Why the U.S. Dislikes Sarkozy

During the past week, leading Anglo-American media attacked the French president, accusing him of ingratitude and near-betrayal of transatlantic friendship with France’s chief ally: America. All of this is due to Nicolas Sarkozy’s readiness to make the idea of a strategic alliance between Europe and Russia into something more substantive than empty declarations, of which everyone is tired.

Americans fear that Sarkozy could voice the new initiative at the upcoming meeting with President Dmitry Medvedev and Chancellor Angela Merkel, which will take place in Deauville on Oct. 18 and 19. American diplomats are particularly irritated by the circumstances that Sarkozy’s potential initiatives would sound in unison with the suggestions previously made by Medvedev.

According to The New York Times, “The idea is to have a single zone of security and economic cooperation, the officials said, that will pull Russia closer to Europe but apart from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” That is, without U.S. involvement? How dare they! The latter circumstance led to righteous anger in Washington. The newspaper quoted a high-ranking American diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity, “Since when, I wonder, is European security no longer an issue of American concern, but something for Europe and Russia to resolve?”

American diplomats are particularly irritated by the fact that Sarkozy’s potential initiatives will resonate with Medvedev’s previous suggestions of a new European “security architecture.” Washington had a skeptical response, voiced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. She said that the U.S. would not agree to measures that would weaken NATO, and would jeopardize the priority of the trans-Atlantic collective defense before any other obligations of the allies. In other words, let’s not fuss with treaties and formats. If you want to cooperate with the West, you must fully comply with the trans-Atlantic rules of conduct that are written, as you know, by the White House.

Only now it turns out that if the Europeans really dare to enter into a legally binding agreement with Russia to establish a framework for preventing military conflicts, then potential and existing conflicts will be resolved through the established mechanism of negotiations and urgent consultations. And then what will Americans do in Europe? Protect whom from whom?

But no one from the Deauville trio is looking that far into the continent’s future. They’re not even trying. On the contrary: For now, Paris, Berlin and even Moscow are willing to work with the United States in all key aspects of international relations. Especially in the fight against terrorism. But NATO, on the eve of the historic summit where a new strategic concept will be adopted, is not prepared to consider Russia as an equal partner in global security. For this reason, the transformation of the NATO-Russia Council into an effective instrument for conflict prevention and military partnership is being delayed. So why not start off by debugging such a mechanism with the European Union?

It’s worth mentioning that, with the advent of Barack Obama, the Americans themselves started the restoration of the entire set of relations with Moscow. Leading European countries are now trying to catch up with the initiative of building bridges with its eastern neighbor in the sensitive area of security (and other areas, too). Russia is needed in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Middle East settlement and the former Soviet Union. So why put a spoke in the wheels of Berlin and Paris, who are only following in the wake of U.S. foreign policy? Or has the U.S. State Department created a global monopoly on the “reset” with Moscow, and doesn’t want to share this scarce commodity with its allies?

There is also a more prosaic explanation for why America is jealous of old lady Europe’s suspected separate rapprochement with Moscow. For starters, the emerging “single zone of security and economic cooperation” presumes selling the French helicopter carrier Mistral, and perhaps other military equipment to Russia. Those who did not revise their anti-Russian Cold War bias in a timely manner could potentially be kept out of this promising market. That’s why the Anglo-Saxon press directs angry shouts at France’s enterprising leader, who is not afraid to plan independent breakthroughs in European “ostpolitik” during a crisis.