Obama and the Risks of Having No Strategy in Afghanistan

Lal Mohammed is the name of the Afghan farmer whose nose and ears were cut off by the Taliban as punishment for going to vote in the first round of presidential elections. His story touched the heart of the public all over the world, obviously for just a brief moment. His stubborn courage seems to symbolize not only the strength of the humble masses, but also individual dignity, which is able to prevail even when faced with the ferocity of the violent and the arrogance of the powerful.

But now we know his sacrifice has not helped. Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah has finally spoken, stating that he will not participate in the election, for fear of further fraud. The paradox is that, strictly according to the Afghan constitution, the election should be held anyway, at the peril of the many like Lal Mohammed, or President Hamid Karzai, whose brother is accused of being simultaneously a drug smuggler and on the CIA payroll, could lose the precious little legitimacy he has. One might say, “Good first year at the White House, Mr. President!”

Certainly, the situation in the area is rapidly becoming a disaster and it seems that the White House doesn’t have much of a clue what to do. Under these conditions, the 40,000 reinforcements (perhaps) promised to General McCrystal are likely to be in jeopardy. On the other hand, without these or any reinforcements, the troops already on the ground may represent little more than targets for attacks by Taliban and al-Qaeda.

With the deterioration of the institutional situation in Afghanistan, it appears more and more that the much desired “political solution” for the mess in Afghanistan could be even more chimerical than a military solution. It looks like everyone in Washington is paralyzed. The idea of villages protected by local troops backed by the U.S. military is too damn similar to the Vietnamese nightmare designed by the Johnson-Westmoreland (commander of U.S. troops in Indochina) team. The simple removal of Karzai, assuming they can find someone to replace him, reminds us too much of the road that led to the Red Army’s victory.

Under these conditions, however, it is time that the White House decides what to do without further delay, even at the cost of “commissioning” Karzai and entrusting the “temporary dictatorship” to McChrystal. It’s a politically incorrect strategy, no doubt, and very, very risky; but it is certainly better than the “non-strategy” in place in the field thus far. In fact, it’s just absurd and amateurish that the efforts of those who contribute the most to attempt to secure the country (the U.S. and coalition troops) are continuously changed and further complicated by internal feuds, a coalition as corrupt as it is ramshackle, an awful Independent Electoral Commission, and by the usual chatter of U.N. officials about principles.

If the White House is not prepared to give a tug on the halter of Karzai and company, they might as well start talks with other members of the coalition to get out of there as quickly as possible, “hoping” that Afghanistan will remain a land of none for many years to come, rather than immediately becoming an exclusive safe haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban once again.

This is perhaps the most difficult choice for Obama. The President can try to avoid the subject, but the fact remains that the one in Afghanistan is the “Obama’s war.” Or, at least, it has become one since, when pointing out the distinction between the Afghan and Iraqi fronts, then-candidate Barack convinced voters he had the makings of a “Commander in Chief.”