Iraq: "Americans Leave Us the Scourge of Sectarianism"
Published in La Croix
(France) on 16 November 2011
by François d’Alançon (link to original)
(France) on 16 November 2011
by François d’Alançon (link to original)
Translated from
by Courtney Lind.
Edited by Michelle Harris.
The district of Karrada, early November, in central Baghdad. Two bombs exploded in the late afternoon near a barrage of special forces, killing four policemen and a civilian. Two hours later, traffic resumed and merchants reopened their shops. It’s almost a routine for Iraqis, who continue to suffer from daily violence in the form of explosions, armed robbery or kidnapping.
“What can we do?” asked Ali al Tamimi, general manager of a generator distributor, a “business” that is thriving in a country that still suffers from power shortages. “This is part of our daily routine, almost since the arrival of American troops in 2003.”
Less than two months before the troops’ departure, violence is making a spectacular return in the Iraqi capital. By mid-December, most of the 34,000 American troops still in Iraq will have left the country; a silent withdrawal, without fanfare, welcomed by Iraqis with a mixture of satisfaction and concern.
On Mutannabi Street, a secular meeting place of booksellers and intellectuals, the Shahbandar café, devastated by a bomb explosion in 2007, has reopened. “The Americans got rid of Saddam, but they brought the scourge of sectarianism,” said writer and frequent visitor, 57-year-old Nader J., a bit sarcastically.
“Their departure puts an end to more than eight years of occupation, but they are leaving us without repairing the damage they caused. Nothing is regulated in the conflict between the Shiite-dominated government and the Sunni minority, or in the territorial dispute between Kurds and Sunni Arabs. Even small and invisible, the U.S. presence had a deterrent effect.”
Religious Parties Dominate the Scene
On the walls, between the billows of hookah smoke, are black and white photos of pashas from the Ottoman Empire and of King Faisal II, the last king executed during the revolution of July 14, 1958 — memories of the past illustrating an almost golden age. “To be fair, the Iraqis’ trauma does not date back just to the start of the American invasion,” said Nader.
“It all started in the late 1970s with the terror of the Ba’ath Party and the mass graves. Then came the bloody war against Iran and the international sanctions that followed the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The dictatorship of Saddam destroyed our social cohesion and integrity.”
“Today the religious parties dominate the scene, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gives his authoritarian tendencies free rein. The government has done everything it can to suppress Friday’s protests against corruption and inequality, which peaked on Feb. 25 in Tahrir Square.”
Viewed as a sign of intensification, a wave of fierce repression has hit Iraqi journalists. On Sept. 9, Hadi al-Mahdi, host of a popular radio show supported by the protest movement, was murdered by a stranger at his home. “We have as much fear as we did in the Saddam era,” said Ghada al-Amely, director of the newspaper Al-Mada, who is being sued for libel by the capital’s army.
At the end of October, Daniel Smith, an American freelance journalist and contributor to the International Crisis Group (ICG), was released after spending nearly four days in a detention center near Baghdad’s Al Muthana Airport, picked up by security forces in Tahrir Square at the end of the weekly demonstration against the government.
Fate of the “Sons of Iraq”?
Meanwhile, Nouri al-Maliki ordered the arrest of over 600 people — among them many army officers and police — accused of preparing a secret takeover. Dozens of Sunni officers were dismissed or retired on the grounds of having served in the repressive agency of Saddam Hussein, or of association with “terrorists.”
In response to this major campaign of arrests aimed exclusively at the Sunni community, the council of the Sunni province of Salahaddin, north of Baghdad, has declared its intention to become an autonomous region like its neighbor, Kurdistan. Other provinces could make the same request for concessions from the government.
Another source of tension concerns the fate, after the American retreat, of the “sons of Iraq,” the Sunni militiamen, former auxiliaries of the U.S. military against the insurgents. Approximately 50,000 of them continue to serve, despite irregularly paid salaries by the authorities, awaiting hypothetical reclassification by the administration.
Partisan Tensions
“The government fears the reformation of an alliance between former senior members of the Ba’ath Party and al-Qaida,” explained Ehssan al-Shemari, professor of political science at the University of Baghdad. “But this policy exacerbates partisan tensions and brings division within the security forces.”
The al-Qaida network in Iraq currently numbers between 800 and 1,000 members, among them Sunni Arabs coming from the North, West, and Central regions. “The Sunnis ruled the country for 80 years before letting the reins of the country fall to the Shiite majority in 2003, and they have still not accepted it," said Said Ali al-Zou Baidi, a retired Shiite officer.
“The sense of injustice and of marginalization drives them, if not to separatism, then at least to the idea of federalism on a denominational basis. Further, It is necessary to agree on fundamental issues, such as the distribution of oil revenues.”
“What can we do?” asked Ali al Tamimi, general manager of a generator distributor, a “business” that is thriving in a country that still suffers from power shortages. “This is part of our daily routine, almost since the arrival of American troops in 2003.”
Less than two months before the troops’ departure, violence is making a spectacular return in the Iraqi capital. By mid-December, most of the 34,000 American troops still in Iraq will have left the country; a silent withdrawal, without fanfare, welcomed by Iraqis with a mixture of satisfaction and concern.
On Mutannabi Street, a secular meeting place of booksellers and intellectuals, the Shahbandar café, devastated by a bomb explosion in 2007, has reopened. “The Americans got rid of Saddam, but they brought the scourge of sectarianism,” said writer and frequent visitor, 57-year-old Nader J., a bit sarcastically.
“Their departure puts an end to more than eight years of occupation, but they are leaving us without repairing the damage they caused. Nothing is regulated in the conflict between the Shiite-dominated government and the Sunni minority, or in the territorial dispute between Kurds and Sunni Arabs. Even small and invisible, the U.S. presence had a deterrent effect.”
Religious Parties Dominate the Scene
On the walls, between the billows of hookah smoke, are black and white photos of pashas from the Ottoman Empire and of King Faisal II, the last king executed during the revolution of July 14, 1958 — memories of the past illustrating an almost golden age. “To be fair, the Iraqis’ trauma does not date back just to the start of the American invasion,” said Nader.
“It all started in the late 1970s with the terror of the Ba’ath Party and the mass graves. Then came the bloody war against Iran and the international sanctions that followed the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The dictatorship of Saddam destroyed our social cohesion and integrity.”
“Today the religious parties dominate the scene, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gives his authoritarian tendencies free rein. The government has done everything it can to suppress Friday’s protests against corruption and inequality, which peaked on Feb. 25 in Tahrir Square.”
Viewed as a sign of intensification, a wave of fierce repression has hit Iraqi journalists. On Sept. 9, Hadi al-Mahdi, host of a popular radio show supported by the protest movement, was murdered by a stranger at his home. “We have as much fear as we did in the Saddam era,” said Ghada al-Amely, director of the newspaper Al-Mada, who is being sued for libel by the capital’s army.
At the end of October, Daniel Smith, an American freelance journalist and contributor to the International Crisis Group (ICG), was released after spending nearly four days in a detention center near Baghdad’s Al Muthana Airport, picked up by security forces in Tahrir Square at the end of the weekly demonstration against the government.
Fate of the “Sons of Iraq”?
Meanwhile, Nouri al-Maliki ordered the arrest of over 600 people — among them many army officers and police — accused of preparing a secret takeover. Dozens of Sunni officers were dismissed or retired on the grounds of having served in the repressive agency of Saddam Hussein, or of association with “terrorists.”
In response to this major campaign of arrests aimed exclusively at the Sunni community, the council of the Sunni province of Salahaddin, north of Baghdad, has declared its intention to become an autonomous region like its neighbor, Kurdistan. Other provinces could make the same request for concessions from the government.
Another source of tension concerns the fate, after the American retreat, of the “sons of Iraq,” the Sunni militiamen, former auxiliaries of the U.S. military against the insurgents. Approximately 50,000 of them continue to serve, despite irregularly paid salaries by the authorities, awaiting hypothetical reclassification by the administration.
Partisan Tensions
“The government fears the reformation of an alliance between former senior members of the Ba’ath Party and al-Qaida,” explained Ehssan al-Shemari, professor of political science at the University of Baghdad. “But this policy exacerbates partisan tensions and brings division within the security forces.”
The al-Qaida network in Iraq currently numbers between 800 and 1,000 members, among them Sunni Arabs coming from the North, West, and Central regions. “The Sunnis ruled the country for 80 years before letting the reins of the country fall to the Shiite majority in 2003, and they have still not accepted it," said Said Ali al-Zou Baidi, a retired Shiite officer.
“The sense of injustice and of marginalization drives them, if not to separatism, then at least to the idea of federalism on a denominational basis. Further, It is necessary to agree on fundamental issues, such as the distribution of oil revenues.”