War on Organized Crime

The “War on Organized Crime” in Mexico was born with original sin and, to date, has yielded only poor results. This “military confrontation” has caused anarchy along with an escalation of lawlessness and violence, which has now been highlighted by the assassination of a candidate for governor in the border state of Tamaulipas.

George Bush’s “War on Terror” paid off in the elections for one simple reason: the alleged terrorist threat came from outside the U.S., so the battles would be fought abroad in Iraq or Afghanistan, not on U.S. territory.

The harsh advantages for Americans are that Bush is no longer president and they only see the effects of their war on television from thousands of miles away. The bulk of civilian deaths have been of Iraqi or Afghan women and children. Few people applaud the U.S. army.

From the start, it seemed naïve to think that a Bush-style war, created to combat crime and drug trafficking, was not going to hit Mexican streets and households. Clinical wars do not exist — much less when an army is not facing another army but rather volatile organized crime or common criminals.

In the case of Mexico, a battlefield was invented, and the army was taken away to perform tasks for which it was not meant: strengthening the justice system and police professionalization. As one of the most respected institutions in the nation’s history, the army emerged a casualty of the war’s conceptual construction. It stopped being an “army of peace” in spite of the fact that it did not face any other nation.

It is true that, in the last decade, violence has increased exponentially. What is doubtful is whether this mix between political propaganda and military strategy is the most appropriate. From January 2007 to date, there have been more than 22,700 deaths related to the fight against drug trafficking. For international observers like Human Rights Watch, it is surprising that only four soldiers were blamed for human rights abuses between 2007 and 2008.

Since 2007, the Failed States Index of the Fund for Peace has highlighted the gravity of the human confrontation, demographic pressures and economic inequality in Mexico. In 2009, the security apparatus was caught failing for the first time. That is, the monopoly of violence has been broken, and there are clear signs or symptoms of anarchy and of the fragility of the internal security apparatus. This includes police and all those within the security system, not just the military.

At the end of the day, the primary target is the Mexican society. There are criminal groups that terrorize their supposed enemies, police and politicians who represent some opposition to their actions, as well as victims who send messages of fear at the local, regional or national level.

Given its dimensions and context, the murder of Rodolfo Torre Cantú can be considered an assassination, but its motives may qualify it as a terrorist act. It was an open attack to cause terror and demonstrate power. It was conducted at the close of an election campaign against a candidate who had an almost assured victory in Tamaulipas. It is a challenge to institutions, electoral democracy and the tranquility of the people.

The conclusion is clear: This Bush-style war brought fighting to Mexican streets and houses, and now neither the Mexican military nor law enforcement can leave suddenly, just as the U.S. forces cannot leave Iraq suddenly. For Mexico, the recommendation is still to copy what works and avoid mixing military strategy with political propaganda to solve public safety problems.