The Iranian Danger as Drawn by America

Much is said and written about Iran after the Shah and the first Islamic revolution of the modern era. Some say that the changes that happened were a result of mostly internal rather than external factors, since Iran witnessed important political transformations after gearing toward the construction of a mixed system of religious and democratic values. The system is consolidated in accordance with the arrival of two powers: the executive and the representative (by means of the voting booth). This matter forced Iran to accept the principle of trading in power, as well as the freedom and plurality of the press, and it continues to spawn political platforms and factions that present different ideological and political programs and directions in front of Iran. This is manifest in the great, visible split in Iran between the reformist and conservative tendencies. Each one of these two tendencies includes a wide spectrum of directions, groups and personalities.

Some find that the system, nevertheless, did not represent a model of freedom and citizenship, nor did it create safeguards for human rights within a country of various ethnicities, since Kurdish and Azeri nationalism and denominational and religious sects face obvious persecution under the ruling majority. Instead of working to treat these problems, the system focused — and continues to focus — on building the military forces and developing weapons, thereby giving the impression to the countries in the region that what happened in Iran did not essentially change anything about the Shah’s system in terms of the postures of Iran’s new rulers vise-a-vie the outside world, and, to be precise, the tendencies and the ambitions of the region. The only thing that changed, from this perspective, is that the Iran of the Shah tended to try and realize Iran’s ambitions in the region by cooperating with the United States — since the enemies of this regime called it the guardian of American interests in the region — whereas the new regime is searching for a way to impose its hegemony or share it with the other power.

Suffice it to say that Iranian regional policy is based on needs and interests and on searching for regional hegemony instead of constructive cooperation. Moreover, it sometimes practices pragmatism, in order to steer clear of conflicts involving ideological beliefs and declared political slogans.

In what pertains to Iraq, it was clear since the beginning of the occupation by America that Iran almost welcomed the occupation; this despite its declared enmity to America — which [Iran] nicknamed after the Shah’s era the Great Satan — because Iran (the rulers) viewed the weakening of Iraq as a necessary factor in maintaining a balance of power in the region. Still, Iran only favored a weakened Iraq, not a partition, because the demographics for Iran are threatened by the establishment of a Kurdish state in the region of Kurdish Iraq. However, the claim that America’s exit from Iraq is leading to a change in this country toward an Iranian occupation is exaggerated.

It is true that in Iraq, Iranian goods are sold everywhere and you can see Iranian pilgrims and tourists everywhere. Likewise, it is possible to see the Iranian flag, which flies over the Iranian Consulate, from every corner in Basra in southern Iraq and in the Kurdish capital, Irbil. But it is also true that the Arabs of Iraq, despite most of them belonging to the Shi’a sect, nevertheless constitute a single element that remains standing firm and able to stop the Iranian extension into Iraq. Furthermore, this is not a result of the American forces alone, but rather from a national Iraqi inclination, on the one hand, and arrogance and the Iranian tendency to hate Arabs, on the other hand. Likewise, many of the current politicians that spent time in exile in Iran have experienced the foolish ideology and nationalist arrogance coming from the side of their Iranian sponsors. Therefore, this being the case, it is certain that a majority of the Iraqis realize well enough that a change from the Americans to the Iranians is not the preferred solution. This is in addition to the fact that in Iraq there are national political gangs that realize that terrorizing Iraqis with occupation and Iranian control is an American construction. It’s essentially a way of keeping Iraq — and then, through Iraq, the entire region — in a state of apprehension and instability under the influence of Iran’s ambitions. Despite the existence of security agreements with Washington, it was able to incite the countries of the Gulf and to terrorize the locals with the Iranian danger after the withdrawal from Iraq. It is clear that the withdrawal, without any gains left behind, bodes well for the fall of America’s regional strategy.

We said in another article that “we are in between the American and Iranian dangers” — dangers obscured by the fact that the smartest stances are losing sureness. Iran’s failure to look after the interests shared between itself and the countries and peoples of the region is not a matter of popular will. Rather, this failure is a determination made outside of these popular aspirations, even when a comparison takes place between the danger of the global hegemonic power and Iranian power. This comparison is made — with the first directives — in harmony with the interests of decision-makers in several countries in the region when one of them poses the question to the reader: Are you with the American plan, which seeks to redraw the regional map from the outside, or do you stand with the Iranian plan, which seeks to internally undermine the states in the region? If we take historical considerations into account, as well as the geographical rights and the interest of the peoples of the region in freedom, independence, and progress, logic says that there is more than one option for standing against the Iranian plan with minimal loss; however, Westerners believe that accompanying the American project is the lesser of two evils! And this view takes hold by playing with emotional strings and stoking passions over sensitive issues. The hegemonic power knows its motivational influence, and as a result, these stances yield apparently adverse results, for the good of the intolerant current in Iran, opening the way for a reconciliation of opponents at the expense of the ambitions of the people, for freedom of choicethe Iranian people.

The present shared interests and progressivism among us and between us and Iran are plentiful, since we need to be together — by concentrating on collective things and supporting them — a power to size up against the greedy strangers who are really exploiting our peoples. But we recognize that the strangers — and first among them America — encourage talk about the points of difference and what is transmitted as a source of tension, and that the American focus on the danger of Iran to the region general, and in particular on Iraq, is interference within this program. Even if the presence of an Iranian danger — considering the behaviors of the current regime — is forced down our throats, then the opportunities to treat and face this danger by expressing goodwill to the people of the region is much easier. We have nothing to lose. It is possible to terminate these dangers for the good of true stability in the region, without the interference of a third party.