The American Predicament and Syrian Obstinacy

Despite statements released in Turkey by U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in which she pledged to hasten the end of al-Assad’s regime and to halt the spilling of blood of Syria, a true resolution may still be a ways off. Observers noted that the American delegation, headed by Clinton, did not include high-ranking military officials who would have been able to debate and discuss workable plans for implementing both the penultimate and final stage of al-Assad’s rule.

According to analysts, the prevailing belief is that America has not yet broken from its pattern of cyclical indecision regarding Syria. The U.S. government has not yet fully decided to intervene, nor outlined the steps for a potential intervention.

In analyzing the U.S. response, it is very important to examine the reality of the situation in Syria, as well as possible methods of dealing with the country’s current issues, from a Western point of view.

Early last week, the French envoy to the U.N. announced that the Security Council would appoint a new envoy to succeed Kofi Annan in his mission. Some are certain that it will be the long-standing diplomat al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi.

Although al-Ibrahimi’s capabilities and his understanding of the political situation in the Middle East will undoubtedly be powerful assets, his appointment nevertheless sent a clear message to the international community: It is imperative to reach an agreement on the Syrian crisis in order to allow al-Ibrahimi the leeway necessary for him to be effective. If no consensus is reached regarding the implementation of Annan’s original six-point peace plan, al-Ibrahimi (and any future envoy) will have no hope of success.

As long as Russia and China are committed to standing by Syria, al-Ibrahimi will undoubtedly follow in the footsteps of the man who preceded him.

Indeed, the U.N. Security Council’s swift selection of al-Ibrahimi, a process that did not include establishing his specific method of action, indicates that al-Ibrahmi’s appointment was a stalling tactic by the U.S. and the EU, rather than a genuine vote of confidence.

The Lebanese have conducted two experiments to examine American politics and processes. The first was conducted by Philip Habib. Working with French and Lebanese mediators, he oversaw negotiations between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel — to the tune of Israeli bombs, guns and planes. He ran negotiations while the iron was hot. The second experiment occurred in 1989, when al-Ibrahimi worked with the Lebanese to facilitate the Taif Agreement regarding Syrian artillery and the Elimination War.

In Syria, the military opposition is not able to exert pressure on the regime. On the contrary, the upper hand belongs to the Syrian army, which is still cohesive and retains the power with which it can continue to manage operations.

Despite increasing escalation of violence, ruin and destruction, opposition forces cannot find a geographical area in which to organize. Such a stronghold would allow them to prepare continuous military operations by which to attack the capital Damascus, as occurred in Benghazi. What happened in Benghazi would not have succeeded had there not been a no-fly zone, which is absent in Syria at present and for the foreseeable future. Western military intelligence says that the implementation of a no-fly zone over Syria requires finding a geographical area to protect. Idlib would be a typical example and ideal choice, as it lies close to the Turkish border and on the outskirts of the economic capital of Aleppo.

A no-fly zone over the whole of Syria exceeds military reckonings for several reasons, the most important of which is the makeup of the Syrian army. Its forces are more than fully equipped: It possesses sixty MiG-29 jet fighters, as well as 30 training planes of the same model. In addition, as a result of Syria’s hostile relations with Israel, the army possesses an advanced missile system as well as a modern array of Russian artillery.

It is true that the West possesses the most advanced military technology and a density of firepower that Syria could not hold out against. However, the U.S. and the EU are suffering economic troubles, and costly military operations would not be seen as fiscally responsible. There is also the issue of the upcoming presidential election in the U.S. Given the willful antagonism that characterizes both candidates’ campaigns, the current administration has no desire to distract from the existing issues by suggesting further military activity overseas. As a result, is it unlikely that either the U.S. or NATO will be willing to intervene as they did in Libya.

Furthermore, Syria remains a spearhead of the Iran-Russia-China axis. The trio of states has announced that it will not allow matters in Syria to descend to the same level as in Libya.

Consequently, the choices available to the West are limited to the following:

• Close all Syrian borders with Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.

• Implement a water siege on the grounds of enforcing sanctions and not allowing reinforcements to reach the regime.

• Increase communications with Syrian military leaders and encourage them to defect. This option undoubtedly appeals to the fact that the U.S. wants to remove al-Assad, but does not want the entire regime to fall. Therefore, it is preferable to allow a military coup or total military defection. However, so far America hasn’t given a guarantee to Syria’s military leaders that it will deal with them if they do accomplish a coup. These leaders will critically weigh such a guarantee, along with international attitudes, before deciding to retire or disappear.