U.S.-Israeli Relations: Nothing New

After Obama’s speech at the University of Cairo, optimists were preparing to praise the positive change in American discourse towards Arabs and the Palestinian cause, the supposed ability to make a breakthrough in the wall of Israeli stubbornness and the possibility of political reconciliation after Israel’s stoppage of new settlements and recognition of the “two-state solution.” However, the Israeli prime minister squelched any hopes in a speech made to a carefully selected audience of right-wing Israeli academics at Bar-Ilan University. He spoke of historically modified realities – using them to circumvent Obama’s words regarding the settlements and Palestinian state – and put an end to the escalating debate in the Middle East about the limits of Israel’s relationship with America, and the fragmentation and vulnerability of Arab opinion.

The political goods offered by Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan exceeded accepting or rejecting proposed plans or initiatives. His desire was to retroactively legitimize Israeli Zionism. He also demanded Palestinian recognition of the Jewish State of Israel as a condition for accepting a demilitarized Palestinian state backed by international guarantees of security. He included a call to relocate Palestinian refugees outside of Israel, reaffirming that a united Jerusalem will remain the eternal capital of Israel. Furthermore, he spoke of the cessation of Palestinian land confiscation for settlement, which means not only the desire to continue to build within the current settlements, but also the theft of public property, including most of the West Bank. Truth is, the three settlement blocs in the West Bank – Maale Adumim, Gush Etzion and Ariel – along with other settlements, the network of bypass roads and the apartheid wall have all been extracted from Palestinian lands and comprise about 40 percent of the West Bank territory. This does not take into account Israel’s so-called Greater Jerusalem and the Jordan valley region, which Tel-Aviv intends to annex.

Logically, those in politics and media should pick apart Netanyahu’s statements and search for inconsistencies, especially between the right-wing Israeli agenda and what Obama said in Cairo. The goal is to anticipate the consequences of the Israeli statements in regards to the U.S., who aspires to change its damaged image among Arabs and Muslims and restructure its interests in the Middle East. However, when the U.S. administration welcomed Obama’s statement, regarding it as “an important step forward,” some predicted that the U.S. would be unable to influence Israel or understand the Palestinian point of view. Netanyahu tried to maneuver his statements between the U.S. desire for a Palestinian state, and the desires of the Likud majority and their allies in his coalition government. This adds to the fact that Netanyahu himself considers a Palestinian state, in essence, an absolute rejection of Jewish rights.

Accordingly, we can presume that Netanyahu’s statement is meant this way if he believes that Obama’s pledges to achieve peace are no more than an attempt to appease the Arabs. Sooner or later, reality, which says that Israel is the most important strategic ally of the United States in the region, will set in. The U.S. administration is trying to sweet talk the Palestinians into focusing on “the real enemies”: Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and fundamentalists. According to the U.S., these groups are the greatest danger not only to Israel, but also to Arab countries and the rest of the world. It is assumable that Netanyahu has seriously read Obama’s Cairo speech, and considers the strength and durability of American-Israeli relations unbreakable. Obama grasps the right of Jews to have a homeland in Palestine, and wants to avoid putting the responsibility for the Palestinian tragedy on Israel, or associate the Palestinians with the suffering of Jews, who were victims of the so-called “Holocaust.” Obama’s administration desires not to impose anything on both parties. Also, the duty of the Arabs is to guide the peace process through a few steps of normalization that contribute to achieving a Palestinian state.

It is important to recall, in this context, that the traditional policy of the United States towards Israel is based on far-reaching interests that are not easily affected by any minor disputes. Here, we have to recall that Israel has not always followed the path laid out for them by the Americans. There are examples of incidents where the relationship was disrupted and Israel became more of a burden, such as in the years following the end of the Cold War. During this time, many began to see Israel as the cause of instability in the Middle East and as standing in opposition to U.S. policy in the region.

The essential element in the U.S.-Israeli problem, portrayed as one of the manifestations of change in strategy in the Arab-Israeli conflict, is that the Americans see an opportunity to rebuild their image in the region, crack the alliance between Damascus and Tehran and create an alliance of Arab nations against Iran’s nuclear program. Negotiations on a compromise should be struck in an innovative way: Israel should stop their new settlements; Palestinian refugees should be housed in host countries and should be only granted return if they want a Palestinian state; peace with Israel should be ensured; a demilitarized Palestinian state should be formed with its capital in East Jerusalem; an international regime to supervise the Old City of Jerusalem should be established; and border issues should be resolved by exchanging land. These terms were pointed out by the U.S. envoy assistant to the Middle East and old U.S. expert in the Middle East, Martin Indyk, when it was published in Yediot Aharonot. There are three opportunities to further the peace process: using the common concern of Israelis and Arabs about the Iranian nuclear program, playing on people’s tiredness of constant war and accepting a Syrian peace initiative to weaken Iran’s position in the process.