Ankara’s Dilemma

The United States and Turkey have common interests in the area, from energy to the Caucasus in Iran

The election of Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States was welcomed with enthusiasm in Turkey. But at the same time, there was a certain unease expressed by those who fear that this choice could jeopardize the bilateral relationships between Washington and Ankara, especially following the open support that the new president expressed on a resolution from the American congress on the Armenian genocide.

Those who instead rejoiced in this election are expecting that Obama will push Turkey towards a greater respect for human rights, the rules of democracy and the rule of law. For this very reason, others feel embarrassed and would have preferred a Republican president who appreciates these values only in words, but actually bases relations between the United States and Turkey primarily on considerations of strategic interest and security.

The relations between Turks and Armenians have been very tense during the Bush administration and have improved only after the November 5th , 2007 meeting between the American president Bush and the Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan. Bush’s request for greater transparency of the Turkish military secret service has contributed to improving the image of the United States in this country and restoring confidence.

Americans recognize that the cooperation of Turkey is desirable and necessary to resolve many thorny issues that the new administration will have to face, from Iraq to Iran in the process of peace in the Middle East. Furthermore, the United States and Turkey have a clear common interest in coordinating their efforts to guarantee energetic security and stabilizing the Caucasus.

Faced with such important commitments, Washington and Ankara have to reach a clarification on their mutual grounds, preoccupations and prospects. In the last ten years, the regional politics of Turkey reflected a new direction towards favoring diplomatic action, the development of equal relationships and local initiatives. Its mediation between Syria and Israel, openness to Armenia and the desire to play a constructive role in the conflict between Iran and the United States are all initiatives that stem from this tendency.

Considering the preference of Obama for diplomacy over armed conflict, there are many possibilities of cooperation between the two allied countries. When the retreat of American troops from Iraq begins, Washington will ask Turkey to lend its assistance. In Afghanistan, if it comes to a truce that is also negotiated with the Taliban, the historic relations of Turkey with this country could become useful to lead to its reconstruction, the only guarantee of peace and stability in the long run.

The Turkish leading class and the public opinion, in general, will trust in American support for a just solution of the Cyprus conflict and greater U.S. aid in the struggle against the Kurds of the PKK in northern Iraq.

By now Turkey is realizing, albeit with reluctance, the political reality of the regional government of Kurdistan. It is very probable that relations between Ankara and Erbil will no longer have to go through Baghdad in the near future. But the prerequisites of such a development are in isolation weakening and ultimately, the elimination of the presence of the PKK in the north of Iraq and the continuation of the status of Kirkuk.

Last but not least, there is the question of Iran. The presence of Turkey for two years on the Security Council of the United Nations will make its agreement with the politics of the new American administration towards Teheran consequential.

Reluctant to apply punitive sanctions on Iran and inclined to sign energy agreements with this country, Ankara will have to undergo difficult choices should Obama decide to give priority to Iranian questions and want to introduce an embargo.

The geopolitical realities would seem to attribute, once again, great importance to Turkey in American foreign policy. In the past, its strategic importance and the trust that the United States was placing in its country were inversely proportional to the development of its democracy. In other words, during the Cold War, its democratic shortcomings did not worry Washington that much.

One of the first tests of the relationship between the Obama administration and Turkey will be to see if he considers its democratic progress fundamental or secondary. If Washington will continue to support the entrance of Turkey to the European Union and foster the same enthusiasm that it showed between 2002 and 2004, then the test will be overcome.