Iranian Nuclear Technology: The Convergence of Opposites

There is still more to find out in the latest developments in the issue of Iran’s nuclearization. For example, the tripartite agreement signed May 17 in Tehran by Lula, Erdogan and Ahmadinejad—the one which so irritated America —is the fruit of a negotiation openly supported by Obama and Hillary Clinton. On April 20, President Obama wrote the following in an open letter to his Brazilian counterpart: “For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile… I would urge Brazil to impress upon Iran the opportunity presented by this offer to ‘escrow’ its uranium in Turkey while the nuclear fuel is being produced.”

And on May 13, Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish minister of foreign affairs, discussed the subject with Hillary Clinton. The spokesperson for the Department of State [Philip J. Crowley] pointed out that “regarding the TRR, it was put on the table last fall to build confidence with the international community … Our stance, which is that Iran has to either respond or face the consequences of a U.N. Security Council resolution.”

Iran responded affirmatively four days later. The Security Council nevertheless passed a fifth resolution, intensifying Iran’s previous sanctions. Similar sanctions from the United States and the European Union can be expected as well. How did we get to this point?

To start off, on the West’s side, it was believed that the Turkish and the Brazilians would fail. The West was telling them to negotiate because they wanted to, but Obama’s hand, extended back in summer 2009, closed on the idea that lack of power could settle it all. It was thought best to try to get back to a specific project, with the hope of being able to build from there.

And of course! Ahmadinejad promptly expressed interest, but he ran into resistance from his own. The Westerners, faced with a procrastinating Tehran, returned to familiar ground: discussing Iran with everyone — everyone, save Iran. It was of little importance that acting in this way had, in the long run, strengthened the regime rather than weakened it, and in no way at all had it hampered Iran’s nuclear program. Of course, Tehran was simultaneously offered the option of negotiating a way out of the crisis, but the proposal—the suspension of its enrichment activities—was too close to the West’s objective: the definitive cessation of said activities. And it wasn’t until Hillary Clinton managed to convince the Russians and the Chinese to sponsor a new resolution at the Security Council that the Tehran agreement finally was signed. Two trains that were never bound to meet had a spectacular collision.

And then came reactionary rhetoric. Whereas Iran’s previous refusal to part from its uranium suggested sinister plans, its agreeing was a new maneuver aided by two naive countries. The Tehran agreement was criticized for not pursuing Iran’s enrichment activities, although the initial plan had never touched on the subject. It was underscored that at the time when an exchange had originally been brought up that the 1,200 kg of uranium asked for accounted for 80 percent of Iran’s stock. But by then, they were only asking for about half, which would leave Iran with enough for a bomb. Besides the fact that this figure was never corrected, it was also ignored that things would have been different this past May if only the agreement had been concluded last autumn.

Finally, it was decided that Iran’s launch of a campaign to achieve 20 percent enrichment of uranium, which had occurred in the meantime, invalidated the entire negotiation process. The fate of this new operation, which actually saw little success, could have been among the questions to be addressed in the development of the exchange. In short, the Turkish and the Brazilians were all wrong.

But the United States’ about-face will stick in the memory of these two countries for a long time. And in Iran, the opponents of any arrangement with America can triumph in light of the evidence of — in their eyes — Washington’s duplicity. Finally, there’s the feeling of defeating the Obama administration or, at least, its leader, who believed in the possibility of improving his country’s relationship with Iran. In the end, he finds himself sent back by his own troops, with Hillary Clinton at the lead, to George W. Bush’s camp, where the only solution to the Iranian nuclear problem was the “regime change.” Does Obama still want to try to improve the United States’ relationship with Iran? And does he have the power to achieve his vision?

Crossifre

Seeing that everyone has returned to their usual positions, one has to ask if the current situation isn’t the best fit for many. All things considered, this situation could prove to be rather comfortable if the Iranian nuclear menace wasn’t as intense as it’s said to be. After 20 years of crying wolf due to constantly surfacing revelations, it must be noted that the dark horizon of an Iran equipped with the bomb is looking increasingly distant as time goes on. Yes, Iran has made tremendous progress in regards to its enrichment technology, probably enough to furnish the primary material for an explosive device, but it is still running into problems. Moreover, from what can be observed, Iran is far from possessing the whole gamut of competences — various and specialized — that would allow the production of a bomb.

Finally, even if all this could come together, one would see it coming. There has been great progress in detection methods. The experience of the past 30 years tells us that when programs of this complexity approach maturity, they cannot remain secret once brought to the world’s attention.

While waiting for this moment, if it ever comes, the international tension aroused over the subject gives the Iranian regime grounds for calling on national unity in the face of the outside world. This cannot be contested. And the isolation that is imposed on Iran only strengthens the influence it has on its population. Israel could also get something out it. Every one of Ahmadinejad’s provocations reinforces the credibility of an existential threat that the government can rely on to rally its people, mobilize its friends on the other side of the world and get the settlement of the Palestinian question put on the backburner.

In this matter, the Arab States of the Gulf find common ground and the satisfaction of receiving American protection. As for the United States, they could benefit from gathering their camp around fighting nuclear proliferation and around their missile defense programs. Then there is the main victim of this convergence of opposites: the Iranian people, caught in the crossfire. With sanctions from one side and repression from the other, it’s admirable that they’ve still managed to respond and to hope.