Obama’s Delicate High Wire Act in Iran

He hopes to encourage the Iranian opposition while simultaneously avoiding alienating the ruling Islamists: the U.S. President will need to use a lot of diplomatic dexterity.

Shortly after his election, people were already saying that Iran would become President Obama’s acid test, but at that time they were referring to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. It was feared that Iran would have “a nuclear weapons potential” as early as the end of 2009 that could shortly lead to their having weapons of mass destruction.

The acid test is already there, but in the form of the Iranian presidential election and the rebellion of hundreds of thousands protesting its remarkable outcome as well as the divisive and opaque maneuvers of the many different power groups.

A great deal will now depend upon how Obama reacts, how he manages to encourage those Iranians thirsting for freedom while not alienating the powerful theocrats who rule the country; how to bring about the gradual change from dictatorial rule; how to create a nuclear policy with a sense of proportion; how to dry up the Hamas and Hezbollah supply routes; how to bring about peace to the Middle East in general.

Thus far, Obama has warned Iran to respect everyone’s human rights but has avoided meddling directly in the power struggle. Because he refuses to be too closely involved, his opponent in the presidential election, Republican Senator John McCain, has accused him of completely and utterly failing the acid test.

McCain accused the President of being too timid in supporting the Iranian opposition. And McCain finds Obama’s stated opinion that there’s probably not much difference between Ahmedinejad and Mousavi “absolutely horrifying”. Some of Obama’s opponents are now challenging him to make a return trip to the Middle East and give a speech at Iran’s border calling for freedom.

The fact is, Obama’s remark was a bit awkward, to say the least. There is a definite difference between the two men when it comes to Iran’s domestic policies. Many Iranians see Mousavi as the source of change in Iran’s economic policies, for increased freedom of expression and the right to assemble, for gender equality. The protests in large urban areas are to a great extent by and for many Iranian women.

Nevertheless, Obama’s foreign policy instincts here are correct. Like Ahmedinejad, Mousavi will seek to further Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The centrifuges will continue to turn and it won’t be long before Iran has sufficient fissionable material to produce one or two, perhaps even three, nuclear bombs. And whether Mousavi would soften his tone concerning Israel remains to be seen. Seen in the cold light of day, it would probably be far more difficult for an international coalition to deal with a beloved Iranian reformer in power than it would with a hated dictator.

Obama has to pull off a devilishly difficult high wire act. The President who promised to support global human rights can’t afford to leave the Iranian demonstrators in a lurch. On the other hand, neither can Obama afford to alienate all those with whom he’ll have to negotiate when it comes to nuclear ambitions, support of terrorism and Middle East peace on the whole. The only thing that’s clear right now about power politics in Iran is this: nothing is clear.

No one knows how or to what extent the elections were rigged and whether Mousavi really won or lost. One thing that is known, however, is that Ahmedinejad has a good deal of support – and we know who’s really pulling the strings from behind the curtain: the President and Parliament (above all the Revolutionary Guard), the Guardian Council, the high-level religious leaders and the theocrats in the city of Qum. They all have their fingers in the pie.

Many of them will still have the actual say in Iran regardless of who is President. Under these circumstances, Obama can do little more than to continue his balancing act. So far, he’s still on that tightrope.