The Afghan Mess
Published in Frankfurter Rundschau
(Germany) on 25 June 2011
by Karl Grohe (link to original)
(Germany) on 25 June 2011
by Karl Grohe (link to original)
Translated from
by Ron Argentati.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
Hillary Clinton tried to put a good face on something that had heretofore been considered relatively bad. The Taliban has now been accepted as a legitimate negotiating partner. It has taken a while for the U.S. government to admit that, but the withdrawal timetable Obama is now trying to pedal to the public would have otherwise had no basis. However, now that Washington has gotten out of the dead end street called Afghanistan, it has driven immediately into another one called Pakistan.
In order to convince its political leadership, a more rigorous pursuit of al-Qaida — or whatever name it now calls itself since bin Laden’s death — is now only possible at the cost of increased conflict with Pakistan’s security service and military. In the triangle consisting of Security-Taliban-Qaida, there are strong connective wires that exist from those days when they swore allegiance to the United States in order to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s civilian government can’t get on the wrong side of the security and military forces. They would fail and with them civil order would also fail. On the other hand, depending on the United States means their position is even more hopeless because they then have to deal with the “collateral damage” caused by unmanned U.S. drone attacks. Two thirds of the Pakistani people already no longer support the “war on terror” as it is.
As prudent as it may be to negotiate with the Taliban, the basis for demonizing them will then disappear — and with it goes the cornerstone for the war’s justification and, ultimately, what’s left of the West’s credibility. Of course, the chaos dates from the Bush era, but Obama inherited his legacy. And in an election year they’ll surely rub his nose in that.
In order to convince its political leadership, a more rigorous pursuit of al-Qaida — or whatever name it now calls itself since bin Laden’s death — is now only possible at the cost of increased conflict with Pakistan’s security service and military. In the triangle consisting of Security-Taliban-Qaida, there are strong connective wires that exist from those days when they swore allegiance to the United States in order to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s civilian government can’t get on the wrong side of the security and military forces. They would fail and with them civil order would also fail. On the other hand, depending on the United States means their position is even more hopeless because they then have to deal with the “collateral damage” caused by unmanned U.S. drone attacks. Two thirds of the Pakistani people already no longer support the “war on terror” as it is.
As prudent as it may be to negotiate with the Taliban, the basis for demonizing them will then disappear — and with it goes the cornerstone for the war’s justification and, ultimately, what’s left of the West’s credibility. Of course, the chaos dates from the Bush era, but Obama inherited his legacy. And in an election year they’ll surely rub his nose in that.