Obama’s Big Mistake

Obama’s exaggerated enthusiasm to act as an usher for Israel and the Palestinian Authorities, along with his inability to read a map, have caused him to make a strategical mistake from the outset.

The latest report on the prime minister’s refusal to respond to American demands in terms of freezing the settlements in Jerusalem is expected to stir up echoes from all sides. But this time, instead of trying to predict the future and what may happen, in my opinion, it would actually be better to focus on the lessons we can learn from the past.

A simple factual and historical survey of the different negotiation sittings between Israel and the Palestinians over the past 20 years will reveal that agreements have been made and signed even at the height of widespread building in East Jerusalem and the nearby areas. From that standpoint, Obama’s demand to freeze the building as a preliminary condition to negotiations between Netanyahu and Abu Mazen is similar to a boomerang that reaches a destination completely opposite of the original plan — the renewed start of the political process in the Middle East.

The year is 1993, the situation — the Israeli and Palestinian negotiation teams meet for the final touches on the imminent Oslo Accords. In those days, there were no less than 13,000 housing units in East Jerusalem in various stages of construction. This refers to Gilo, Neve Yaakov, Har-Homa and Pisgat Zeev. Arafat maybe didn’t like it, but he swallowed the pill for the benefit of signing an agreement that brought him back to Ramallah after a long exile as the recognized representative of the Palestinians. Even the Rabin administration’s announcement of its intentions to build 15,000 additional housing units by January 1995 did not hinder the negotiations that preceded the Oslo II agreement, which was signed in September, five weeks before the murder of Rabin.

Clinton did not get involved in the settlements, and that did not bother the well-being of Arafat too much, even when he entered into negotiation with Rabin’s successor, Netanyahu, on the Hebron agreement that was signed sometime in 1997, and later the Wye River agreement. Arafat and Abu Mazen, who played an active and important role in the deliberations, could not even dream about stopping the settlements in areas it was clear would be part of Israel in the future. Even Ehud Barak, who showed Arafat his willingness to give up the territories to an unprecedented extent, did not put an end to the building in Jerusalem, and even accelerated it in the neighborhoods of Har-Homa and Ras al-Amud. Clinton was also quoted at the same time as having said that “the United States cannot prevent Israel from building in Har-Homa.”

George Bush, one of the true friends of Israel who saw a true partner in Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, did not pressure his Israeli friend regarding the settlements, and he took an unprecedented withdrawal from the territories of Gush Katif and the Shomron — a withdrawal that was meant, according to Bush and Sharon, to expedite a permanent agreement. In exchange, Sharon received in April 2004 an American commitment annotated with these words:

“In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.”

The Political Process is at a Dead End

This detailed memorandum sent by Bush to Sharon, with which Obama chooses to get involved in a systematic manner (through a scathing violation of the rules that dictate that a certain country’s obligations to another country are not void with the entrance of a new administration to the White House), will therefore generate a clear division between settlements in the West Bank that are expected to be vacated if and when the sides reach an agreement, and continued settlements in the regions everyone knows will remain under Israel’s control even after such an agreement is reached. It was exactly that mantra that Netanyahu repeated in the last AIPAC meeting, which took place several weeks ago.

Abu Mazen, who turned into Arafat’s substitute with time, did not establish a freeze on settlements as a condition to the negotiations he held with Ehud Olmart, and that was out of an understanding that such a condition would lead the talks to a dead end from the very beginning. Furthermore, Olmart even publicly stated that building in the areas mentioned in his letter to Bush, like Gush Etzion and Beitar Alit, would continue.

At the time of this writing, the political process was at a dead end, and that is because Obama’s demands of Israel brought the prime minister into an impossible situation. Any concession on his part could be dismantled there. Then the present coalition and Netanyahu, who worries about the incorporation of the Kadima Party into the government and legitimizing Livni, who could replace him at any moment, will do everything in their power to prevent the collapse of coalition partners with the Shas, which was one of the principal causes of Netanyahu’s fall during his first term.

No Conditions Please

The third side of this problematic triangle is the president of the United States, Barack Obama. Obama, who has been considered since and following his election to be a pioneer and a real revolutionary (the fact of his election is an undeniable historical feat), was firm in breaking down the barrier and doing what many before him tried but didn’t succeed in doing — being the usher of an inclusive peace agreement between us and the Palestinians. On that and more, the American president didn’t listen to the warnings of his envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, who claimed more than once that the American government mustn’t make conditions to negotiations.

In past weeks, the pressure on Obama from prominent legislators has increased, Republican and Democratic, House members and Senators alike. One of the most prominent was the Democratic senator from New York, Chuck Schumer, who was one of the people that significantly influenced the passing of Obama’s health care bill in Congress about a month ago. Schumer, like many others, demanded that Obama stop pressuring Israel on the matter of Jerusalem, but the president’s exaggerated enthusiasm, in addition to his inability to read a map correctly, blinded him and brought him to execute what was, from the beginning, a strategical mistake that distanced all of the parties from the finish line. And that is why they say: The end of a deed is in thought first. Or, think before you act.