Will Obama Rebuild International Agreement?
Published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(Russia) on 19 January 2009
by Alexei Bogaturov (link to original)
(Russia) on 19 January 2009
by Alexei Bogaturov (link to original)
Translated from
by Olga Kerzhner.
Edited by Christie Chu.
It will be difficult for Obama to rebuild an international consensus by himself.
The president of the United States is a position whose role extends far beyond the U.S. borders. George W. Bush, who seemed very lucky, inherited America in almost ideal condition from Bill Clinton in 2000. But he left Barack Obama nothing but problems: two unfinished wars, a blown-up budget, bankruptcies, poor relations with the European Union and Russia, and worried Americans who fear their inability to pay their bills. It will take a great deal of intelligence, energy, and charm to convince the country to follow this president, especially if he has to take unpopular measures in order to deal with the crisis.
Things aren’t any easier in the sphere of international affairs. The U.S. is accustomed to thinking of itself as the center of the world democracy. It’s all the more curious, therefore, that western intellectuals now commonly use the expression “post-democratic state” to describe the American political system under Bush. This is despite the fact that in the 1990’s the world's political science was boiling over with visions of a global democratic society, whose central role was naturally given to the U.S. Reality moderated the romanticism of these visions.
Democratization in the hands of the Bush administration became an instrument in a series of regional conflicts, two of which resulted in war (in Iraq and Afghanistan), and three have been prevented or almost prevented (in Korea, Iran, and Georgia) due to fortuitous circumstances and the negotiating efforts of many countries that actually acted contrary to American Republican diplomacy.
In response to the growing conflicts, the unorthodox part of American political thought began discussing a variety of paths to freedom. Scientists and politicians began to reluctantly accept the inevitability and normality of national models of democracy of sorts, including non-liberal, “not yet liberalized," and “not quite liberal."
In principle, this should have eased the contradiction between Western and non-Western parts of the international system. The world cannot be judged and evaluated solely by American standards. There are many countries that want nothing to do with those standards, now or ever. To recognize this would be to exercise democracy in thought and politics. Will the new U.S. administration be able to accept the legality of pluralistic political development of the world within the framework of democracy? Will the American elite recognize the right of democracies not to resemble each other (even to a great extent)?
Everything in Obama’s personality - his youth, intelligence, and talent - appear to be sincere, and encourages people to view him as extraordinary. However, Condoleezza Rice had a similarly extraordinary personality. Rice’s legacy in American politics left an unprecedentedly rigid “orthodoxy complex” that future historians will be able to legitimately call “the Rice syndrome." This complex suppressed her natural ability to act in an extraordinary fashion. No one thinks that Obama will be the same. For one thing, he is a man, which (even under American conditions) psychologically facilitates his ability to break out of the mold.
It will be difficult to find the right tone and ideological basis for a conversation with Obama. The emotional keys in conversations between Putin and Bush - with their emphasis on faith, democracy, and the fight against terrorism - have been played out. Following the Georgian venture, it has become clear that the theory of the democratic world (the hypothesis that democracies do not fight among themselves) does not work if it isn’t fed by geopolitics (i.e., if it isn't backed by coinciding geopolitical interests).
Russia is building a democracy, not out of solidarity with the U.S., Western Europe, or Japan, but because Russians need a democracy. After the events in Georgia, it’s wiser to negotiate with Americans from a position of pragmatism rather than ideology, although it has always been more difficult to talk to Democrats than Republicans about practical matters. This may be one of the complexities of upcoming dialogue with Obama.
It is important to note that from the Washington columnists’ perspective, when Russia uses a sharp tone in statements addressed to the Ukraine and Georgia, it is perceived as the strong pressuring the weak. But speaking psychologically and from looking at his career, Obama is a typical American common man (i.e. weak), who reached the position of the strong. It would be worthwhile to determine with which of these sides, weak or strong, the American president associates himself.
The key question is: What does American leadership mean to Obama? In the liberal-classical American understanding, it is based on the principle of leadership with the consent of the governed. Under Clinton, this principle was embodied in the strategy of imposed consensus. Bush changed the leadership formula. His policies upheld a single goal: to present U.S. interests as though they were the interests of the entire world, if necessary by force or threat of war. Does Obama have the will and power to restore international agreement?
The president of the United States is a position whose role extends far beyond the U.S. borders. George W. Bush, who seemed very lucky, inherited America in almost ideal condition from Bill Clinton in 2000. But he left Barack Obama nothing but problems: two unfinished wars, a blown-up budget, bankruptcies, poor relations with the European Union and Russia, and worried Americans who fear their inability to pay their bills. It will take a great deal of intelligence, energy, and charm to convince the country to follow this president, especially if he has to take unpopular measures in order to deal with the crisis.
Things aren’t any easier in the sphere of international affairs. The U.S. is accustomed to thinking of itself as the center of the world democracy. It’s all the more curious, therefore, that western intellectuals now commonly use the expression “post-democratic state” to describe the American political system under Bush. This is despite the fact that in the 1990’s the world's political science was boiling over with visions of a global democratic society, whose central role was naturally given to the U.S. Reality moderated the romanticism of these visions.
Democratization in the hands of the Bush administration became an instrument in a series of regional conflicts, two of which resulted in war (in Iraq and Afghanistan), and three have been prevented or almost prevented (in Korea, Iran, and Georgia) due to fortuitous circumstances and the negotiating efforts of many countries that actually acted contrary to American Republican diplomacy.
In response to the growing conflicts, the unorthodox part of American political thought began discussing a variety of paths to freedom. Scientists and politicians began to reluctantly accept the inevitability and normality of national models of democracy of sorts, including non-liberal, “not yet liberalized," and “not quite liberal."
In principle, this should have eased the contradiction between Western and non-Western parts of the international system. The world cannot be judged and evaluated solely by American standards. There are many countries that want nothing to do with those standards, now or ever. To recognize this would be to exercise democracy in thought and politics. Will the new U.S. administration be able to accept the legality of pluralistic political development of the world within the framework of democracy? Will the American elite recognize the right of democracies not to resemble each other (even to a great extent)?
Everything in Obama’s personality - his youth, intelligence, and talent - appear to be sincere, and encourages people to view him as extraordinary. However, Condoleezza Rice had a similarly extraordinary personality. Rice’s legacy in American politics left an unprecedentedly rigid “orthodoxy complex” that future historians will be able to legitimately call “the Rice syndrome." This complex suppressed her natural ability to act in an extraordinary fashion. No one thinks that Obama will be the same. For one thing, he is a man, which (even under American conditions) psychologically facilitates his ability to break out of the mold.
It will be difficult to find the right tone and ideological basis for a conversation with Obama. The emotional keys in conversations between Putin and Bush - with their emphasis on faith, democracy, and the fight against terrorism - have been played out. Following the Georgian venture, it has become clear that the theory of the democratic world (the hypothesis that democracies do not fight among themselves) does not work if it isn’t fed by geopolitics (i.e., if it isn't backed by coinciding geopolitical interests).
Russia is building a democracy, not out of solidarity with the U.S., Western Europe, or Japan, but because Russians need a democracy. After the events in Georgia, it’s wiser to negotiate with Americans from a position of pragmatism rather than ideology, although it has always been more difficult to talk to Democrats than Republicans about practical matters. This may be one of the complexities of upcoming dialogue with Obama.
It is important to note that from the Washington columnists’ perspective, when Russia uses a sharp tone in statements addressed to the Ukraine and Georgia, it is perceived as the strong pressuring the weak. But speaking psychologically and from looking at his career, Obama is a typical American common man (i.e. weak), who reached the position of the strong. It would be worthwhile to determine with which of these sides, weak or strong, the American president associates himself.
The key question is: What does American leadership mean to Obama? In the liberal-classical American understanding, it is based on the principle of leadership with the consent of the governed. Under Clinton, this principle was embodied in the strategy of imposed consensus. Bush changed the leadership formula. His policies upheld a single goal: to present U.S. interests as though they were the interests of the entire world, if necessary by force or threat of war. Does Obama have the will and power to restore international agreement?