It Is the U.S. That Wants Japan to Perceive China As a Threat

The Japanese have been taking incremental steps in the way the United States wants them to. The New Military Strategy Document, which was made public last Friday (Dec. 16, 2010), envisages the shifting 10 years of the heavy armor currently stationed in northern Japan to the south. Japan will also downsize the number of its tanks from 600 to 390 and abolish some of its artillery units, while getting more submarines and fighter aircraft as a part of its new strategy.

What this should be telling us is that, although they have not signed yet a peace agreement since World War II ended, Japan does not perceive Russia as a threat anymore, whereas China is becoming more and more of a cause for concern. The other issue that raises concerns in Japan is the exacerbation of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Japan’s preferences indicate a shift from military structuring for preventing occupation of the country toward a new structuring for objectives overseas.

Why Is Japan Important?

Despite the disagreement with the Obama administration over the future of the American military base on Okinawa Island, the Japanese government not only stopped challenging the existence of an American military base in the face of American reactions, but has also shown signs of taking additional strategic steps in line with American officials. There are three short-, mid- and long-term military objectives that the U.S. expects Japan to do: In the short term, Washington expects Japan to participate in joint military exercises with South Korea and the U.S. by sending soldiers, thereby joining the U.S.–South Korea “alliance” as the third force. In the mid-term, the U.S. wishes the repeal of an anti-armament clause in the Japanese constitution so that Japan can re-arm. And finally, the long-term expectation the U.S. has of Japan is Japan’s identification of China as its priority threat and its entrance into full defense cooperation with the U.S. against China in the Far East and Pacific.

There are two reasons for these American expectations: First, Japan’s military support would ease, to a great extent, the American navy’s task of controlling a large area stretching from the Malaka Straits to Hawaii. Because the U.S. sees China’s recent steps to empower its navy as a serious threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. wants to enlist Japan in the north while it draws Australian support for the South Pacific. The second reason is economic. Economists argue that for the United States to close its immense budget gap, it needs to reduce its defense expenses. If indispensable reductions in defense budget are not made from 2012 onward, the amount of interest to pay the internal debt is predicted to exceed the defense budget in 2018. The Obama administration has withdrawn American soldiers from Iraq in large part to cut these expenses, yet the increase he commanded in the number of soldiers in Afghanistan does not help the overall cut. On the other hand, about 2.25 million people are full-time employers in military-related jobs. When thousands of companies that work with the Pentagon are added to that number, it is understandable that there are concerns over potential increases in unemployment were the defense expenses to be cut.

Weapons Sales

This is why, just like during the Cold War years, the American administration finds it very important to sell advanced and expensive defense systems to “friendly countries” so as to turn the American military-industrial complex into a profitable instrument. The billion-dollar weapons deals with the Gulf countries, the development of a missile defense project, having the NATO countries accept the project, their efforts to sell Turkey eight-billion-dollar missile defense systems and exaggerating the Iranian threat are parts of this goal. In this vein, the U.S. wants Japan to institute a strong navy and air force and buy, of course, American weapons while doing so.

At this point, a contradiction, which sometimes leads to arguments in Congress and causes clashes between weapons producers and various lobbies, surfaces. While weapons producers lobby for the removal of legal hurdles before advanced weapons sales to China, which they see as a vast market, others who wish to see a weaker China object to such weapons sales. If the U.S. cannot overcome its extant budget problems, the United States could sell Japan and South Korea weapons while entering the Chinese weapons market at the same time, just like they did during the Iraq–Iran War (1980–1988). This should catch none of us by surprise.