Why Should Gadhafi Get Bombed?
Published in Nezavisimaya
(Russia) on 30 March 2011
by Alex Valeriyovych Fenenko (link to original)
(Russia) on 30 March 2011
by Alex Valeriyovych Fenenko (link to original)
Translated from
by Iryna Dzyubynska.
Edited by Amy Wong.
On March 28, U.S. President Barack Obama spoke at the National Defense University in Washington, explaining the reasons for the use of force against Libya: Inability to "turn a blind eye to atrocities;" prevention of destabilization in the region; need to prevent a "humanitarian crisis;" a look at the refusal to use force as a "betrayal" of American values. All these themes were quoted by the Clinton administration and by both Bushes before the invasions of Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. The only difference is that Obama has stressed the impossibility of overthrowing Moammar Gadhafi's regime by way of force.
The U.S. president said that by March 30, complete control over the conduct of the Libyan operation will be transferred to NATO. This decision was taken on March 27 by the NATO Council at the ambassador’s level. The question arises: What prompted the White House to pass control of the Libyan operation so quickly to the collective institutions of NATO? (In the effectiveness of which the American military experts have serious doubts since Kosovo and Afghanistan.)
Experts are inclined to explain the U.S. initiative in carrying out operations against Gadhafi with energy considerations. Libya actually has about 1.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and more than 36 billion barrels of oil. (For comparison: In Kuwait, the proven natural gas reserves are 1.55 trillion cubic meters of oil — about 102 billion barrels). However, it’s impossible to reduce the causes of the Libyan war to energy intrigue. Even NATO's victory will not mean automatic access of foreign companies to Libyan oil and gas fields. If the events in Libya develop like the Iraqi version, it is not clear (1) what costs will require post-war reconstruction of Libyan infrastructure and (2) whether it will be possible in the conditions of permanent war.
The problem gets deeper. Over the past two years, the tendency of EU countries to obtain greater autonomy from NATO has increased. Since the end of the 1980s, in Paris and Rome, the idea of creating a special "zone of responsibility" from the European Community to the Mediterranean Sea has been discussed. The Barcelona Conference in 1995 launched the process of EU cooperation with countries in southern and eastern Mediterranean region. In 1997, France and Italy proposed a special Mediterranean command of the NATO-led EU structures. At that time, Britain and Portugal blocked the project. But in 2008, at the initiative of France, the Mediterranean Union was created. The 43 nations became participants in the new organization, including the remote regions of the EU such as Sweden and the Netherlands. The European Union made an application to build its own regional security zone — independent from America.
The Mediterranean EU initiatives caused some concern in Washington. Officially, the White House did not object against the "Barcelona Process" or against the creation of the Mediterranean Union. Still, American experts saw a disturbing trend in these steps of the EU: the erosion of the transatlantic framework of NATO. The Libyan War gives the U.S. a chance to stop the development of harmful processes for them.
First, the lead role in a military strike against Libya belongs to the Americans. The EU once again lacked the independent resources for military operations. This raises a question of how effective the Mediterranean Union is.
Secondly, the Libyan war establishes the return of France to NATO's military organization. Two years ago, analysts were arguing about whether the French will strengthen the capacity of the tendency for autonomy of the EU within the framework of NATO. Paris now stands not as the main critic but as a privileged ally of the United States.
Thirdly, the participation of the U.S. and Canada in the Libyan war revives the priority of NATO in the matters of response to crisis. After the Second Gulf War in 2003, Western European countries talked about the need to expand the powers of the military mechanism of the EU. The Libyan war, by contrast, proves that as in 1999, the EU countries are not yet capable of solving crisis situations without NATO. The transition leading role in the Libyan operation in NATO proves that the "common European security and defense initiative" remains at the level of declarations for now.
Fourth, the Libyan war can change the ratio of energy potentials. After 2004, significant positions in the Libyan energy market were acquired by an Italian company. Rome presented a project on building gas pipelines from North Africa to southern Europe. The positions of the American and British businesses in the energy sector of Libya were weaker. Possible changes of government in Libya would allow American and British companies to change the situation. Prolonged continuation of hostilities also negates projects with off-path access of the EU’s Mediterranean countries to Libyan energy resources.
In the fall of 2010, American diplomacy had to adopt a new "strategic concept" of NATO to declare a strategy to strengthen transatlantic unity. The Libyan war is a good precedent for this strategy. In the mid-1990s, the Bill Clinton administration successfully used the war in Yugoslavia to save the American military and political presence in Europe. Will the Obama administration be capable of repeating the successful experience of their predecessors with the Libyan conflict?
The U.S. president said that by March 30, complete control over the conduct of the Libyan operation will be transferred to NATO. This decision was taken on March 27 by the NATO Council at the ambassador’s level. The question arises: What prompted the White House to pass control of the Libyan operation so quickly to the collective institutions of NATO? (In the effectiveness of which the American military experts have serious doubts since Kosovo and Afghanistan.)
Experts are inclined to explain the U.S. initiative in carrying out operations against Gadhafi with energy considerations. Libya actually has about 1.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and more than 36 billion barrels of oil. (For comparison: In Kuwait, the proven natural gas reserves are 1.55 trillion cubic meters of oil — about 102 billion barrels). However, it’s impossible to reduce the causes of the Libyan war to energy intrigue. Even NATO's victory will not mean automatic access of foreign companies to Libyan oil and gas fields. If the events in Libya develop like the Iraqi version, it is not clear (1) what costs will require post-war reconstruction of Libyan infrastructure and (2) whether it will be possible in the conditions of permanent war.
The problem gets deeper. Over the past two years, the tendency of EU countries to obtain greater autonomy from NATO has increased. Since the end of the 1980s, in Paris and Rome, the idea of creating a special "zone of responsibility" from the European Community to the Mediterranean Sea has been discussed. The Barcelona Conference in 1995 launched the process of EU cooperation with countries in southern and eastern Mediterranean region. In 1997, France and Italy proposed a special Mediterranean command of the NATO-led EU structures. At that time, Britain and Portugal blocked the project. But in 2008, at the initiative of France, the Mediterranean Union was created. The 43 nations became participants in the new organization, including the remote regions of the EU such as Sweden and the Netherlands. The European Union made an application to build its own regional security zone — independent from America.
The Mediterranean EU initiatives caused some concern in Washington. Officially, the White House did not object against the "Barcelona Process" or against the creation of the Mediterranean Union. Still, American experts saw a disturbing trend in these steps of the EU: the erosion of the transatlantic framework of NATO. The Libyan War gives the U.S. a chance to stop the development of harmful processes for them.
First, the lead role in a military strike against Libya belongs to the Americans. The EU once again lacked the independent resources for military operations. This raises a question of how effective the Mediterranean Union is.
Secondly, the Libyan war establishes the return of France to NATO's military organization. Two years ago, analysts were arguing about whether the French will strengthen the capacity of the tendency for autonomy of the EU within the framework of NATO. Paris now stands not as the main critic but as a privileged ally of the United States.
Thirdly, the participation of the U.S. and Canada in the Libyan war revives the priority of NATO in the matters of response to crisis. After the Second Gulf War in 2003, Western European countries talked about the need to expand the powers of the military mechanism of the EU. The Libyan war, by contrast, proves that as in 1999, the EU countries are not yet capable of solving crisis situations without NATO. The transition leading role in the Libyan operation in NATO proves that the "common European security and defense initiative" remains at the level of declarations for now.
Fourth, the Libyan war can change the ratio of energy potentials. After 2004, significant positions in the Libyan energy market were acquired by an Italian company. Rome presented a project on building gas pipelines from North Africa to southern Europe. The positions of the American and British businesses in the energy sector of Libya were weaker. Possible changes of government in Libya would allow American and British companies to change the situation. Prolonged continuation of hostilities also negates projects with off-path access of the EU’s Mediterranean countries to Libyan energy resources.
In the fall of 2010, American diplomacy had to adopt a new "strategic concept" of NATO to declare a strategy to strengthen transatlantic unity. The Libyan war is a good precedent for this strategy. In the mid-1990s, the Bill Clinton administration successfully used the war in Yugoslavia to save the American military and political presence in Europe. Will the Obama administration be capable of repeating the successful experience of their predecessors with the Libyan conflict?