Time to Break the NATO Taboo

NATO is in bad shape. Its strategic concept is obsolete.

If the Atlantic Alliance is to have any future, if it is meant to strengthen trans-Atlantic ties, then it’s in everyone’s interest to risk breaking one taboo: a ruthless analysis of its shortcomings and mistakes during recent times is absolutely necessary. Only such an analysis can form the basis for a constructive dialogue concerning the alliance’s future.

NATO didn’t cut an especially good figure during the Georgian crisis, showing little unity on the issue. It became clear that a deep rift ran through the alliance – between the new members, who define security in anti-Russian terms, and the old members, who stress balance and partnership with Russia. The tension between NATO and Russia was further damaged by the lack of dialogue between the two.

For years, the alliance has shown near-criminal neglect in the areas of arms control and disarmament, something that has led to an erosion of European stability. The treaties that ensure nuclear stability between world powers expire this year. The termination of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and America’s declared intention to station components of a national anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic have damaged relations with Russia. The treaty that deals with conventional forces in Europe was modified to suit current conditions, but it has been ratified only by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine; the NATO nations, in contrast, have persisted in delaying ratification for years. Russia finally lost its patience and has temporarily set it aside.

The 1999 NATO strategic concept is now totally obsolete. It was created before the events of 11 September 2001, before the latest round of NATO expansion, before its engagement in Afghanistan, before the defense of maritime lanes in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and before the Iraq war.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has repeatedly warned that the alliance must develop a new strategy and answer several important questions: which strategic concepts can be developed from previous experiences with asymmetrical threats and global terrorism? What threats do countries on the verge of collapse raise? How can we confront threats at their point of origin, i.e., before their devastating effects reach our shores? How can the alliance contribute to the security of important transportation routes? How could the alliance assist in intensifying arms control and disarmament measures?

Nothing has been done about the extent of the dangers with which we must deal, no strategic requirements addressed, although the crisis potential becomes clearer every day.

The battle against terrorism and radical Islam hasn’t been won. The dangers of cultural conflict continue to grow. A fiasco is in the making in Afghanistan unless a dramatic change in basic strategy is made and the situation there is contributing to security risks in Pakistan and India.

The spread of weapons of mass destruction is also not under control. Even before Iran became a threat, an arms race had begun in the Middle East. Israel is the most threatened and therefore the most tempted to find its salvation by military means.

The potential for crisis and conflict is concentrated in the Near and Middles East, in the so-called “southern crisis arc” that runs from North Africa through the Middle East to Central Asia and encompasses a region holding more than two-thirds of the world’s energy reserves. The most probable dangers to western security and economic survival over the coming years and decades will come from this region.

Central Asia has all the ingredients for conflict and crisis: immense energy reserves, numerous ethnic squabbles, corrupt governments, Islamic fundamentalists and a petroleum-based opposition to the world’s powers. Whoever lights the fuse to this powder keg can only lose. Accepting Georgia into NATO won’t change anything, especially since we have no vital interests there that require a military defense.

How will NATO deal with these challenges? Get involved with the problems of the Middle East? What exit strategy does it have for Afghanistan? How does the alliance assess India’s precarious security situation and what consequences does that have for Europe’s security? Why does NATO refuse to discuss Russian suggestions for a new European security architecture?

The NATO members must really worry when they consider how the alliance is supposed to fulfill its duties if there’s no longer a basic consensus of what the organization’s mission should be, no longer a raison d’ètre. The European public isn’t in favor of military involvement in Afghanistan nor does it want constant and continued expansion of NATO. European governments haven’t given the public any illuminating information about these questions.

Because it has no clear concept, the alliance is drifting toward a situation full of doubt and insecurity and is in danger of losing control. A solution to the west’s precarious position remains elusive. The alliance, therefore, requires a conceptual and institutional rebirth. The following needs to be done:

– The nature of a political alliance among equal partners must again be brought into the foreground. The end of the east-west confrontation was the result of a politically laid-out strategy. Its highest goal was an equitable, peaceful and stable European political order. A comparable political strategy must be developed to meet the new challenges. Russia must be included as an equal partner to achieve this, therefore it is imperative that relations with Russia be normalized as soon as possible.

– The alliance must energetically pursue disarmament and arms control initiatives as well as initiatives for the security of those nations covered by Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreements; initiatives concerning the maintenance of nuclear balance must also be developed. It would serve European security well if the American missile shield project were put on hold until a new security architecture for all of Europe has been decided.

– It is of vital interest to the United States, Europe and Russia to take on the problem of ethnic and nationalist rivalries in the Near and Middle East in order to provide more regional stability – stability that will benefit the people and simultaneously ensure continued Western access to oil. A new strategic consensus to deal with the challenges of the Near and Middle East can neither be determined nor restricted by military action. New ways and means must be found and implemented.

– NATO should be restricted to essentially peacekeeping activities, mainly in the European region, and not be encumbered with giving aid during natural catastrophes or providing security for major sporting events.

– In the face of dwindling resources, the alliance should restrict itself to a realistic and affordable balance between a few rapidly-deployable, highly-modern, mobile and diverse strike forces and those troops needed to maintain the peace for a limited time in those regions where it has intervened.