Afghanistan Revised

NATO slides deeper and deeper into a war that it cannot win. Afghanistan hasn’t yet become NATO’s Vietnam, but it’s high time to reconsider its engagement there from the ground up.

Six years ago, NATO went into Afghanistan to provide help and protection to the civilian population there. Now, it slides inexorably deeper and deeper into a war that it didn’t want and one that it cannot win. Insurgents who fight in the shadow of the civilian population, who employ suicide attacks and who use targeted terrorism cannot be defeated militarily.

Two years ago Bantz Craddock, Commander of NATO, gave the order for a “spring offensive” against the Taliban. Seldom in history have so many mistaken calculations ever been made. Nobody talks about an offensive against the Taliban these days; on the contrary, it’s the Taliban that increasingly dictates the terms of engagement.

The flurry of activity that surrounds the constant search for more troops and the way the military leadership keeps on expanding requirements leads to only one conclusion: NATO has been hit by mission creep. This effect has been feared ever since Vietnam: first the enemy and the mission are underestimated, then more and more troops are sent into the campaign, all because no one has the courage to pause and reflect and to question their own decisions in any meaningful way.

Afghanistan isn’t NATO’s Vietnam yet. But if it isn’t meant to become so, then the alliance needs to take stock of its engagement there. The first thing that should be said is that the conventional wisdom within NATO that the Hindu Kush will decide NATO’s fate is complete nonsense.

A defeat or even a withdrawal without any successes would certainly throw the alliance into heavy turbulence. But neither is it a wise strategy to proceed stubbornly, fearing the result of failure, and hoping that someday the sheer number of troops and heavy weapons sent in will eventually lead to military victory. That logic just reeks of dangerous cluelessness.

NATO has to develop the courage to reconsider everything in Afghanistan from square one. Instead of the Defense Ministers’ clinging to their strategy of more troops, the member nations should take stock of the situation realistically and then decide, based on their conclusions, what they are capable of doing and – most importantly – what they’re willing to do.

It’s about time to dispel the widespread illusion in Germany that the Afghanistan mission is all about protecting the tender shoots of a halfway free society and to ensure they have room to grow.

It’s true that long-term infrastructure repair alone will bring some stability to the country. NATO now recognizes the connection between military security and civilian reconstruction and has begun to couple its military actions with the work of assistance organizations, although it is still by no means enough.

But the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated to such an extent that nation building cannot succeed by a military-civilian strategy alone. NATO must face the fact that the conflict is dangerously affecting the entire region and will eventually pull NATO, led by the United States, into a war beyond the Afghan borders.

Attacks on Afghanistan originate mainly in Pakistan because Islamabad is politically and militarily too weak to push the Taliban from its border regions or even to control them. The fact that Pakistan just ceded an entire valley to the Taliban has to frighten the United States and NATO. Anyone who wishes to weaken the Taliban enough so that it is no longer capable of causing suffering in Afghanistan will eventually have to engage it on Pakistani territory.

The slow deterioration of Pakistan also presents another problem for NATO: NATO’s supply lines run principally through Pakistan and are therefore vulnerable. There are alternative routes, but the best and most secure run through Iran; the continuing disagreements over Iran’s nuclear program preclude any meaningful cooperation there.

The new American president is currently reconsidering the entire Afghan operation. That’s prudent provided the main policies are restored and the automatic military solution of “more troops” is finally abandoned. But the Europeans shouldn’t leave the revision of Afghanistan policy solely up to Obama.

Europe has to develop its own perceptions. It’s no longer a matter of merely fine-tuning an allegedly correct policy. Europeans have increasingly to ask themselves whether they really understand the gravity of the situation and whether they’re ready to change course, becoming active participants both militarily and politically. They must decide if they want to be players or pawns.

To be players, they first have to develop an offensive military strategy against the Taliban beyond Afghanistan’s borders. Secondly, they have to get the political support of neighboring states, forming political alliances and partnerships in which they may have to accept some unpleasant conditions. That’s the only way there’ll ever be a realistic hope of avoiding a descent into an uncontrollable war.