Holbrooke the American: A Great European

Eulogistic words accompanied Richard Holbrooke — the most prominent American negotiator in the last two decades — on his last journey. He was preparing the negotiations that, hopefully, would lead to a conclusion of the Afghanistan war.

I had heard details about his political and diplomatic career at the end of 1992, right after Bill Clinton was elected president of the U.S. I was in Washington, D.C., and the European diplomatic gossips were saying that Holbrooke would be given an important position at the State Department or even the White House. Therefore, I tried to learn what possible benefits Europe could gain from this, and I found out that Holbrooke valued relations with Europe and that he could temper the post-‘90s political current running through Congress — “leave Europeans take care of themselves when it comes to security and defense.” The gossip did not come true; instead, Holbrooke was appointed ambassador to Germany — an important diplomatic position, especially in Europe.

After observing the post-Maastricht evolution of the EU and the immense pressure from Central Europe to join NATO, President Clinton appointed Holbrooke in 1994 as assistant secretary of state for European Affairs. Shortly after his appointment, the new boss of European relations reorganized his office, creating the Central Europe bureau — with states taken from the former Eastern Europe bureau. This was not just a simple rotation of files, but rather a political signal for the countries in Central Europe that were most vocal for joining NATO. Also, NATO enlargement was a major point of interest for Holbrooke, who prepared the actions of the Allies from 1997 to 1999, from political and diplomatic points of view.

Unfortunately, some “errors in judgment” from Bucharest managed to create the impression, in Washington, that Romania did not know what it wanted and was not interested in what was to come either. Within a private conversation, at the end of 1994, Holbrooke was heard saying: “You regained the most-favored nation clause, you joined the Peace Partnership, and the State Department put you within the borders of Central Europe! What else could you possibly want?” The response from his Romanian companion was: “I want Romania to become the Eastern border of Western Europe — meaning part of the EU and NATO!” Holbrooke’s reaction was immediate: “My friend, this position must build up in Romania. Tell that to the guys in Bucharest.” During the next spring, Holbrooke became even more fond of Central Europe, through his marriage to Kati Marton, an American journalist born in Budapest.

By appointing Holbrooke to the State Department in 1994, the Clinton administration sent a signal for closer relations with Europe. Holbrooke himself signed, at the beginning of 1994, an article in Foreign Affairs called “America, a European Power.” In this article, Holbrooke said that the U.S. remained “committed” to Europe and that the U.S. wanted a new transatlantic relationship for the 21st century — meaning a more active American involvement in Europe. Holbrooke felt that Europe was facing a great opportunity — achieving peace by means of institutions. By that he meant NATO, of course, but also the EU. And the moment for American involvement came — with the conflict in the Balkans (the former Yugoslavia). When the European negotiators (Owen and Bildt) did not get results, Holbrooke pleaded for 14 weeks and signed the Dayton Accord. This was not only a personal success of the American negotiator, but also a clear statement about America’s leading position in international politics. There is much written about the effects of the Dayton Accord, and there still will be. The important aspect is that this American intervention stimulated NATO and EU enlargements and redesigned the continental balance of power by speeding up structural reforms in the countries from Central-Eastern Europe.

Holbrooke was not a comfortable character for the American political elite, because he strongly believed in a constructive criticism toward American imperfections, and he maintained the same attitude toward NATO and the EU. He considered that Europe must develop its own security strategy and clear objectives for its external affairs. But, in order to do this, Europeans should demonstrate political will and make resources available. In this respect, NATO and Washington should accept a strong EU and be prepared to redefine the role of the Alliance. Holbrooke praised the EU’s initiative to continue its enlargement with the Western Balkans, but warned about the risks of lacking a coherent strategy for the region and also a post-Dayton stabilization program.

In his mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Holbrooke proposed that NATO and the EU should be involved more actively — the EU especially, in regard to civil and economic reconstruction. His experience in international negotiations reinforced the belief that global interdependencies, where the U.S. and the EU have major interests, require involvement, coordination and cooperation.

Jerzy Buzek, president of the European Parliament, was right when he said on Dec. 14, 2010, that Richard Holbrooke “has earned himself the right to be called a great European.” Maybe his trust in the institutional capacity of the EU will encourage Europeans to revive the Union, and European leaders to propose a new and strong leadership.

Note: This article is published with the express permission of Dr. Vasile Puşcas.