What the Americans Knew About Bin Laden

U.S. cables show that Osama bin Laden was known to intelligence services quite early on. A relative, among others, gave detailed reports.

The banker from Saudi Arabia had been a guest of the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, many times. In 1993, when he was once again talking to the diplomats, he gave reports that were mainly about his younger brother, who had grown close to the mujahedeen Muslim fighters in Afghanistan. The businessman was worried that when his brother returned from Afghanistan, he would break away from his family and turn to extreme Islamic fundamentalism.

The Founder of the al-Qaida Terror Network

The bank manager believed that “Islamic fundamentalists would hardly succeed in a takeover of power in Saudi Arabia.”* He added that the majority of Saudi business people hardly support the aims of Islam. However, there were exceptions: for example, Osama bin Laden, the son of a Saudi business dynasty, who followed the Islamic movements. The businessman stressed once again that bin Laden was “an exception to the general attitudes of most businessmen in Saudi Arabia.” On Jan. 23, 1993, the diplomats cabled the outcome of the talk to Washington.

It is the first time that the subsequent godfather of terror appears in the cables of the U.S. Department of State. In cooperation with the Norwegian newspaper “Aftenposten,” “Die Welt” could search for traces of bin Laden in the 251,000 documents.

As early as one year after bin Laden was mentioned in a talk with the banker, on Nov. 23, 1994, the American Embassy warned in its “annual terrorism report” on Saudi Arabia that bin Laden was being suspected of supporting terrorism in Yemen, Sudan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories.

Doubt in France

At this point, bin Laden had already been living in Sudan for three years. He lost his Saudi citizenship because of his “irresponsible activities, which do not correspond with the interests of the Kingdom and damage our sister nations,”* the Kingdom announced. At the same time, the Americans suspected that he was training terrorists in camps in Sudan. In the cables it states that France, on the other hand, doubted these discoveries. Members of the intelligence services in Paris believed bin Laden to be too poor to be able to support terrorism. However, for the Americans this certainly meant giving terrorists a free hand — supporting terror.

Bin Laden appeared in the Western press for the first time in 1996 when Time magazine interviewed him in Sudan. During a meeting with Ali Osman Taha — Sudan’s former foreign minister — on May 10, 1996, the Americans complained about this interview being allowed to take place. Taha believed that contact with the Western world could help bin Laden see things from another perspective. He pointed out that he could bring bin Laden into contact with Western diplomats in order to evangelize the extremists. In their report, the Americans commented that it would probably be better if bin Laden was extradited to Saudi Arabia than to hope that he would change in talks.

Thus the USA urged Sudan to throw bin Laden out of the country, and Sudan gave in. Once he had arrived in Afghanistan, bin Laden had to ask the council of elders in Jalalabad for permission to live there. When they refused, bin Laden moved on to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, to ask Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — the head of state at the time — for protection. A short while later, when the Taliban took control of Kabul on Sept. 27, 1996, the American Department of State instructed its outpost to convince the Taliban to expel foreign terrorists from the country. Bin Laden’s name got a special mention.

Around the same time, on Sept. 17, 1996, the Saudi Embassy received a description of bin Laden from one of his closest relatives, who had known him since he was a small boy. Bin Laden has 45 brothers and sisters who his father, Mohammed, had with several women. He also has a countless amount of cousins. Around half of his siblings study or live abroad.

His siblings who stayed in Saudi Arabia apparently have “a more conservative outlook on life,” the clan contact said to the Americans. Osama is one of the more conservative bin Ladens. “He is a simple thinker easily influenced by the ideas of others,” the man said. He added that this makes Osama susceptible to extremist religious ideas, which are certainly spread by “foreign agents” in Saudi Arabia.

A “Brainwashing” Missed

The family noticed that about 10 years before — in the mid-‘80s — Osama bin Laden picked up “unusual ideas” while he was still working for the company. At that time, bin Laden gave up life as a businessman because doing business with banks was un-Islamic. During numerous visits to Afghanistan, he came into contact with Egyptian extremists, who — according to the report from his relative — had “brainwashed” him. During his time in Sudan, the Sudanese government apparently supported the black sheep of the family. The government assigned him road construction and agricultural projects. The relative alleged that even Iran helped bin Laden through middlemen, but he apparently avoided being openly associated with the Shiite regime in Tehran, the capital of Iran.

This is not the only trace that leads to Iran. In another cable from August 1998, the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem reported that bin Laden was in close contact with the al-Aqsa Islamic Bank and possibly had shares in the institute. The al-Aqsa Bank in turn belongs to half of the Jordan Islamic Bank, which is in turn owned by Sheikh Saleh Kamel.

Kamel is considered to be the Saudi bin Ladens’ business associate. Many years later another connection to Iran became visible. The consulate had a source in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, who reported in 2009 that for the prior two years Iran had allowed Saudis who were in contact with terrorists and were working against the Kingdom in Riyadh to hide out. Osama’s son Ibrahim was among this group. The government in Riyadh protested, and in the end they signed an agreement with the regime in Tehran. The agreement was that Iran was to cease the procedures that it had so far carried out.

In the long term, the aforementioned family member seemed to be the sole source from bin Laden’s inner circle. In 1996 he believed bin Laden to be near the end of the road, since he was now once again living in the Hindu Kush mountains. Osama told his family that he was willing to return to Saudi Arabia, but in return, the clan was to help him “seek the release of certain political prisoners.” The bin Ladens refused the deal. “He is finished,” the relative said. There was no more direct contact with the family. In the past he is said to have communicated with his Syrian mother during stays in her home country. In the end, the family tried — in vain — to talk to Osama through a 90-year-old uncle in Medina, Saudi Arabia. The U.S. Embassy’s contact allegedly tried everything in a “noticeably open discussion”* to convince the Americans that the powerful bin Laden family had nothing to do with terrorists.

At the same time, the Americans were getting nowhere with the Taliban with their wish to extradite bin Laden. The Taliban were of the opinion that “the Saudi prince” was a “good holy warrior” who should stay in Afghanistan, under the condition that he does not get involved with terrorist attacks against the West or Saudi Arabia. In doing so, the Taliban took no notice of the fact that bin Laden had already threatened to attack American soldiers in Saudi Arabia.

Back in 1998, bin Laden finally turned the world’s attention to himself when he made the remark that all Muslims were allowed to kill all Americans anywhere in the world — regardless of whether they were civilians or soldiers. He made a speech saying that all Muslims must “declare jihad” against U.S. troops. “The jihad fatwa has been proclaimed.”* Madeleine Albright, U.S. secretary of state, immediately gave instruction to her ambassadors to protest against bin Laden’s fatwa. “There are signs that bin Laden is planning an imminent attack on American or Saudi establishments in the Persian Gulf,”* Albright wrote in a cable on May 30, 1998.

Hero of the Poor in the Country

Some two months later, simultaneous bombings were carried out in U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The USA responded with attacks on terrorist camps in Afghanistan and a suspicious powdered milk factory in Sudan where chemical weapons were allegedly being produced. Bin Laden remained unscathed. In the fall the Americans wanted to increase the pressure on the Taliban to force them into extraditing bin Laden. In doing so, they also looked for support from Pakistan, but their ambassador in Islamabad did not even get a meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the matter.

At the same time, the ambassador reported that bin Laden had become the hero of the poor in the country. “90 percent of the people have a very positive opinion of bin Laden and the Taliban”* reported one of the American sources in the densely populated Punjab province. The ambassador resignedly asserted that the Taliban have won the PR war. “Since August they have beaten us to it several times,”* a diplomat wrote in a cable to Washington in January 1999. A Pakistani foundation in Karachi, Pakistan, paid for the propaganda — which was pro-bin Laden and anti-USA — with cheap bin Laden placards, among other things.

In February 1999, the Taliban claimed that bin Laden was not staying in their territory, which the Americans refused to accept. The U.N. Security Council decided on a series of resolutions that would call upon the Taliban to extradite bin Laden. The resolutions showed no effect, but in spring 2001 a rumor circulated that the Taliban wanted to take bin Laden to court in Qatar.

It is not clear whether this was a diversionary tactic or whether the Islamic fundamentalists actually wanted to get rid of their dangerous guest. The USA would rather have taken him to court in America, and ambassador Elizabeth McKune raised this matter with the secretary of state on April 7. On the same day, a delegation of the Taliban arrived in Doha, the capital city of Qatar, possibly to put a similar proposal forward, the USA presumed. However, the secretary of state assured McKune that there was no way there would be such a tribunal against America’s will in his country.

Sept. 12, 2001 was the next time that Osama bin Laden appeared in the cables. It was the day after the attacks on the USA, and the intelligence services were sure that the former businessman was behind the biggest terrorist attack in history.

*Translator’s Note: These quotes, though accurately translated, could not be verified.