Iraq and the American Withdrawal

The Iraqi file returns once again to top the priorities of American foreign policy after having been knocked off the top spot over the last two years. Perhaps this ‘file’ will become a burden to Obama’s administration in the coming weeks after having been relieved of most of this burden after withdrawing most of the troops from Iraq after the security convention between Washington and Baghdad the previous year.

The date which this convention set out for a complete withdrawal of American forces from Iraq is fast approaching — the end of 2011 — and discussions have already begun about the possibility of this actually happening. In other words, how realistic it is at a time when questions are being raised about the Iraqi forces’ ability to maintain security and to control the country’s borders. Another issue is the impact of the changes recently witnessed in the region on the situation in Iraq, especially if the internal situation in Syria continues.

The Iraqi political blocs disagree about whether the rest of the American forces should stay or withdraw, with their positions varying between threatening to declare war on America if the troops remain (the Sadrist movement) and warning of a civil war breaking out if they withdraw (mostly Kurdish forces). Obama’s administration appears to be alternating between strictly adhering to the convention and withdrawing all the remaining troops and leaving a limited number of them — less than 3,000 — and it could be even less if the Iraqi government requested it.

Despite this, this position is generating opposition from American strategists and politicians, among them some members of Congress, based on the fact that this represents a risk, because 3,000 troops — most of them advisory — are not capable of maintaining stability in Iraq. These people believe that both American and Iraqi interests require the presence of 10,000 to 20,000 troops, down from 46,000, which would constitute all the American troops remaining in Iraq at the moment.

Before the end of 2009, the American military presence was reduced to six brigades whose principal mission was to train the Iraqi security forces, to rehabilitate them and to develop their plan of action. They were also building “trust” amongst Iraqis in sensitive areas where they incorporated some of them into their units in the army on joint patrols or into the security force at checkpoints, etc.

Those against a limited force remaining believe that it will be beyond the powers of such a force to execute such missions or even to undertake the entire training mission. This situation could increase the effectiveness of the armed groups which are still present, albeit weaker than they were in the past. Iran is also encouraging efforts to turn Iraq into an area of influence for itself.

Therefore, perhaps the Obama administration’s final decision about the withdrawal will be based on two specific key factors: the possibility of improving the domestic situation and assessing trends in Iranian politics. However, the most important factor is that the Iraqi government officially requests either a formal amendment to the convention of 2008 or for a new convention to be signed which provides for the use of limited American forces in order to carry out specific missions and for a limited period. Such a request would depend upon the Iraqi political blocs reaching a consensus.

It will not be easy for Obama’s administration to leave forces in Iraq by early next year without a formal request. Equally, it may not be possible for the president of the Iraqi government to bring forward such a request without a broad internal agreement on it and a promise from those who oppose the decision not to take up arms against the remaining forces.

In this case, America’s final position will be linked to what may happen internally in Iraq and surveying what Iran might do in case of a full withdrawal — particularly if it proves impossible to find a solution to the crisis in Syria, and the Assad regime continues to be threatened with collapse, or if it actually collapses. Those two specific factors (the Iraqi interior situation and the Iranian policies toward it) are not fixed. Their effect on America’s final decision-making process concerning full withdrawal or almost complete withdrawal may still be linked to developments in both of them until next month.

At the domestic level, the declining violence in Iraq recently appears to reinforce the tendency to withdraw the remaining American forces or to keep a small number of them there (not more than 3,000). The number could be less than 3,000 if what Fox News and the Times newspaper said to the American secretary of Defense at the start of last September turns out to be correct.

However, opponents of this approach warn of a miscalculation of the violence which still haunts Iraq and an exaggeration in the prediction of a continuation in the decline of the rates of violence for two reasons. The first is a recession in the Iraqi political situation and the inability of the current coalition government to achieve even the minimum level of expected progress. Additionally, the level of rivalry between the two main political parties exists to such an extent that the leaders of the two (Dawlat al Qanoon and Al Qa’ima al Iraqiya) are quarreling and refuse to speak to each other.

The second reason has to do with over-reliance on the abilities of the Iraqi forces alone and the fact that al-Qaida is still holding on in Iraq despite the strong blows it has suffered. This hidden danger requires a force of at least 10,000 soldiers to remain in order to be able to assist the Iraqi forces on the ground (and not just in training them) in times of escalation or intensification of violence. Those who support this approach believe that a force of 3,000 is not sufficient to provide even a minimum level of deterrence.

As for the Iranian influence over the final American decision about Iraq, it is related to the fear of those who oppose a complete or almost complete withdrawal that this could lead to Maliki becoming a prisoner of Tehran and its regional policies and a weakening in his power to maintain the balance between Iran and the U.S. on which he is so keen. That balance helped his survival as prime minister after the last elections, despite the fact that his bloc, Dawlat Al Qanoon, came in second after the Al Qa’ima al Iraquiya bloc.

Iran is playing an increasingly important role in Iraq in the light of the crisis in Syria, as this is as much an Iranian crisis as it is Syrian. Consequently, Tehran has put a great deal of pressure on Maliki’s government to provide economic support to Syria. Those Americans who are calling for a continued active military presence in Iraq are not ruling out that Tehran would strengthen its grip on Iraq in the event of a complete or almost complete withdrawal.

Therefore, although the date for this withdrawal is very close indeed, the final American decision about it may depend on the developments in the internal situation in Iraq and the Iranian policy toward them, as well as the effect of the Syrian crisis on them.