The U.S. and China: Condemned to Like Each Other

Washington and Beijing can have different political systems, values and interests, but there is something that will hold them together until the end of the crisis: Their respective economic needs.

On the eve of Hu Jintao’s historic visit to Washington, no one could have expected that the conversations between the Chinese president and his U.S. counterpart could magically overlook the reality of the current political-economic balance that governs the relations between the two powers. Actually, expectations were not disappointed.

For the U.S. — or rather, for the Obama administration — the purpose of the Chinese visit was to combine two hardly compatible items: human rights and business.

The former has long been a weak point of the Sino-American relationship. But it had become even more so after the frank but politically unlucky claim of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who long ago stated that the issue of human rights could not in any way “interfere” with the bilateral relations between the two countries.

Recovering from the gaffe (or retaining at least a facade) was a political priority for the administration. This has also been addressed by the same Clinton speech on the eve of the visit, when she said that “the United States would also continue to call for China to observe the human rights of its citizens.”

The same was also said in a speech delivered by Obama, in that it “reaffirmed America’s fundamental commitment to the universal rights of all people.” The word of the president must be believed, since these issues were mainly raised in the more confidential situation of the private meetings, where they talked about this and much more.

This “much more” was the real core of this visit and was the object of many public statements, including those released during the joint press conference, which lasted about an hour.

Dominating the field was a double economic imperative: To revive U.S. exports to the only country now able to absorb them in great quantity and to give a breath of fresh air to, on the one hand, a domestic economy weakened by the crisis, and on the other, an administration whose popularity is affected by employment problems.

For their part, the Chinese need to develop an internal market that is being curbed by high saving rates, which made Beijing the banker of Washington but that now threaten to stifle growth, especially at a time when the U.S. does not import as much as before.

Inside this strong confluence of interests — the result of a deep mutual interdependence — lies the essence of the bilateral Sino-American relation and the ultimate reason for Hu’s visit (besides the triumphal welcome reserved for him).

Given the weak effectiveness of the U.S. to shed light on human rights and the vagueness of China’s commitment to them (“China has a long way to go on rights,”* Hu told reporters), the clear language of economic agreements sounds very different.

During the press conference, a beaming Obama announced a list of commercial agreements that increase the U.S. exports to China by $45 billion, with the creation of more than 230,000 jobs.

Obama told his Chinese interlocutors that “[the U.S.] wants to sell you all kinds of stuff. We want to sell you planes. We want to sell you cars. We want to sell you software.”And “as China’s per-capita income rises, that offers an opportunity for increased trade and commercial ties that benefit both countries.”

And, certainly, disagreements in economics are not missing.

In particular, Obama raised the issue of the alleged overvalued Chinese currency against the American dollar (which would damage U.S. exports), and the prickly matter of the protection of intellectual property rights, and how it relates to the Chinese counterfeit industry.

But the fact that Obama publicly tended to reduce these issues, asserting that occasionally they are a “source of tension”, speaks volumes about the climate that prevails in the bilateral relations.

Although constrained, the political-economic partnership between China and the U.S. is an urgent imperative for both countries, one which must be safeguarded against potential crises that, although important, are not essential to the issues at hand.

This is the hard lesson of realpolitiks that the Washington meeting entrusts to its protagonists and to all of us.

* Editor’s note: The above quote, properly translated, could not be verified.