Bin Laden Was Already Dead Politically
Published in Le Monde
(France) on 2 May 2011
by Alain Frachon (link to original)
(France) on 2 May 2011
by Alain Frachon (link to original)
Translated from
by Sarah Repucci.
Edited by Jenette Axelrod.
Transcript of moderated online chat:
Lan Chi: Will the United States’ strategy in Afghanistan change?
Alain Frachon: Yes and no. Let’s start with the no: For a long time, the al-Qaida networks have no longer exerted much influence in Afghanistan. The links on the ground between the Afghan Taliban and “the Arabs,” as al-Qaida men are called there, are extremely weakened, and this is only be because the latter are no longer present in that country.
But al-Qaida, through the intermediary of certain networks, still may exert influence on certain Taliban groups in Pakistan. The death of bin Laden can only diminish their influence and promote dialogue between the Taliban and the central power in Kabul.
For American public opinion, which doesn’t delve into these complex details, the death of bin Laden will again reduce the feeling that the war in Afghanistan is necessary. In this sense, it will pressure Barack Obama to truly begin a withdrawal of American troops in July of this year, as he promised. He could announce at this date the departure of some 5,000 American soldiers out of the 100,000 that are engaged in Afghanistan.
Al: What will be the consequences of the death of bin Laden on relations between the United States and Pakistan?
That is a complex subject, as are the relations between the two countries. On the one hand, one can point out that the fact that bin Laden was hiding 50 kilometers from the capital, Islamabad, and not in the distant border zones near Afghanistan. This will again heighten suspicions of complicity between the Pakistani secret services and al-Qaida. To say the least, a major complacency of the aforementioned services toward al-Qaida, as it is difficult to make anyone believe that the omnipresent Pakistani services — the ISI — didn’t know that bin Laden might be found in this select neighborhood that shelters numerous high-ranking retired officers.
But one can also point out that there was a Pakistani green light for the American operation and that the operation demonstrates an implicit cooperation from Islamabad with Washington. One can put forth the hypothesis that this operation means that Pakistan, under pressure from an internal situation that is increasingly destabilized, has finally decided to cooperate against radical Islam.
Nicolas: Is it possible that the geopolitical context in the Middle East will change with the death of this “symbol” of Islamic terrorism?
I think that the “Arab spring” — those events that, for the past six months, have been turning the Arab world upside down — meant the end of the attraction that radical Islam — the jihadism put forth by bin Laden — could exert in this part of the world.
Here we see a revolt that is made in the name of democracy and liberty, and not in the name of political Islam, of jihadism, of hatred of the West, of hatred of “crosses and Jews,” all the themes dear to bin Laden.
At no time, no spokesperson for the rebellion — whether in Tunis, Cairo, Damascus, or Benghazi — has declared themselves for bin Laden or al-Qaida. On the contrary. In this sense, it seems to me that bin Laden was politically dead before the American operation that cost him his life in Pakistan.
This doesn’t mean that there are not al-Qaida subsidiaries here and there, in the Maghreb or elsewhere in the Arab or even African world, which will continue to exist and to serve. But the capacity for mobilization and training on jihadist themes, which were those of Bin Laden, has radically diminished during this Arab spring.
Amine: Should we fear an “immediate vengeance” on the part of terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb on people taken to Mali for example?
On this specific point, I don’t know. But the United States, just like the Pakistani government, warned their interlocutors in the United States, and notably in Europe, that reprisals from al-Qaida cells must be expected.
Phil: Won’t the fact that Bin Laden was killed by the Americans simply set him up as a martyr among the most radical and thus reinforce their hatred for the West?
That is probably the case, but once again, the important thing seems to me rather to point out how little attraction jihadist themes have in Arab opinion, judging from the slogans, watchwords and rallying cries that were heard in the Arab spring.
A. Raenhau: The death of bin Laden risks weakening the terrorist influence across the world (already happening since the Arab spring), but isn’t the fear, going forward, the emergence of new terrorist entities or the struggle among them for “power”?
The fear lies in the fact that there are al-Qaida subsidiaries or mini autonomous al-Qaidas that are still operating, we know this, in an arc of crisis that goes from the south of the Maghreb to Sahelian Africa. Those cells, more or less loosely tied to the “mother ship,” continue to exist, without a doubt.
Corentin: Isn’t there a risk that American opinion will again take up hegemonic and interventionist ideas since they are reassured by this “victory for America”?
I don’t think so at all. With the drama that was the war in Iraq, and the Afghan stalemate, American opinion is feeling isolationist. Polls say that a majority of Americans think that the war in Iraq was a mistake and that the one being pursued in Afghanistan is no longer necessary to American security either.
American opinion knows that this overengagement of the country abroad is not separate from the enormous public debt that weighs down the federal budget and largely contributes to the economic difficulties that are facing the United States.
Finally, in Barack Obama, the country has a president who has insisted many times that the United States needs to be devoted to fixing their internal problems rather than projecting their military forces to the four corners of the globe.
Lan Chi: Will the United States’ strategy in Afghanistan change?
Alain Frachon: Yes and no. Let’s start with the no: For a long time, the al-Qaida networks have no longer exerted much influence in Afghanistan. The links on the ground between the Afghan Taliban and “the Arabs,” as al-Qaida men are called there, are extremely weakened, and this is only be because the latter are no longer present in that country.
But al-Qaida, through the intermediary of certain networks, still may exert influence on certain Taliban groups in Pakistan. The death of bin Laden can only diminish their influence and promote dialogue between the Taliban and the central power in Kabul.
For American public opinion, which doesn’t delve into these complex details, the death of bin Laden will again reduce the feeling that the war in Afghanistan is necessary. In this sense, it will pressure Barack Obama to truly begin a withdrawal of American troops in July of this year, as he promised. He could announce at this date the departure of some 5,000 American soldiers out of the 100,000 that are engaged in Afghanistan.
Al: What will be the consequences of the death of bin Laden on relations between the United States and Pakistan?
That is a complex subject, as are the relations between the two countries. On the one hand, one can point out that the fact that bin Laden was hiding 50 kilometers from the capital, Islamabad, and not in the distant border zones near Afghanistan. This will again heighten suspicions of complicity between the Pakistani secret services and al-Qaida. To say the least, a major complacency of the aforementioned services toward al-Qaida, as it is difficult to make anyone believe that the omnipresent Pakistani services — the ISI — didn’t know that bin Laden might be found in this select neighborhood that shelters numerous high-ranking retired officers.
But one can also point out that there was a Pakistani green light for the American operation and that the operation demonstrates an implicit cooperation from Islamabad with Washington. One can put forth the hypothesis that this operation means that Pakistan, under pressure from an internal situation that is increasingly destabilized, has finally decided to cooperate against radical Islam.
Nicolas: Is it possible that the geopolitical context in the Middle East will change with the death of this “symbol” of Islamic terrorism?
I think that the “Arab spring” — those events that, for the past six months, have been turning the Arab world upside down — meant the end of the attraction that radical Islam — the jihadism put forth by bin Laden — could exert in this part of the world.
Here we see a revolt that is made in the name of democracy and liberty, and not in the name of political Islam, of jihadism, of hatred of the West, of hatred of “crosses and Jews,” all the themes dear to bin Laden.
At no time, no spokesperson for the rebellion — whether in Tunis, Cairo, Damascus, or Benghazi — has declared themselves for bin Laden or al-Qaida. On the contrary. In this sense, it seems to me that bin Laden was politically dead before the American operation that cost him his life in Pakistan.
This doesn’t mean that there are not al-Qaida subsidiaries here and there, in the Maghreb or elsewhere in the Arab or even African world, which will continue to exist and to serve. But the capacity for mobilization and training on jihadist themes, which were those of Bin Laden, has radically diminished during this Arab spring.
Amine: Should we fear an “immediate vengeance” on the part of terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb on people taken to Mali for example?
On this specific point, I don’t know. But the United States, just like the Pakistani government, warned their interlocutors in the United States, and notably in Europe, that reprisals from al-Qaida cells must be expected.
Phil: Won’t the fact that Bin Laden was killed by the Americans simply set him up as a martyr among the most radical and thus reinforce their hatred for the West?
That is probably the case, but once again, the important thing seems to me rather to point out how little attraction jihadist themes have in Arab opinion, judging from the slogans, watchwords and rallying cries that were heard in the Arab spring.
A. Raenhau: The death of bin Laden risks weakening the terrorist influence across the world (already happening since the Arab spring), but isn’t the fear, going forward, the emergence of new terrorist entities or the struggle among them for “power”?
The fear lies in the fact that there are al-Qaida subsidiaries or mini autonomous al-Qaidas that are still operating, we know this, in an arc of crisis that goes from the south of the Maghreb to Sahelian Africa. Those cells, more or less loosely tied to the “mother ship,” continue to exist, without a doubt.
Corentin: Isn’t there a risk that American opinion will again take up hegemonic and interventionist ideas since they are reassured by this “victory for America”?
I don’t think so at all. With the drama that was the war in Iraq, and the Afghan stalemate, American opinion is feeling isolationist. Polls say that a majority of Americans think that the war in Iraq was a mistake and that the one being pursued in Afghanistan is no longer necessary to American security either.
American opinion knows that this overengagement of the country abroad is not separate from the enormous public debt that weighs down the federal budget and largely contributes to the economic difficulties that are facing the United States.
Finally, in Barack Obama, the country has a president who has insisted many times that the United States needs to be devoted to fixing their internal problems rather than projecting their military forces to the four corners of the globe.