190,000 weapons that the Americans had handed over to Iraqi government military units.

However, the easy leakage of these weapons out of Iraqi government hands and into the unknown couldn’t possibly have occurred without the knowledge of the intelligence services, all of which are fully aware that government units are obedient and subservient tools for the powerful militias. The Americans certainly know that the formation of government forces on the basis of sectarian quotas is the real reason for the disappearing weapons, wasted money and loss of national stability. It is also the direct cause of Iraq’s ongoing bloodshed.

If the Pentagon or any other American agency dominating Iraqi affairs decided to take an inventory of how much of Washington’s support has been given and lost, it would be clear that the trouble began with the assumption that giving support to this broken government or the one that preceded it would yield positive results; these were decisions that have resulted in Iraq’s ruin.

If the Americans decided to take a real inventory, the recognition of the loss of this insignificant number of light weapons would be just the beginning. The Iraqis have possessed many times as many weapons for decades.

Such an accounting would have to include massive lists of politicians that Washington has lost – politicians who went along with the U.S invasion and then became spies for the Iranians.

Tremendous financial assistance was lost when the Americans were tempted by Iraqi government promises that armed groups would be put out of business forever; it was later that such promises were shown to be nothing but a mirage.

Such an inventory would show the extent of the damage done to Washington’s international standing when the U.S. thought that Nouri al-Maliki and his group of foolish, good-for-nothing advisors would be capable of changing the outlook of Iraqis in regard to the future of their country – and thus change the balance-sheet of American forces from losses to gains.

The inventory would show how much of Washington’s efforts were thrown to the wind when it depended on ignorant speculators more interested in real estate, hotels and expensive restaurants than establishing a civil society, democratic media and political institutions in broken-down Iraq.

The list would show how much the American administration has lost and continues to lose, while it remains silent about submitting government officials to local and international courts as perpetrators of crimes against humanity for killing their victims or forcing them to flee their homes. The average Iraqi (supposedly, the original subject of the Iraq War) doesn’t understand restricting trials to crimes committed in a bygone era while contemporary criminals wearing official uniforms get away with stealing the people’s money and siding with sectarian groups with the blood of the people on their hands.

This is not the final assessment of what Washington has lost in the Iraq War. I and many others await the recognition of other agencies outside the Pentagon of what the Americans have lost, as the fifth year of this war of rebellion unfolds.