Is the U.S. a Reliable Ally?

It is generally accepted that great powers do not have permanent friends or enemies; they only have permanent interests. But is it not imperative in a system of competitive polarity to preserve the very alliances that facilitate achieving those interests?

This question focuses attention on the doctrine of “smart power” and the impact it may be having, both in terms of key U.S. alliances and in the stability of the international system.

The “smart power” approach involves a pragmatic but not necessarily realistic vision, which tends to reduce the level of commitment, at least diplomatically, in bilateral alliances of vital strategic importance.

Colombia, Israel and Egypt are three specific instances of this principle. These privileged recipients of U.S. military aid have not seen it diminish under the Obama administration. What is more, in Colombia’s case the use by the U.S. of at least seven Colombian military bases says a great deal about how interdependent the two sides really are.

However, little has been done to cement this alliance with a free-trade agreement. Such ambiguity has colored Bogota’s view on the use of the bases and has even driven it to reconsider its role as a member of the Brazilian project UNASUR, going so far as to propose its own candidate for the General Secretariat.

In the case of Israel, Tel Aviv’s unsustainable settlements policy, its blockade of Gaza, as well as its insinuations of a possible preemptive attack on Iran, all testify to the lackluster management of bilateral relations with the United States.

Although geopolitical interests sustain the alliance, the deal that the Obama administration offered the Netanyahu government was dismissive from the beginning.

While the U.S. is responsible for administering punishments and rewards as a major partner in the relationship, the fact that it delegated the task of receiving a representative of an allied state to the Defense Department adversely affected the relationship and sowed personal distrust, in spite of routine military support.

The last case, that of Egypt, is linked to the second. It is difficult to justify the Mubarak regime, but as Sadat’s political heir and the representative of the secular state that signed a peace treaty in recognition of Israel, the situation called for a clear policy of engagement, at least at the outset, to ensure a peaceful and secular transition.

Doubts, a necessary consequence of “smart power,” led to the abandonment of a close ally without securing the loyalty of a potential successor.

Presumably, those three examples will have an impact beyond their immediate borders. How will Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, whose defense and/or stability are linked to bilateral agreements with the U.S., respond to erratic American conduct?

To cease being a reliable ally in a multi-polar system is the worst tactic imaginable if you want to preserve international order.