Pakistan and the United States Are in an Ignored War

Pakistan and the United States are at war, a war unrecognized and undeclared but still not muffled. In international strategic calculations, the two countries continue to be loyal allies. But nothing is as it was between them — not just since Sept. 11 but going much further back, since the dictatorship of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, a dedicated and conscientious friend to Washington. Relations between the two countries soured because of the Taliban. Pakistan, a country far from being homogeneous and constantly seeking internal equilibrium, more and more came to resemble an Islamic regime. It has never been free from its dual role since the Taliban, or “students of theology,” emerged victorious from the chaos that enveloped pro-American and pro-Saudi fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan after the expulsion of Soviet troops.

The Pakistani military sector and secret police maintained their support of Islamic mercenaries through the Taliban. Their own [Pakistani] Taliban were not born sworn enemies of the United States; they continued to participate in talks after the “students of theology” had started to govern Kabul, even though their regime was not recognized by the U.N.

The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 qualitatively altered the situation. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to “hunt Bin Laden” removed the Taliban from the government of Kabul, but it could not liquidate the group, whose main bases continued to be located in Pakistan, with the support of the country. The war of resistance against the NATO invasion of Afghanistan over time diluted differences between various fundamentalist groups, making tenuous the boundaries that differentiate the Taliban, al-Qaida and regional separatist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The attack to execute bin Laden, carried out this year by U.S. special operations forces in Pakistani territory, catapulted to the surface the ill feelings between Islamabad and Washington. They traded mutual threats of retaliation; and Pakistani unhappiness over the frequent NATO military operations in its territory, under the pretext of combating the Taliban, raised the level of contention between the two allies. One signal that leaves no doubt about the level of instability of ties within the region was from the government of Hamid Karzai, installed and sustained by the United States, when Karzai said that he would take Pakistan’s side in the case of a war with the U.S.

The latest in a “forest of mistakes” — which NATO troops seem to get lost in during operations with terrifying frequency — was a scene that dealt a new blow to the alliance. It was not only that a group of children was slain in an attack by NATO troops as a consequence of an “error” in identifying targets; the “mistake” was more extensive: Helicopters and other heavy vehicles advanced inside Pakistan — saying that the border was “poorly marked” — and attacked Pakistani military posts, resulting in the death of at least 28 soldiers. They had been caught off guard because “allies” were not supposed to do what they did. The United States, as usual after the job is done, distributed apologies in all directions. But the problem will still leave marks because there is no power in Islamabad that could resist and stand by with arms crossed in the face of the seriousness of this humiliation.

Pakistan makes sure that NATO has maps in its possession with all Pakistani military posts very well identified. And to further ensure that no possible mistakes could occur from the use of more archaic maps, there is the GPS system of the world’s most powerful army. For these reasons, the Pakistani military has advised the United States to vacate pilotless airplanes (drones) from bases in northeast Pakistan and told Washington that they will close supply routes and end supplies to NATO, which are very important for the war against the Taliban. This is not something one sees in relations between allies. We are, without doubt, facing a scenario of war.