The Korean Triangle

In spite of Chinese support, the only country that North Korea respects and wants to be friends with is the United States.

The surprising and spectacular visit of former President Bill Clinton to Pyongyang on August 13 ended with the liberation of the two American journalists held by the Communist North Korean regime. Although the majority of the international community was happy with Bill Clinton’s success, not every country was pleased with the resolution.

China, for example, is more afflicted than happy at the success of Clinton’s mission. It is not that Beijing has any interest in the continued incarceration of the two Americans; the Chinese leaders are likely annoyed that the North Koreans have once again given prominence to the Americans and not to them. In fact, from the press releases it seems evident that Pyongyang did not even bother to inform Beijing of Clinton’s visit; it was Washington that notified Beijing of the former American president ‘s mission to Pyongyang.

Given that the North Korean regime could not even live a day without Chinese support, the question that needs an answer is the following: Why is Pyongyang so shamelessly looking down on Beijing? If we consider the process of negotiations of the so-called sextet (China, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and North Korea), the North Koreans have systematically demonstrated that they have a preference for making agreements with Americans, alone and without intermediaries. The most important agreements reached in relation to the suspension of the North Korean nuclear program were sealed between the North Korean and American negotiators, without any involvement of the Chinese or any notice.

For China, being excluded from the negotiations and put in second place not only means losing face; it also brings to light a basic flaw that is present in the relations between Beijing and North Korea.

Considering that the Chinese provide the North Koreans with the majority of their needs in terms of energy and food products, it is commonly held that only China can reduce the number of North Korea’s weapons. Consequentially, the West has always counted on Beijing to exercise pressure on Pyongyang to honor the nuclear disarmament agreements that have been ratified.

In reality, the situation is completely different: North Korea wanted to purposely defy the international community, ignoring agreements and conducting two nuclear tests. It has also made a mockery of China, its only ally, any time China has asked it to act in a more appropriate manner. Why then does Beijing appear impotent when Pyongyang could not survive without its support?

The answer is simple. If it is true that China is impatient with the North Korean nuclear ambitions, it is also true that it fears the Americans even more. However reprehensible Pyongyang’s regime may be, it still functions, even now, as a strategic buffer between China and the United States. If Pyongyang were to fall, and this is Beijing’s fear, this strategic asset would disappear and Washington would once again have an opportunity to install its military bases even closer to Chinese territory. It is useless to say that the North Koreans understand Beijing’s fears all too well and don’t bother taking into account what it thinks.

As long as China and the United States remain strategic adversaries in the long term, there is not much left for China to do other than continue to support a dangerous and ungrateful ally. The only country that North Korea respects and with which it wants to be friends at any cost is the United States. Bill Clinton’s mission to Pyongyang, crowned with success, is only the latest example of how the United States, in spite of all their problems, intends to be a leader in negotiations. To China, however, it is the latest reminder of the limits of their power and prestige.