Israeli Strategic Coordination: The US in the Case of an Israeli Operation against Iran

If and when the Israeli government decides to use its efforts and the efforts of its military to stop Iran’s nuclear program, it will first need to answer another vital question: Is there anything significant in this effort to officially request a green light from the U.S. government or that would play the role of a call to arms for Americans?

In a speech on Dec. 2, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, stressed the obvious need for Israel to work with the United States to foil the threat of the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program. This declaration by the defense secretary comes amid growing U.S. concerns about possible Israeli actions against Iran in the future to put a stop to their nuclear program. U.S. Army Chief of Staff Martin Dempsey gave his opinion in a speech a week ago: The state of Iran is clear. Although they frequently try to hide it, the moment of truth is approaching at a rapid pace. At the center of the situation, there is the fact that Iran continues to work actively to achieve military nuclear capability. Before the eyes of everyone, it has become apparent that the steps taken in recent years by Western countries in general and the United States in particular, designed to dissuade Iran from continuing to develop its nuclear program, did not work. The latest report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) gave an unequivocal picture of this situation.

The United States is well aware of this situation. It can be assumed that it understands very well that the continued activity against Iran at its current level will not prevent it from continuing to develop its nuclear capability. President Obama’s administration, like its predecessor, has declared very emphatically that Iran cannot get nuclear weapons, and that all options to prevent this, including the military option, are on the table. As far as we can tell, it is clear that the U.S. government has no real intention to use the military option to stop the Iranian nuclear program. Carried to the logical extreme, this means that President Obama’s administration would rather Iran get nuclear weapons rather than risk a military operation against them.

This situation leaves Israel in a fateful dilemma in the coming months: It recognizes the practical possibility that Iran will turn into a country with nuclear capability, unless it tries to foil this option by a military operation carried out alone. As mentioned, according to the testimony of the defense minister, Barak, Israel tried over a year ago to thwart the Iranian nuclear project.

If and when Israel decides to work alone, taking a military stand against Iran, there will be another difficult dilemma: Should it coordinate positions with the U.S. administration before the operation? In practice, the specific question is whether Israel will have to ask for a “green light” from President Obama’s administration for a military operation against Iran. This issue will be discussed later only in the political context, when the premise is basically whether Israel is able to achieve a military operation against Iran without the need of a call to the U.S. to do so. The dilemma of Israel will be, in this context, conflicting and even sometimes contradictory.

In recent months, the leaders of the United States have said in public, and almost certainly in the closed meetings too, that the United States rejects the Israeli military operation against Iran. The meaning of the matter is that if Israel tried for clarification, whether directly or indirectly, either explicitly or by hinting about the “green light,” it is almost certain that the answer will be completely negative, in a manner that does not leave room for doubt. The administration of President Obama presumbably will not run the risk of creating an image, albeit implicit, as one who created the understanding that Israel has a “green light” for a military operation in Iran.

Israel’s demand for a “permit” for the military operation must be raised to the top political leadership, the U.S. president. If Israel asks for a green light from the administration, and receives, as should be expected, a completely negative answer, its freedom to maneuver will be reduced and the political risk involved in the military operation will become more serious. Therefore, it is starting to process the effects of long-term strategy at odds with the position of its main, and perhaps only, ally. Under the circumstances is difficult to understand what the benefit would arise from this for Israel.

It should be assumed that Prime Minister Netanyahu would not receive an “implicit green light” for a military operation, as Prime Minister Eshkol received from President Johnson on the eve of the Six-Day War. It certainly would not receive an “explicit green light” as, according to various sources, Prime Minister Olmert received from President Bush on the eve of the attack on the nuclear facility in Syria. That position will be very similar to that of David Ben-Gurion on the eve of the Suez War, when it was clear to him that the military campaign against Egypt would led to a negative reaction from the U.S., and perhaps more similar to the situation on the eve of the day Menachem Begin bombed the reactor in Iraq.

Besides, Israel can assume that if the military operation in Iran fails, and the Iranian and regional response places them in a situation of serious security threat, the U.S. administration will not leave it to its fate as punishment for acting contrary to its wishes for the following reasons: The network of special relationships that have evolved over many years between the two countries; unequivocal statements of high-ranking members of the administration about the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel; fear that the United States failing to support Israel will force Israel to use the “strategic deterrence” in their hands; awareness that public opinion and Congress put heavy pressure on the administration not to abandon the State of Israel in difficult moments; and the fear that many voters, including Jews and allies of Israel, will turn their backs on the president in the coming elections.

The bottom line is, if and when the government of Israel reaches the conclusion that it must go it alone, militarily, to stop the continued development of Iran’s nuclear program, it will have to answer another critical question: Whether it should formally request a “green light” from the U.S. administration or to do it without receiving permission from the U.S. to do so. It seems that under the circumstances, a “request for authorization” to a narrow part of the administration is very serious work for the freedom of Israel, and may even deprive them of the ability to conduct the operation. The Israeli government must assume that, in any case, the U.S. administration will come out with statements against the Israeli military operation in Iran.

The actual nature of the U.S. reaction will be affected in large measure, of course, by the extent of the success of the Israeli operation. If it’s “clean,” in the sense that the operation foils the Iranian nuclear project and does not involve heavy losses for both parties, and Iran’s reaction is not erratic, the United States may condemn Israel for diving into the military operation and its own plan without the political steps against Iran being exhausted. In practice, almost certainly, the United States will be satisfied that the mission was carried out by others. If the operation fails, Israel must take into account not only its denunciation by the U.S. and internationally, but perhaps even punitive steps as well, perhaps on the pattern of those taken by the administration of President Reagan in the wake of the attack in Iraq.

The administration’s reaction will also almost certainly be affected by the behavior of the Netanyahu government before and during the process. If it really is, as it can be assumed, that Israel showed or will show the U.S. administration at the highest levels that they are willing to go it alone in military action against Iran, with commitment to the security of its citizens, the wrath of the administration will be reduced to a mere formality. If they feel any anger for Israel, the anger would be accompanied by a sense that Israel misled the U.S. In any case, it can be assumed as well that if Israel decides to act, it will ensure that the president and the U.S. administration are the first to receive reports on the process, and in real time.