The US and Its “Banana Republic” Treatment of China

The political firestorm sparked by the case of Chinese dissident Chen Guangchen is an example of how the United States cannot seem to shed its traditional Banana Republic syndrome, which is now more evident than ever with regard to its treatment of China.

Neither of the two nations likes to admit as much, yet both key powers are far from wanting to be thought of resembling a system that the United States has historically employed with nations of a lesser caliber. It is most often characterized by fruit exports, especially of bananas, and is where the disparaging concept, “Banana Republic,” was coined. It is most likely today’s most telling expression of neo-colonialism.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic skirmishes around the Chinese dissident, who came out against his country’s birth control policy and was about to obtain asylum in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, show how the powerful northern superpower has yet to abandon the methodology of infiltration that it used to use in the good ole days of the anti-Soviet Cold War.

Crude one minute and sophisticated the next, America’s penetration efforts to destabilize and ultimately conquer China have turned into a tumultuous nightmare.

The central historical theme unfolds (plays out) after a long and bloody war and the failed American efforts to unify the two Koreas under a Western model, which meant ultimately a loss to China. This monumental defeat resulted in deep scars that now lie forgotten in the State Department and the Pentagon’s “Black Box.” Underlying the disruption of the consolidation of communist China was an ever-present strategic concept: war equals occupation.

During the years in which it took place, 1950-1953, the Asian giant was not like Greece, which was on the verge of turning socialist near the end of the Second World War. Not even the most fervent Greek partisans could compare to the 30-year struggle of Chinese communists under Mao and Kin Biao.

Given the radius of action and the times, the Korean War resulted in more victims than the Second World War, which spanned various continents and lasted almost 7 years. It was perhaps the most defining war in political terms because it turned into a conflict between Western nations in pursuit of supremacy whilst the rest of the nations were effectively opposed to said supremacy. It’s that simple. The impact of the Second World War (1939-1945) was all too fresh in the collective memory of its nations and inhabitants to warrant any other interpretation of the Korean War.

For many years, the repercussions stemming from the damage of having won a piece of Korea and losing China were largely underestimated by the U.S., who led the isolation and brutal harassment of a country already devastated by a long war and a Japanese occupation. Maximum exponent and “Cold Warrior” Richard Nixon ultimately woke up United States’ foreign policy in order to build a plan to get China back.

It was all is part of an international geometric scheme to contain the other anti-capitalist monster: the Soviet Union. When the U.S. opened the floodgates and China became part of the United Nations (1971), it occurred in the midst of significant internal tension brought on by the Cultural Revolution (1966- 1976). China’s joining the international system after 22 years of total isolation with the exception of the Soviet block alleviated the pressure felt by both Chinese adversaries: the one wanting to keep Mao’s socialist precepts and the other advocating for China’s integration with the rest of the world.

Naturally, the current situation in 2012 is totally different and forms part of the new paradigm: the desire to see China relegated into a second world power on all global levels, along with the risks and opportunities that go with that.

This means having to accept that the other power will do everything possible not to have its predominance challenged, in spite of domestic political policy. This was the lesson that the U.S. learned with the ex-Soviet Union and which brought about a radical change in foreign policy, wherein the U.S. would never again allow another major nation to get in its way. Presently, Western pressure to modify the Chinese political regime is nothing but a blatant pretext to destabilize China and take advantage of the resulting situation to gain ground in the pursuit of supremacy.

In other areas, however, there are paths to better cooperation. It is estimated that 22 percent of foreign students in the U.S. come from China. There are 157,000 students now circulating within the university system, a figure that has been steadily increasing more than 10 percent annually over the past decade. There are even militant communist party students that have been accepted as part of exchange programs in scientific fields.

Officially recognized espionage activity between China and the U.S. has resulted in a direct correlation to the pressure for China to open up. In 2002, Chinese analyst Wan Jisi, renowned in both camps, wrote in the Japan Center for International Exchanges publication, ”China-Japan-U.S. Relations,” that the U.S. would take advantage of any circumstance in order to delegitimize the Chinese leadership and destabilize the country at any cost.