Washington’s Dance with the AKP and the CHP

Last week, American think tanks held a number of meetings about the elections in Turkey. At every opportunity, I asked the specialists, “Who would win if the election was held in Washington today?” They agreed that the CHP (Republican People’s Party) would have a greater appeal, while they were not sure if the AKP (Justice and Development Party) would stand much of a chance.

One of the most striking analyses of Turkey’s elections came from Dr. Joshua Walker in a panel discussion curated by the Rumi Forum. I myself was the panel’s moderator, and Walker responded to my questions by saying that “the AKP is admired by those within Washington’s foreign policy environment who spend less time analyzing Turkey.” Walker claimed that while not all of the Washington’s foreign policy observers agreed, those who focused on Turkey assumed that the CHP would defeat the AKP by far. Matthew Duss, a specialist with the Center for American Progress, said that “people who look at the issue from a social science point of view understand better what the AKP means for Turkey and for the region, in comparison to those who approach the issue from the national security view.”

There are many reasons why the CHP has remained so popular in Washington for the last ten years, despite their extremely anti-American view. One of the foremost reasons is that those who follow Turkey closely are attached to Kemalism to a certain degree. Turkey specialist Graham Fuller stated that “America probably preferred the old Kemalist government because it was a trustworthy ally and was totally isolated from Islam. The CHP is its natural successor.” He continued, “Washington is still anxious about the role of Islam in politics. They do not want any type of Islamic government.”

This is where the AKP loses the most in the eyes of the U.S. It is a movement with its “roots in Islam” according to a known Western phrase. However, many liberal developments have occurred within the AKP, doubts about the religious attitude of the party and its founding members notwithstanding. Despite the extreme defects of the CHP, including its militaristic character, it is given much more credit for tolerance than the AKP and associated organizations.

Why Moderate Kemalism is Preferred

When it comes to choosing a side between those who are more sensitive to Islam and those who are more secular, Washington has subconsciously leaned towards secularism (which is the CHP party line). According to Fuller, “they believe that secular governments are more likely to favor America than Islamic governments, even if they are moderate.” Could the atmosphere in Washington, where the CHP is favored, be explained by the psychology of “one who falls in the sea holds on to a snake?” In other words, the U.S. supports the CHP merely as part of a strategy to get rid of, or at least weaken, the AKP? Perhaps; I have suggested before that the CHP is treated like a favorite son whose bad behavior is simply ignored by Washington. In Turkey, most of the people who oppose the CHP do so because of its love, not its hatred. The CHP is being criticized for not having more room in its heart for the Turkish people.

Consequently, I can tell that the regime that Washington prefers for Turkey is Kemalism, as interpreted by the CHP for today’s realities. The main reason why Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the new leader of the CHP, has so excited America is that he reinvigorates its hope for Turkey by being a reformist and moderate Kemalist. In this way, it is no surprise that Washington was disappointed by the results of the last election.

The CIA and the White House Do Not Resort to Prejudices

June 12 was, in my opinion, a massive shock for a U.S. State Department that has had very poor and pessimist predictions for Turkey as of late. American foreign policy figures who follow Turkey did not expect that 58 percent of votes would be in favor of the constitutional referendum on June 12, 2007 either. Even some members of the CHP, secretly or openly cooperating with the remaining “white” influence on the Turkish intelligentsia, believed that the referendum would not succeed. The results of June 12, 2011 were not unlike this. The AKP was predicted to be the winning party, but U.S. foreign policy elites still hoped that the CHP could obtain at least 30 percent of the vote. Thus, another failed prediction was added to their thinking, along with Kemalist prejudice and envy of the AKP.

The Pentagon sees Turkey from an even more Kemalist and secular perspective than the State Department. However, there are two places in Washington where I still have hope for accurate analysis: the CIA and the White House. The major advantage of the CIA is that they can do analysis that relies on more humanistic values than other American government institutions; they are able to see the big picture and go beyond prejudices.

The White House is very lucky due in large part to the vision of President Barack Obama. He is one of the first members of the American administration to approach Turkey from the right angle without sinking into Cold War prejudices. He benefits his country by developing close relations with Prime Minister Erdoğan, who is not well liked by Obama’s subordinates. Despite his partial failures, Erdoğan is the most significant contemporary leader in Turkey, a country whose regional and global value has markedly increased in recent years. Additionally, Erdoğan and his party seem to be a gateway into Turkey, at least for the foreseeable future. The elections of June 12 only served to prove that the AKP and the social organizations it draws on will have an essential role in Turkey’s future. Washington should adapt to this reality immediately.